Chapter 59 1837
INAUGURAL ADDRESS. 
Fellow Citizens: The practice of all my predecessors imposes on me an obligation I cheerfully fulfill  to accompany the first and solemn act of my public trust with an avowal of the principles that will guide me in performing it and an expression of my feelings on assuming a charge so responsible and vast. In imitating their example I tread in the footsteps of illustrious men, whose superiors it is our happiness to believe are not found on the executive calendar of any country. Among them we recognize the earliest and firmest pillars of the Republic  those by whom our national independence was first declared, him who above all others contributed to establish it on the field of battle, and those whose expanded intellect and patriotism constructed, improved, and perfected the inestimable institutions under which we live. If such men in the position I now occupy felt themselves overwhelmed by a sense of gratitude for this the highest of all marks of their country's confidence, and by a consciousness of their inability adequately to discharge the duties of an office so difficult and exalted, how much more must these considerations affect one who can rely on no such claims for favor or forbearance! Unlike all who have preceded me, the Revolution that gave us existence as one people was achieved at the period of my birth; and whilst I contemplate with grateful reverence that memorable event, I feel that I belong to a later age and that I may not expect my countrymen to weigh my actions with the same kind and partial hand. 
So sensibly, fellow-citizens, do these circumstances press themselves upon me that I should not dare to enter upon my path of duty did I not look for the generous aid of those who will be associated with me in the various and coordinate branches of the Government; did I not repose with unwavering reliance on the patriotism, the intelligence, and the kindness of a people who never yet deserted a public servant honestly laboring in their cause; and, above all, did I not permit myself humbly to hope for the sustaining support of an ever-watchful and beneficent Providence. 
To the confidence and consolation derived from these sources it would be ungrateful not to add those which spring from our present fortunate condition. Though not altogether exempt from embarrassments that disturb our tranquillity at home and threaten it abroad, yet in all the attributes of a great, happy, and flourishing people we stand without a parallel in the world. Abroad we enjoy the respect and, with scarcely an exception, the friendship of every nation; at home, while our Government quietly but efficiently performs the sole legitimate end of political institutions  in doing the greatest good to the greatest number  we present an aggregate of human prosperity surely not elsewhere to be found. 
How imperious, then, is the obligation imposed upon every citizen, in his own sphere of action, whether limited or extended, to exert himself in perpetuating a condition of things so singularly happy! All the lessons of history and experience must be lost upon us if we are content to trust alone to the peculiar advantages we happen to possess. Position and climate and the bounteous resources that nature has scattered with so liberal a hand  even the diffused intelligence and elevated character of our people  will avail us nothing if we fail sacredly to uphold those political institutions that were wisely and deliberately formed with reference to every circumstance that could preserve or might endanger the blessings we enjoy. The thoughtful framers of our Constitution legislated for our country as they found it. Looking upon it with the eyes of statesmen and patriots, they saw all the sources of rapid and wonderful prosperity; but they saw also that various habits, opinions, and institutions peculiar to the various portions of so vast a region were deeply fixed. Distinct sovereignties were in actual existence, whose cordial union was essential to the welfare and happiness of all. Between many of them there was, at least to some extent, a real diversity of interests, liable to be exaggerated through sinister designs; they differed in size, in population, in wealth, and in actual and prospective resources and power; they varied in the character of their industry and staple productions, and [in some] existed domestic institutions which, unwisely disturbed, might endanger the harmony of the whole. Most carefully were all these circumstances weighed, and the foundations of the new Government laid upon principles of reciprocal concession and equitable compromise. The jealousies which the smaller States might entertain of the power of the rest were allayed by a rule of representation confessedly unequal at the time, and designed forever to remain so. A natural fear that the broad scope of general legislation might bear upon and unwisely control particular interests was counteracted by limits strictly drawn around the action of the Federal authority, and to the people and the States was left unimpaired their sovereign power over the innumerable subjects embraced in the internal government of a just republic, excepting such only as necessarily appertain to the concerns of the whole confederacy or its intercourse as a united community with the other nations of the world. 
This provident forecast has been verified by time. Half a century, teeming with extraordinary events, and elsewhere producing astonishing results, has passed along, but on our institutions it has left no injurious mark. From a small community we have risen to a people powerful in numbers and in strength; but with our increase has gone hand in hand the progress of just principles. The privileges, civil and religious, of the humblest individual are still sacredly protected at home, and while the valor and fortitude of our people have removed far from us the slightest apprehension of foreign power, they have not yet induced us in a single instance to forget what is right. Our commerce has been extended to the remotest nations; the value and even nature of our productions have been greatly changed; a wide difference has arisen in the relative wealth and resources of every portion of our country; yet the spirit of mutual regard and of faithful adherence to existing compacts has continued to prevail in our councils and never long been absent from our conduct. We have learned by experience a fruitful lesson  that an implicit and undeviating adherence to the principles on which we set out can carry us prosperously onward through all the conflicts of circumstances and vicissitudes inseparable from the lapse of years. 
The success that has thus attended our great experiment is in itself a sufficient cause for gratitude, on account of the happiness it has actually conferred and the example it has unanswerably given. But to me, my fellow-citizens, looking forward to the far-distant future with ardent prayers and confiding hopes, this retrospect presents a ground for still deeper delight. It impresses on my mind a firm belief that the perpetuity of our institutions depends upon ourselves; that if we maintain the principles on which they were established they are destined to confer their benefits on countless generations yet to come, and that America will present to every friend of mankind the cheering proof that a popular government, wisely formed, is wanting in no element of endurance or strength. Fifty years ago its rapid failure was boldly predicted. Latent and uncontrollable causes of dissolution were supposed to exist even by the wise and good, and not only did unfriendly or speculative theorists anticipate for us the fate of past republics, but the fears of many an honest patriot overbalanced his sanguine hopes. Look back on these forebodings, not hastily but reluctantly made, and see how in every instance they have completely failed. 
An imperfect experience during the struggles of the Revolution was supposed to warrant the belief that the people would not bear the taxation requisite to discharge an immense public debt already incurred and to pay the necessary expenses of the Government. The cost of two wars has been paid, not only without a murmur, but with unequaled alacrity. No one is now left to doubt that every burden will be cheerfully borne that may be necessary to sustain our civil institutions or guard our honor or welfare. Indeed, all experience has shown that the willingness of the people to contribute to these ends in cases of emergency has uniformly outrun the confidence of their representatives. 
In the early stages of the new Government, when all felt the imposing influence as they recognized the unequaled services of the first President, it was a common sentiment that the great weight of his character could alone bind the discordant materials of our Government together and save us from the violence of contending factions. Since his death nearly forty years are gone. Party exasperation has been often carried to its highest point; the virtue and fortitude of the people have sometimes been greatly tried; yet our system, purified and enhanced in value by all it has encountered, still preserves its spirit of free and fearless discussion, blended with unimpaired fraternal feeling. 
The capacity of the people for self-government, and their willingness, from a high sense of duty and without those exhibitions of coercive power so generally employed in other countries, to submit to all needful restraints and exactions of municipal law, have also been favorably exemplified in the history of the American States. Occasionally, it is true, the ardor of public sentiment, outrunning the regular progress of the judicial tribunals or seeking to reach cases not denounced as criminal by the existing law, has displayed itself in a manner calculated to give pain to the friends of free government and to encourage the hopes of those who wish for its overthrow. These occurrences, however, have been far less frequent in our country than in any other of equal population on the globe, and with the diffusion of intelligence it may well be hoped that they will constantly diminish in frequency and violence. The generous patriotism and sound common sense of the great mass of our fellow-citizens will assuredly in time produce this result; for as every assumption of illegal power not only wounds the majesty of the law, but furnishes a pretext for abridging the liberties of the people, the latter have the most direct and permanent interest in preserving the landmarks of social order and maintaining on all occasions the inviolability of those constitutional and legal provisions which they themselves have made. 
In a supposed unfitness of our institutions for those hostile emergencies which no country can always avoid their friends found a fruitful source of apprehension, their enemies of hope. While they foresaw less promptness of action than in governments differently formed, they overlooked the far more important consideration that with us war could never be the result of individual or irresponsible will, but must be a measure of redress for injuries sustained, voluntarily resorted to by those who were to bear the necessary sacrifice, who would consequently feel an individual interest in the contest, and whose energy would be commensurate with the difficulties to be encountered. Actual events have proved their error; the last war, far from impairing, gave new confidence to our Government, and amid recent apprehensions of a similar conflict we saw that the energies of our country would not be wanting in ample season to vindicate its rights. We may not possess, as we should not desire to possess, the extended and ever-ready military organization of other nations; we may occasionally suffer in the outset for the want of it; but among ourselves all doubt upon this great point has ceased, while a salutary experience will prevent a contrary opinion from inviting aggression from abroad. 
Certain danger was foretold from the extension of our territory, the multiplication of States, and the increase of population. Our system was supposed to be adapted only to boundaries comparatively narrow. These have been widened beyond conjecture; the members of our Confederacy are already doubled, and the numbers of our people are incredibly augmented. The alleged causes of danger have long surpassed anticipation, but none of the consequences have followed. The power and influence of the Republic have risen to a height obvious to all mankind; respect for its authority was not more apparent at its ancient than it is at its present limits; new and inexhaustible sources of general prosperity have been opened; the effects of distance have been averted by the inventive genius of our people, developed and fostered by the spirit of our institutions; and the enlarged variety and amount of interests, productions, and pursuits have strengthened the chain of mutual dependence and formed a circle of mutual benefits too apparent ever to be overlooked. 
In justly balancing the powers of the Federal and State authorities difficulties nearly insurmountable arose at the outset, and subsequent collisions were deemed inevitable. Amid these it was scarcely believed possible that a scheme of government so complex in construction could remain uninjured. From time to time embarrassments have certainly occurred; but how just is the confidence of future safety imparted by the knowledge that each in succession has been happily removed! Overlooking partial and temporary evils as inseparable from the practical operation of all human institutions, and looking only to the general result, every patriot has reason to be satisfied. While the Federal Government has successfully performed its appropriate functions in relation to foreign affairs and concerns evidently national, that of every State has remarkably improved in protecting and developing local interests and individual welfare; and if the vibrations of authority have occasionally tended too much toward one or the other, it is unquestionably certain that the ultimate operation of the entire system has been to strengthen all the existing institutions and to elevate our whole country in prosperity and renown. 
The last, perhaps the greatest, of the prominent sources of discord and disaster supposed to lurk in our political condition was the institution of domestic slavery. Our forefathers were deeply impressed with the delicacy of this subject, and they treated it with a forbearance so evidently wise that in spite of every sinister foreboding it never until the present period disturbed the tranquillity of our common country. Such a result is sufficient evidence of the justice and the patriotism of their course; it is evidence not to be mistaken that an adherence to it can prevent all embarrassment from this as well as from every other anticipated cause of difficulty or danger. Have not recent events made it obvious to the slightest reflection that the least deviation from this spirit of forbearance is injurious to every interest, that of humanity included? Amidst the violence of excited passions this generous and fraternal feeling has been sometimes disregarded; and standing as I now do before my countrymen, in this high place of honor and of trust, I can not refrain from anxiously invoking my fellow-citizens never to be deaf to its dictates. Perceiving before my election the deep interest this subject was beginning to excite, I believed it a solemn duty fully to make known my sentiments in regard to it, and now, when every motive for misrepresentation has passed away, I trust that they will be candidly weighed and understood. At least they will be my standard of conduct in the path before me. I then declared that if the desire of those of my countrymen who were favorable to my election was gratified "I must go into the Presidential chair the inflexible and uncompromising opponent of every attempt on the part of Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia against the wishes of the slaveholding States, and also with a determination equally decided to resist the slightest interference with it in the States where it exists." I submitted also to my fellow-citizens, with fullness and frankness, the reasons which led me to this determination. The result authorizes me to believe that they have been approved and are confided in by a majority of the people of the United States, including those whom they most immediately affect. It now only remains to add that no bill conflicting with these views can ever receive my constitutional sanction. These opinions have been adopted in the firm belief that they are in accordance with the spirit that actuated the venerated fathers of the Republic, and that succeeding experience has proved them to be humane, patriotic, expedient, honorable, and just. If the agitation of this subject was intended to reach the stability of our institutions, enough has occurred to show that it has signally failed, and that in this as in every other instance the apprehensions of the timid and the hopes of the wicked for the destruction of our Government are again destined to be disappointed. Here and there, indeed, scenes of dangerous excitement have occurred, terrifying instances of local violence have been witnessed, and a reckless disregard of the consequences of their conduct has exposed individuals to popular indignation; but neither masses of the people nor sections of the country have been swerved from their devotion to the bond of union and the principles it has made sacred. It will be ever thus. Such attempts at dangerous agitation may periodically return, but with each the object will be better understood. That predominating affection for our political system which prevails throughout our territorial limits, that calm and enlightened judgment which ultimately governs our people as one vast body, will always be at hand to resist and control every effort, foreign or domestic, which aims or would lead to overthrow our institutions. 
What can be more gratifying than such a retrospect as this? We look back on obstacles avoided and dangers overcome, on expectations more than realized and prosperity perfectly secured. To the hopes of the hostile, the fears of the timid, and the doubts of the anxious actual experience has given the conclusive reply. We have seen time gradually dispel every unfavorable foreboding and our Constitution surmount every adverse circumstance dreaded at the outset as beyond control. Present excitement will at all times magnify present dangers, but true philosophy must teach us that none more threatening than the past can remain to be overcome; and we ought (for we have just reason) to entertain an abiding confidence in the stability of our institutions and an entire conviction that if administered in the true form, character, and spirit in which they were established they are abundantly adequate to preserve to us and our children the rich blessings already derived from them, to make our beloved land for a thousand generations that chosen spot where happiness springs from a perfect equality of political rights. 
For myself, therefore, I desire to declare that the principle that will govern me in the high duty to which my country calls me is a strict adherence to the letter and spirit of the Constitution as it was designed by those who framed it. Looking back to it as a sacred instrument carefully and not easily framed; remembering that it was throughout a work of concession and compromise; viewing it as limited to national objects; regarding it as leaving to the people and the States all power not explicitly parted with, I shall endeavor to preserve, protect, and defend it by anxiously referring to its provision for direction in every action. To matters of domestic concernment which it has intrusted to the Federal Government and to such as relate to our intercourse with foreign nations I shall zealously devote myself; beyond those limits I shall never pass. 
To enter on this occasion into a further or more minute exposition of my views on the various questions of domestic policy would be as obtrusive as it is probably unexpected. Before the suffrages of my countrymen were conferred upon me I submitted to them, with great precision, my opinions on all the most prominent of these subjects. Those opinions I shall endeavor to carry out with my utmost ability. 
Our course of foreign policy has been so uniform and intelligible as to constitute a rule of Executive conduct which leaves little to my discretion, unless, indeed, I were willing to run counter to the lights of experience and the known opinions of my constituents. We sedulously cultivate the friendship of all nations as the condition most compatible with our welfare and the principles of our Government. We decline alliances as adverse to our peace. We desire commercial relations on equal terms, being ever willing to give a fair equivalent for advantages received We endeavor to conduct our intercourse with openness and sincerity, promptly avowing our objects and seeking to establish that mutual frankness which is as beneficial in the dealings of nations as of men. We have no disposition and we disclaim all right to meddle in disputes, whether internal or foreign, that may molest other countries, regarding them in their actual state as social communities, and preserving a strict neutrality in all their controversies. Well knowing the tried valor of our people and our exhaustless resources, we neither anticipate nor fear any designed aggression; and in the consciousness of our own just conduct we feel a security that we shall never be called upon to exert our determination never to permit an invasion of our rights without punishment or redress. 
In approaching, then, in the presence of my assembled countrymen, to make the solemn promise that yet remains, and to pledge myself that I will faithfully execute the office I am about to fill, I bring with me a settled purpose to maintain the institutions of my country, which I trust will atone for the errors I commit. 
In receiving from the people the sacred trust twice confided to my illustrious predecessor, and which he has discharged so faithfully and so well, I know that I can not expect to perform the arduous task with equal ability and success. But united as I have been in his counsels, a daily witness of his exclusive and unsurpassed devotion to his country's welfare, agreeing with him in sentiments which his countrymen have warmly supported, and permitted to partake largely of his confidence, I may hope that somewhat of the same cheering approbation will be found to attend upon my path. For him I but express with my own the wishes of all, that he may yet long live to enjoy the brilliant evening of his well-spent life; and for myself, conscious of but one desire, faithfully to serve my country, I throw myself without fear on its justice and its kindness. Beyond that I only look to the gracious protection of the Divine Being whose strengthening support I humbly solicit, and whom I fervently pray to look down upon us all. May it be among the dispensations of His providence to bless our beloved country with honors and with length of days. May her ways be ways of pleasantness and all her paths be peace! 
MARCH 4, 1837. 

  
  
SPECIAL MESSAGE. 
WASHINGTON, March 6, 1837. 
To the Senate of the United States: 
I nominate to the Senate Powhatan Ellis, of Mississippi, to be envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States to the United Mexican States, to be sent whenever circumstances will permit a renewal of diplomatic intercourse honorably with that power. 
M. VAN BUREN. 

  
  
PROCLAMATIONS. 
[From Statutes at Large (Little & Brown), Vol. V, p. 802.] 
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
A PROCLAMATION. 
Whereas by an act of Congress of the 7th of June, 1836, it was enacted that when the Indian title to all the lands lying between the State of Missouri and the Missouri River should be extinguished the jurisdiction over said land should be ceded by the said act to the State of Missouri and the western boundary of said State should be then extended to the Missouri River, reserving to the United States the original right of soil in said lands and of disposing of the same; and 
Whereas it was in and by the said act provided that the same should not take effect until the President should by proclamation declare that the Indian title to said lands had been extinguished, nor until the State of Missouri should have assented to the provisions of the said act; and 
Whereas an act was passed by the general assembly of the State of Missouri on the 16th of December, 1836, expressing the assent of the said State to the provisions of the said act of Congress, a copy of which act of the general assembly, duly authenticated, has been officially communicated to this Government and is now on file in the Department of State: 
Now, therefore, I, Martin Van Buren, President of the United States of America, do by this my proclamation declare and make known that the Indian title to all the said lands lying between the State of Missouri and the Missouri River has been extinguished and that the said act of Congress of the 7th of June, 1836, takes effect from the date hereof. 
Given under my hand, at the city of Washington, this 28th day of March, A.D. 1837, and of the Independence of the United States of America the sixty-first. 
MARTIN VAN BUREN. 

By the President:
JOHN FORSYTH,
Secretary of State. 

[From Statutes at Large (Little, Brown & Co.), Vol. XI, p. 783.] 
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
A PROCLAMATION. 
Whereas great and weighty matters claiming the consideration of the Congress of the United States form an extraordinary occasion for convening them, I do by these presents appoint the first Monday of September next for their meeting at the city of Washington, hereby requiring the respective Senators and Representatives then and there to assemble in Congress in order to receive such communications as may then be made to them and to consult and determine on such measures as in their wisdom may be deemed meet for the welfare of the United States. 
In testimony whereof I have caused the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed, and signed the same with my hand. 
[SEAL.] 
Done at the city of Washington, the 15th day of May, A.D. 1837, and of the Independence of the United States the sixty-first. 
MARTIN VAN BUREN. 

By the President:
JOHN FORSYTH,
Secretary of State. 

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
A PROCLAMATION. 
Whereas by the third section of the act of Congress of the United States of the 13th of July, 1832, entitled "An act concerning tonnage duty on Spanish vessels," it is provided that whenever the President shall be satisfied that the discriminating or countervailing duties of tonnage levied by any foreign nation on the ships or vessels of the United States shall have been abolished he may direct that the tonnage duty on the vessels of such nation shall cease to be levied in the ports of the United States; and 
Whereas satisfactory evidence has lately been received from His Majesty the King of Greece that the discriminating duties of tonnage levied by said nation on the ships or vessels of the United States have been abolished: 
Now, therefore, I, Martin Van Buren, President of the United States, do hereby declare and proclaim that the tonnage duty on the vessels of the Kingdom of Greece shall from this date cease to be levied in the ports of the United States. 
Given under my hand, at the city of Washington, the 14th day of June, A.D. 1837, and of the Independence of the United States the sixty-first. 
M. VAN BUREN. 

By the President:
JOHN FORSYTH,
Secretary of State. 

  
  
EXECUTIVE ORDER. 
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, March 7, 1837. 
GENERAL ORDER No. 6. 
I. The Major-General Commanding in Chief has received from the War Department the following order: 
  
WASHINGTON, March 6, 1837. 
General Andrew Jackson, ex-President of the United States, being about to depart from this city for his home in Tennessee, and the state of his health rendering it important that he should be accompanied by a medical attendant, the President directs that the Surgeon-General of the Army accompany the ex-President to Wheeling, in the State of Virginia, there to be relieved, in case the ex-President's health shall be such as to allow it, by some officer of the Medical Department, who will attend the ex-President from that place to his residence. 
In giving this order the President feels assured that this mark of attention to the venerable soldier, patriot, and statesman now retiring in infirm health from the cares of office to the repose of private life will be as grateful to the feelings of the American people as it appears to the President to be suitable in itself. 
M. VAN BUREN. 
  
The Major-General Commanding in Chief will carry into effect the foregoing directions of the President of the United States. 
B.F. BUTLER,
Secretary of War ad interim. 
  
II. Pursuant to the above order, Surgeon-General Lawson will immediately join the ex-President, and will accompany him as his medical attendant to Wheeling, in the State of Virginia, and, at his discretion, to the residence of the ex-President, at the Hermitage, near Nashville, in the State of Tennessee. 
III. Assistant Surgeon Reynolds will join the ex-President at Wheeling, Va., and from that place, either alone or in conjunction with the Surgeon-General, as the latter may direct, will proceed with the ex-President to his residence in Tennessee. 
IV. The officers above named, on the conclusion of the duties above assigned to them, will repair to their respective stations. 
By order of Alexander Macomb, Major-General Commanding in Chief: 
R. JONES,
Adjutant-General. 

  
  
SPECIAL SESSION MESSAGE. 
WASHINGTON, September 4, 1837. 
Fellow-Citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives: 
The act of the 23d of June, 1836, regulating the deposits of the public money and directing the employment of State, District, and Territorial banks for that purpose, made it the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to discontinue the use of such of them as should at any time refuse to redeem their notes in specie, and to substitute other banks, provided a sufficient number could be obtained to receive the public deposits upon the terms and conditions therein prescribed. The general and almost simultaneous suspension of specie payments by the banks in May last rendered the performance of this duty imperative in respect to those which had been selected under the act, and made it at the same time impracticable to employ the requisite number of others upon the prescribed conditions. The specific regulations established by Congress for the deposit and safe-keeping of the public moneys having thus unexpectedly become inoperative, I felt it to be my duty to afford you an early opportunity for the exercise of your supervisory powers over the subject. 
I was also led to apprehend that the suspension of specie payments, increasing the embarrassments before existing in the pecuniary affairs of the country, would so far diminish the public revenue that the accruing receipts into the Treasury would not, with the reserved five millions, be sufficient to defray the unavoidable expenses of the Government until the usual period for the meeting of Congress, whilst the authority to call upon the States for a portion of the sums deposited with them was too restricted to enable the Department to realize a sufficient amount from that source. These apprehensions have been justified by subsequent results, which render it certain that this deficiency will occur if additional means be not provided by Congress. 
The difficulties experienced by the mercantile interest in meeting their engagements induced them to apply to me previously to the actual suspension of specie payments for indulgence upon their bonds for duties, and all the relief authorized by law was promptly and cheerfully granted. The dependence of the Treasury upon the avails of these bonds to enable it to make the deposits with the States required by law led me in the outset to limit this indulgence to the 1st of September, but it has since been extended to the 1st of October, that the matter might be submitted to your further direction. 
Questions were also expected to arise in the recess in respect to the October installment of those deposits requiring the interposition of Congress. 
A provision of another act, passed about the same time, and intended to secure a faithful compliance with the obligation of the United States to satisfy all demands upon them in specie or its equivalent, prohibited the offer of any bank note not convertible on the spot into gold or silver at the will of the holder; and the ability of the Government, with millions on deposit, to meet its engagements in the manner thus required by law was rendered very doubtful by the event to which I have referred. 
Sensible that adequate provisions for these unexpected exigencies could only be made by Congress; convinced that some of them would be indispensably necessary to the public service before the regular period of your meeting, and desirous also to enable you to exercise at the earliest moment your full constitutional powers for the relief of the country, I could not with propriety avoid subjecting you to the inconvenience of assembling at as early a day as the state of the popular representation would permit. I am sure that I have done but justice to your feelings in believing that this inconvenience will be cheerfully encountered in the hope of rendering your meeting conducive to the good of the country. 
During the earlier stages of the revulsion through which we have just passed much acrimonious discussion arose and great diversity of opinion existed as to its real causes. This was not surprising. The operations of credit are so diversified and the influences which affect them so numerous, and often so subtle, that even impartial and well-informed persons are seldom found to agree in respect to them. To inherent difficulties were also added other tendencies which were by no means favorable to the discovery of truth. It was hardly to be expected that those who disapproved the policy of the Government in relation to the currency would, in the excited state of public feeling produced by the occasion, fail to attribute to that policy any extensive embarrassment in the monetary affairs of the country. The matter thus became connected with the passions and conflicts of party; opinions were more or less affected by political considerations, and differences were prolonged which might otherwise have been determined by an appeal to facts, by the exercise of reason, or by mutual concession. It is, however, a cheering reflection that circumstances of this nature can not prevent a community so intelligent as ours from ultimately arriving at correct conclusions. Encouraged by the firm belief of this truth, I proceed to state my views, so far as may be necessary to a clear understanding of the remedies I feel it my duty to propose and of the reasons by which I have been led to recommend them. 
The history of trade in the United States for the last three or four years affords the most convincing evidence that our present condition is chiefly to be attributed to overaction in all the departments of business  an over-action deriving, perhaps, its first impulses from antecedent causes, but stimulated to its destructive consequences by excessive issues of bank paper and by other facilities for the acquisition and enlargement of credit. At the commencement of the year 1834 the banking capital of the United States, including that of the national bank, then existing, amounted to about $200,000,000, the bank notes then in circulation to about ninety-five millions, and the loans and discounts of the banks to three hundred and twenty-four millions. Between that time and the 1st of January, 1836, being the latest period to which accurate accounts have been received, our banking capital was increased to more than two hundred and fifty-one millions, our paper circulation to more than one hundred and forty millions, and the loans and discounts to more than four hundred and fifty-seven millions. To this vast increase are to be added the many millions of credit acquired by means of foreign loans, contracted by the States and State institutions, and, above all, by the lavish accommodations extended by foreign dealers to our merchants. 
The consequences of this redundancy of credit and of the spirit of reckless speculation engendered by it were a foreign debt contracted by our citizens estimated in March last at more than $30,000,000; the extension to traders in the interior of our country of credits for supplies greatly beyond the wants of the people; the investment of $39,500,000 in unproductive public lands in the years 1835 and 1836, whilst in the preceding year the sales amounted to only four and a half millions; the creation of debts, to an almost countless amount, for real estate in existing or anticipated cities and villages, equally unproductive, and at prices now seen to have been greatly disproportionate to their real value; the expenditure of immense sums in improvements which in many cases have been found to be ruinously improvident; the diversion to other pursuits of much of the labor that should have been applied to agriculture, thereby contributing to the expenditure of large sums in the importation of grain from Europe  an expenditure which, amounting in 1834 to about $250,000, was in the first two quarters of the present year increased to more than $2,000,000; and finally, without enumerating other injurious results, the rapid growth among all classes, and especially in our great commercial towns, of luxurious habits founded too often on merely fancied wealth, and detrimental alike to the industry, the resources, and the morals of our people. 
It was so impossible that such a state of things could long continue that the prospect of revulsion was present to the minds of considerate men before it actually came. None, however, had correctly anticipated its severity. A concurrence of circumstances inadequate of themselves to produce such widespread and calamitous embarrassments tended so greatly to aggravate them that they can not be overlooked in considering their history. Among these may be mentioned, as most prominent, the great loss of capital sustained by our commercial emporium in the fire of December, 1835  a loss the effects of which were underrated at the time because postponed for a season by the great facilities of credit then existing; the disturbing effects in our commercial cities of the transfers of the public moneys required by the deposit law of June, 1836, and the measures adopted by the foreign creditors of our merchants to reduce their debts and to withdraw from the United States a large portion of our specie. 
However unwilling any of our citizens may heretofore have been to assign to these causes the chief instrumentality in producing the present state of things, the developments subsequently made and the actual condition of other commercial countries must, as it seems to me, dispel all remaining doubts upon the subject. It has since appeared that evils similar to those suffered by ourselves have been experienced in Great Britain, on the Continent, and, indeed, throughout the commercial world, and that in other countries as well as in our own they have been uniformly preceded by an undue enlargement of the boundaries of trade, prompted, as with us, by unprecedented expansions of the systems of credit. A reference to the amount of banking capital and the issues of paper credits put in circulation in Great Britain, by banks and in other ways, during the years 1834, 1835, and 1836 will show an augmentation of the paper currency there as much disproportioned to the real wants of trade as in the United States. With this redundancy of the paper currency there arose in that country also a spirit of adventurous speculation embracing the whole range of human enterprise. Aid was profusely given to projected improvements; large investments were made in foreign stocks and loans; credits for goods were granted with unbounded liberality to merchants in foreign countries, and all the means of acquiring and employing credit were put in active operation and extended in their effects to every department of business and to every quarter of the globe. The reaction was proportioned in its violence to the extraordinary character of the events which preceded it. The commercial community of Great Britain were subjected to the greatest difficulties, and their debtors in this country were not only suddenly deprived of accustomed and expected credits, but called upon for payments which in the actual posture of things here could only be made through a general pressure and at the most ruinous sacrifices. 
In view of these facts it would seem impossible for sincere inquirers after truth to resist the conviction that the causes of the revulsion in both countries have been substantially the same. Two nations, the most commercial in the world, enjoying but recently the highest degree of apparent prosperity and maintaining with each other the closest relations, are suddenly, in a time of profound peace and without any great national disaster, arrested in their career and plunged into a state of embarrassment and distress. In both countries we have witnessed the same redundancy of paper money and other facilities of credit; the same spirit of speculation; the same partial successes; the same difficulties and reverses, and at length nearly the same overwhelming catastrophe. The most material difference between the results in the two countries has only been that with us there has also occurred an extensive derangement in the fiscal affairs of the Federal and State Governments, occasioned by the suspension of specie payments by the banks. 
The history of these causes and effects in Great Britain and the United States is substantially the history of the revulsion in all other commercial countries. 
The present and visible effects of these circumstances on the operations of the Government and on the industry of the people point out the objects which call for your immediate attention. 
They are, to regulate by law the safe-keeping, transfer, and disbursement of the public moneys; to designate the funds to be received and paid by the Government; to enable the Treasury to meet promptly every demand upon it; to prescribe the terms of indulgence and the mode of settlement to be adopted, as well in collecting from individuals the revenue that has accrued as in withdrawing it from former depositories; and to devise and adopt such further measures, within the constitutional competency of Congress, as will be best calculated to revive the enterprise and to promote the prosperity of the country. 
For the deposit, transfer, and disbursement of the revenue national and State banks have always, with temporary and limited exceptions, been heretofore employed; but although advocates of each system are still to be found, it is apparent that the events of the last few months have greatly augmented the desire, long existing among the people of the United States, to separate the fiscal operations of the Government from those of individuals or corporations. 
Again to create a national bank as a fiscal agent would be to disregard the popular will, twice solemnly and unequivocally expressed. On no question of domestic policy is there stronger evidence that the sentiments of a large majority are deliberately fixed, and I can not concur with those who think they see in recent events a proof that these sentiments are, or a reason that they should be, changed. 
Events similar in their origin and character have heretofore frequently occurred without producing any such change, and the lessons of experience must be forgotten if we suppose that the present overthrow of credit would have been prevented by the existence of a national bank. Proneness to excessive issues has ever been the vice of the banking system  a vice as prominent in national as in State institutions. This propensity is as subservient to the advancement of private interests in the one as in the other, and those who direct them both, being principally guided by the same views and influenced by the same motives, will be equally ready to stimulate extravagance of enterprise by improvidence of credit. How strikingly is this conclusion sustained by experience! The Bank of the United States, with the vast powers conferred on it by Congress, did not or could not prevent former and similar embarrassments, nor has the still greater strength it has been said to possess under its present charter enabled it in the existing emergency to check other institutions or even to save itself. In Great Britain, where it has been seen the same causes have been attended with the same effects, a national bank possessing powers far greater than are asked for by the warmest advocates of such an institution here has also proved unable to prevent an undue expansion of credit and the evils that flow from it. Nor can I find any tenable ground for the reestablishment of a national bank in the derangement alleged at present to exist in the domestic exchanges of the country or in the facilities it may be capable of affording them. Although advantages of this sort were anticipated when the first Bank of the United States was created, they were regarded as an incidental accommodation, not one which the Federal Government was bound or could be called upon to furnish. This accommodation is now, indeed, after the lapse of not many years, demanded from it as among its first duties, and an omission to aid and regulate commercial exchange is treated as a ground of loud and serious complaint. Such results only serve to exemplify the constant desire among some of our citizens to enlarge the powers of the Government and extend its control to subjects with which it should not interfere. They can never justify the creation of an institution to promote such objects. On the contrary, they justly excite among the community a more diligent inquiry into the character of those operations of trade toward which it is desired to extend such peculiar favors. 
The various transactions which bear the name of domestic exchanges differ essentially in their nature, operation, and utility. One class of them consists of bills of exchange drawn for the purpose of transferring actual capital from one part of the country to another, or to anticipate the proceeds of property actually transmitted. Bills of this description are highly useful in the movements of trade and well deserve all the encouragement which can rightfully be given to them. Another class is made up of bills of exchange not drawn to transfer actual capital nor on the credit of property transmitted, but to create fictitious capital, partaking at once of the character of notes discounted in bank and of bank notes in circulation, and swelling the mass of paper credits to a vast extent in the most objectionable manner. These bills have formed for the last few years a large proportion of what are termed the domestic exchanges of the country, serving as the means of usurious profit and constituting the most unsafe and precarious paper in circulation. This species of traffic, instead of being upheld, ought to be discountenanced by the Government and the people. 
In transferring its funds from place to place the Government is on the same footing with the private citizen and may resort to the same legal means. It may do so through the medium of bills drawn by itself or purchased from others; and in these operations it may, in a manner undoubtedly constitutional and legitimate, facilitate and assist exchanges of individuals founded on real transactions of trade. The extent to which this may be done and the best means of effecting it are entitled to the fullest consideration. This has been bestowed by the Secretary of the Treasury, and his views will be submitted to you in his report. 
But it was not designed by the Constitution that the Government should assume the management of domestic or foreign exchange. It is indeed authorized to regulate by law the commerce between the States and to provide a general standard of value or medium of exchange in gold and silver, but it is not its province to aid individuals in the transfer of their funds otherwise than through the facilities afforded by the Post-Office Department. As justly might it be called on to provide for the transportation of their merchandise. These are operations of trade. They ought to be conducted by those who are interested in them in the same manner that the incidental difficulties of other pursuits are encountered by other classes of citizens. Such aid has not been deemed necessary in other countries. Throughout Europe the domestic as well as the foreign exchanges are carried on by private houses, often, if not generally, without the assistance of banks; yet they extend throughout distinct sovereignties, and far exceed in amount the real exchanges of the United States. There is no reason why our own may not be conducted in the same manner with equal cheapness and safety. Certainly this might be accomplished if it were favored by those most deeply interested; and few can doubt that their own interest, as well as the general welfare of the country, would be promoted by leaving such a subject in the hands of those to whom it properly belongs. A system founded on private interest, enterprise, and competition, without the aid of legislative grants or regulations by law, would rapidly prosper; it would be free from the influence of political agitation and extend the same exemption to trade itself, and it would put an end to those complaints of neglect, partiality, injustice, and oppression which are the unavoidable results of interference by the Government in the proper concerns of individuals. All former attempts on the part of the Government to carry its legislation in this respect further than was designed by the Constitution have in the end proved injurious, and have served only to convince the great body of the people more and more of the certain dangers of blending private interests with the operations of public business; and there is no reason to suppose that a repetition of them now would be more successful. 
It can not be concealed that there exists in our community opinions and feelings on this subject in direct opposition to each other. A large portion of them, combining great intelligence, activity, and influence, are no doubt sincere in their belief that the operations of trade ought to be assisted by such a connection; they regard a national bank as necessary for this purpose, and they are disinclined to every measure that does not tend sooner or later to the establishment of such an institution. On the other hand, a majority of the people are believed to be irreconcilably opposed to that measure; they consider such a concentration of power dangerous to their liberties, and many of them regard it as a violation of the Constitution. This collision of opinion has doubtless caused much of the embarrassment to which the commercial transactions of the country have lately been exposed. Banking has become a political topic of the highest interest, and trade has suffered in the conflict of parties. A speedy termination of this state of things, however desirable, is scarcely to be expected. We have seen for nearly half a century that those who advocate a national bank, by whatever motive they may be influenced, constitute a portion of our community too numerous to allow us to hope for an early abandonment of their favorite plan. On the other hand, they must indeed form an erroneous estimate of the intelligence and temper of the American people who suppose that they have continued on slight or insufficient grounds their persevering opposition to such an institution, or that they can be induced by pecuniary pressure or by any other combination of circumstances to surrender principles they have so long and so inflexibly maintained. 
My own views of the subject are unchanged. They have been repeatedly and unreservedly announced to my fellow-citizens, who with full knowledge of them conferred upon me the two highest offices of the Government. On the last of these occasions I felt it due to the people to apprise them distinctly that in the event of my election I would not be able to cooperate in the reestablishment of a national bank. To these sentiments I have now only to add the expression of an increased conviction that the reestablishment of such a bank in any form, whilst it would not accomplish the beneficial purpose promised by its advocates, would impair the rightful supremacy of the popular will, injure the character and diminish the influence of our political system, and bring once more into existence a concentrated moneyed power, hostile to the spirit and threatening the permanency of our republican institutions. 
Local banks have been employed for the deposit and distribution of the revenue at all times partially and on three different occasions exclusively: First, anterior to the establishment of the first Bank of the United States; secondly, in the interval between the termination of that institution and the charter of its successor; and thirdly, during the limited period which has now so abruptly closed. The connection thus repeatedly attempted proved unsatisfactory on each successive occasion, notwithstanding the various measures which were adopted to facilitate or insure its success. On the last occasion, in the year 1833, the employment of the State banks was guarded especially, in every way which experience and caution could suggest. Personal security was required for the safe-keeping and prompt payment of the moneys to be received, and full returns of their condition were from time to time to be made by the depositories. In the first stages the measure was eminently successful, notwithstanding the violent opposition of the Bank of the United States and the unceasing efforts made to overthrow it. The selected banks performed with fidelity and without any embarrassment to themselves or to the community their engagements to the Government, and the system promised to be permanently useful; but when it became necessary, under the act of June, 1836, to withdraw from them the public money for the purpose of placing it in additional institutions or of transferring it to the States, they found it in many cases inconvenient to comply with the demands of the Treasury, and numerous and pressing applications were made for indulgence or relief. As the installments under the deposit law became payable their own embarrassments and the necessity under which they lay of curtailing their discounts and calling in their debts increased the general distress and contributed, with other causes, to hasten the revulsion in which at length they, in common with the other banks, were fatally involved. 
Under these circumstances it becomes our solemn duty to inquire whether there are not in any connection between the Government and banks of issue evils of great magnitude, inherent in its very nature and against which no precautions can effectually guard. 
Unforeseen in the organization of the Government and forced on the Treasury by early necessities, the practice of employing banks was in truth from the beginning more a measure of emergency than of sound policy. When we started into existence as a nation, in addition to the burdens of the new Government we assumed all the large but honorable load of debt which was the price of our liberty; but we hesitated to weigh down the infant industry of the country by resorting to adequate taxation for the necessary revenue. The facilities of banks, in return for the privileges they acquired, were promptly offered, and perhaps too readily received by an embarrassed Treasury. During the long continuance of a national debt and the intervening difficulties of a foreign war the connection was continued from motives of convenience; but these causes have long since passed away. We have no emergencies that make banks necessary to aid the wants of the Treasury; we have no load of national debt to provide for, and we have on actual deposit a large surplus. No public interest, therefore, now requires the renewal of a connection that circumstances have dissolved. The complete organization of our Government, the abundance of our resources, the general harmony which prevails between the different States and with foreign powers, all enable us now to select the system most consistent with the Constitution and most conducive to the public welfare. Should we, then, connect the Treasury for a fourth time with the local banks, it can only be under a conviction that past failures have arisen from accidental, not inherent, defects. 
A danger difficult, if not impossible, to be avoided in such an arrangement is made strikingly evident in the very event by which it has now been defeated. A sudden act of the banks intrusted with the funds of the people deprives the Treasury, without fault or agency of the Government, of the ability to pay its creditors in the currency they have by law a right to demand. This circumstance no fluctuation of commerce could have produced if the public revenue had been collected in the legal currency and kept in that form by the officers of the Treasury. The citizen whose money was in bank receives it back since the suspension at a sacrifice in its amount, whilst he who kept it in the legal currency of the country and in his own possession pursues without loss the current of his business. The Government, placed in the situation of the former, is involved in embarrassments it could not have suffered had it pursued the course of the latter. These embarrassments are, moreover, augmented by those salutary and just laws which forbid it to use a depreciated currency, and by so doing take from the Government the ability which individuals have of accommodating their transactions to such a catastrophe. 
A system which can in a time of profound peace, when there is a large revenue laid by, thus suddenly prevent the application and the use of the money of the people in the manner and for the objects they have directed can not be wise; but who can think without painful reflection that under it the same unforeseen events might have befallen us in the midst of a war and taken from us at the moment when most wanted the use of those very means which were treasured up to promote the national welfare and guard our national rights? To such embarrassments and to such dangers will this Government be always exposed whilst it takes the moneys raised for and necessary to the public service out of the hands of its own officers and converts them into a mere right of action against corporations intrusted with the possession of them. Nor can such results be effectually guarded against in such a system without investing the Executive with a control over the banks themselves, whether State or national, that might with reason be objected to. Ours is probably the only Government in the world that is liable in the management of its fiscal concerns to occurrences like these. 
But this imminent risk is not the only danger attendant on the surrender of the public money to the custody and control of local corporations. Though the object is aid to the Treasury, its effect may be to introduce into the operations of the Government influences the most subtle, founded on interests the most selfish. 
The use by the banks, for their own benefit, of the money deposited with them has received the sanction of the Government from the commencement of this connection. The money received from the people, instead of being kept till it is needed for their use, is, in consequence of this authority, a fund on which discounts are made for the profit of those who happen to be owners of stock in the banks selected as depositories. The supposed and often exaggerated advantages of such a boon will always cause it to be sought for with avidity. I will not stop to consider on whom the patronage incident to it is to be conferred. Whether the selection and control be trusted to Congress or to the Executive, either will be subjected to appeals made in every form which the sagacity of interest can suggest. The banks under such a system are stimulated to make the most of their fortunate acquisition; the deposits are treated as an increase of capital; loans and circulation are rashly augmented, and when the public exigencies require a return it is attended with embarrassments not provided for nor foreseen. Thus banks that thought themselves most fortunate when the public funds were received find themselves most embarrassed when the season of payment suddenly arrives. 
Unfortunately, too, the evils of the system are not limited to the banks. It stimulates a general rashness of enterprise and aggravates the fluctuations of commerce and the currency. This result was strikingly exhibited during the operations of the late deposit system, and especially in the purchases of public lands. The order which ultimately directed the payment of gold and silver in such purchases greatly checked, but could not altogether prevent, the evil. Specie was indeed more difficult to be procured than the notes which the banks could themselves create at pleasure; but still, being obtained from them as a loan and returned as a deposit, which they were again at liberty to use, it only passed round the circle with diminished speed. This operation could not have been performed had the funds of the Government gone into the Treasury to be regularly disbursed, and not into banks to be loaned out for their own profit while they were permitted to substitute for it a credit in account. 
In expressing these sentiments I desire not to undervalue the benefits of a salutary credit to any branch of enterprise. The credit bestowed on probity and industry is the just reward of merit and an honorable incentive to further acquisition. None oppose it who love their country and understand its welfare. But when it is unduly encouraged; when it is made to inflame the public mind with the temptations of sudden and unsubstantial wealth; when it turns industry into paths that lead sooner or later to disappointment and distress, it becomes liable to censure and needs correction. Far from helping probity and industry, the ruin to which it leads falls most severely on the great laboring classes, who are thrown suddenly out of employment, and by the failure of magnificent schemes never intended to enrich them are deprived in a moment of their only resource. Abuses of credit and excesses in speculation will happen in despite of the most salutary laws; no government, perhaps, can altogether prevent them, but surely every government can refrain from contributing the stimulus that calls them into life. 
Since, therefore, experience has shown that to lend the public money to the local banks is hazardous to the operations of the Government, at least of doubtful benefit to the institutions themselves, and productive of disastrous derangement in the business and currency of the country, is it the part of wisdom again to renew the connection? 
It is true that such an agency is in many respects convenient to the Treasury, but it is not indispensable. A limitation of the expenses of the Government to its actual wants, and of the revenue to those expenses, with convenient means for its prompt application to the purposes for which it was raised, are the objects which we should seek to accomplish. The collection, safe-keeping, transfer, and disbursement of the public money can, it is believed, be well managed by officers of the Government. Its collection, and to a great extent its disbursement also, have indeed been hitherto conducted solely by them, neither national nor State banks, when employed, being required to do more than keep it safely while in their custody, and transfer and pay it in such portions and at such times as the Treasury shall direct. 
Surely banks are not more able than the Government to secure the money in their possession against accident, violence, or fraud. The assertion that they are so must assume that a vault in a bank is stronger than a vault in the Treasury, and that directors, cashiers, and clerks not selected by the Government nor under its control are more worthy of confidence than officers selected from the people and responsible to the Government  officers bound by official oaths and bonds for a faithful performance of their duties, and constantly subject to the supervision of Congress. 
The difficulties of transfer and the aid heretofore rendered by banks have been less than is usually supposed. The actual accounts show that by far the larger portion of payments is made within short or convenient distances from the places of collection; and the whole number of warrants issued at the Treasury in the year 1834  a year the result of which will, it is believed, afford a safe test for the future  fell short of 5,000, or an average of less than 1 daily for each State; in the city of New York they did not average more than 2 a day, and at the city of Washington only 4. 
The difficulties heretofore existing are, moreover, daily lessened by an increase in the cheapness and facility of communication, and it may be asserted with confidence that the necessary transfers, as well as the safe-keeping and disbursements of the public moneys, can be with safety and convenience accomplished through the agencies of Treasury officers. This opinion has been in some degree confirmed by actual experience since the discontinuance of the banks as fiscal agents in May last  a period which from the embarrassments in commercial intercourse presented obstacles as great as any that may be hereafter apprehended. 
The manner of keeping the public money since that period is fully stated in the report of the Secretary of the Treasury. That officer also suggests the propriety of assigning by law certain additional duties to existing establishments and officers, which, with the modifications and safeguards referred to by him, will, he thinks, enable the Department to continue to perform this branch of the public service without any material addition either to their number or to the present expense. The extent of the business to be transacted has already been stated; and in respect to the amount of money with which the officers employed would be intrusted at any one time, it appears that, assuming a balance of five millions to be at all times kept in the Treasury, and the whole of it left in the hands of the collectors and receivers, the proportion of each would not exceed an average of $30,000; but that, deducting one million for the use of the Mint and assuming the remaining four millions to be in the hands of one-half of the present number of officers  a supposition deemed more likely to correspond with the fact  the sum in the hands of each would still be less than the amount of most of the bonds now taken from the receivers of public money. Every apprehension, however, on the subject, either in respect to the safety of the money or the faithful discharge of these fiscal transactions, may, it appears to me, be effectually removed by adding to the present means of the Treasury the establishment by law at a few important points of offices for the deposit and disbursement of such portions of the public revenue as can not with obvious safety and convenience be left in the possession of the collecting officers until paid over by them to the public creditors. Neither the amounts retained in their hands nor those deposited in the offices would in an ordinary condition of the revenue be larger in most cases than those often under the control of disbursing officers of the Army and Navy, and might be made entirely safe by requiring such securities and exercising such controlling supervision as Congress may by law prescribe. The principal officers whose appointments would become necessary under this plan, taking the largest number suggested by the Secretary of the Treasury, would not exceed ten, nor the additional expenses, at the same estimate, $60,000 a year. 
There can be no doubt of the obligation of those who are intrusted with the affairs of Government to conduct them with as little cost to the nation as is consistent with the public interest; and it is for Congress, and ultimately for the people, to decide whether the benefits to be derived from keeping our fiscal concerns apart and severing the connection which has hitherto existed between the Government and banks offer sufficient advantages to justify the necessary expenses. If the object to be accomplished is deemed important to the future welfare of the country, I can not allow myself to believe that the addition to the public expenditure of comparatively so small an amount as will be necessary to effect it will be objected to by the people. 
It will be seen by the report of the Postmaster-General herewith communicated that the fiscal affairs of that Department have been successfully conducted since May last upon the principle of dealing only in the legal currency of the United States, and that it needs no legislation to maintain its credit and facilitate the management of its concerns, the existing laws being, in the opinion of that officer, ample for those objects. 
Difficulties will doubtless be encountered for a season and increased services required from the public functionaries; such are usually incident to the commencement of every system, but they will be greatly lessened in the progress of its operations. 
The power and influence supposed to be connected with the custody and disbursement of the public money are topics on which the public mind is naturally, and with great propriety, peculiarly sensitive. Much has been said on them in reference to the proposed separation of the Government from the banking institutions; and surely no one can object to any appeals or animadversions on the subject which are consistent with facts and evince a proper respect for the intelligence of the people. If a Chief Magistrate may be allowed to speak for himself on such a point, I can truly say that to me nothing would be more acceptable than the withdrawal from the Executive, to the greatest practicable extent, of all concern in the custody and disbursement of the public revenue; not that I would shrink from any responsibility cast upon me by the duties of my office, but because it is my firm belief that its capacity for usefulness is in no degree promoted by the possession of any patronage not actually necessary to the performance of those duties. But under our present form of government the intervention of the executive officers in the custody and disbursement of the public money seems to be unavoidable; and before it can be admitted that the influence and power of the Executive would be increased by dispensing with the agency of banks the nature of that intervention in such an agency must be carefully regarded, and a comparison must be instituted between its extent in the two cases. 
The revenue can only be collected by officers appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The public moneys in the first instance must therefore in all cases pass through hands selected by the Executive. Other officers appointed in the same way, or, as in some cases, by the President alone, must also be intrusted with them when drawn for the purpose of disbursement. It is thus seen that even when banks are employed the public funds must twice pass through the hands of executive officers. Besides this, the head of the Treasury Department, who also holds office at the pleasure of the President, and some other officers of the same Department, must necessarily be invested with more or less power in the selection, continuance, and supervision of the banks that may be employed. The question is then narrowed to the single point whether in the intermediate stage between the collection and disbursement of the public money the agency of banks is necessary to avoid a dangerous extension of the patronage and influence of the Executive. But is it clear that the connection of the Executive with powerful moneyed institutions, capable of ministering to the interests of men in points where they are most accessible to corruption, is less liable to abuse than his constitutional agency in the appointment and control of the few public officers required by the proposed plan? Will the public money when in their hands be necessarily exposed to any improper interference on the part of the Executive? May it not be hoped that a prudent fear of public jealousy and disapprobation in a matter so peculiarly exposed to them will deter him from any such interference, even if higher motives be found inoperative? May not Congress so regulate by law the duty of those officers and subject it to such supervision and publicity as to prevent the possibility of any serious abuse on the part of the Executive? And is there equal room for such supervision and publicity in a connection with banks, acting under the shield of corporate immunities and conducted by persons irresponsible to the Government and the people? It is believed that a considerate and candid investigation of these questions will result in the conviction that the proposed plan is far less liable to objection on the score of Executive patronage and control than any bank agency that has been or can be devised. 
With these views I leave to Congress the measures necessary to regulate in the present emergency the safe-keeping and transfer of the public moneys. In the performance of constitutional duty I have stated to them without reserve the result of my own reflections. The subject is of great importance, and one on which we can scarcely expect to be as united in sentiment as we are in interest. It deserves a full and free discussion, and can not fail to be benefited by a dispassionate comparison of opinions. Well aware myself of the duty of reciprocal concession among the coordinate branches of the Government, I can promise a reasonable spirit of cooperation, so far as it can be indulged in without the surrender of constitutional objections which I believe to be well founded. Any system that may be adopted should be subjected to the fullest legal provision, so as to leave nothing to the Executive but what is necessary to the discharge of the duties imposed on him; and whatever plan may be ultimately established, my own part shall be so discharged as to give to it a fair trial and the best prospect of success. 
The character of the funds to be received and disbursed in the transactions of the Government likewise demands your most careful consideration. 
There can be no doubt that those who framed and adopted the Constitution, having in immediate view the depreciated paper of the Confederacy  of which $500 in paper were at times only equal to $1 in coin  intended to prevent the recurrence of similar evils, so far at least as related to the transactions of the new Government. They gave to Congress express powers to coin money and to regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin; they refused to give it power to establish corporations  the agents then as now chiefly employed to create a paper currency; they prohibited the States from making anything but gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts; and the First Congress directed by positive law that the revenue should be received in nothing but gold and silver. 
Public exigency at the outset of the Government, without direct legislative authority, led to the use of banks as fiscal aids to the Treasury. In admitted deviation from the law, at the same period and under the same exigency, the Secretary of the Treasury received their notes in payment of duties. The sole ground on which the practice thus commenced was then or has since been justified is the certain, immediate, and convenient exchange of such notes for specie. The Government did, indeed, receive the inconvertible notes of State banks during the difficulties of war, and the community submitted without a murmur to the unequal taxation and multiplied evils of which such a course was productive. With the war this indulgence ceased, and the banks were obliged again to redeem their notes in gold and silver. The Treasury, in accordance with previous practice, continued to dispense with the currency required by the act of 1789, and took the notes of banks in full confidence of their being paid in specie on demand; and Congress, to guard against the slightest violation of this principle, have declared by law that if notes are paid in the transactions of the Government it must be under such circumstances as to enable the holder to convert them into specie without depreciation or delay. 
Of my own duties under the existing laws, when the banks suspended specie payments, I could not doubt. Directions were immediately given to prevent the reception into the Treasury of anything but gold and silver, or its equivalent, and every practicable arrangement was made to preserve the public faith by similar or equivalent payments to the public creditors. The revenue from lands had been for some time substantially so collected under the order issued by directions of my predecessor. The effects of that order had been so salutary and its forecast in regard to the increasing insecurity of bank paper had become so apparent that even before the catastrophe I had resolved not to interfere with its operation. Congress is now to decide whether the revenue shall continue to be so collected or not. 
The receipt into the Treasury of bank notes not redeemed in specie on demand will not, I presume, be sanctioned. It would destroy without the excuse of war or public distress that equality of imposts and identity of commercial regulation which lie at the foundation of our Confederacy, and would offer to each State a direct temptation to increase its foreign trade by depreciating the currency received for duties in its ports. Such a proceeding would also in a great degree frustrate the policy so highly cherished of infusing into our circulation a larger proportion of the precious metals  a policy the wisdom of which none can doubt, though there may be different opinions as to the extent to which it should be carried. Its results have been already too auspicious and its success is too closely interwoven with the future prosperity of the country to permit us for a moment to contemplate its abandonment. We have seen under its influence our specie augmented beyond eighty millions, our coinage increased so as to make that of gold amount, between August, 1834, and December, 1836, to $10,000,000, exceeding the whole coinage at the Mint during the thirty-one previous years. 
The prospect of further improvement continued without abatement until the moment of the suspension of specie payments. This policy has now, indeed, been suddenly checked, but is still far from being overthrown. Amidst all conflicting theories, one position is undeniable  the precious metals will invariably disappear when there ceases to be a necessity for their use as a circulating medium. It was in strict accordance with this truth that whilst in the month of May last they were everywhere seen and were current for all ordinary purposes they disappeared from circulation the moment the payment of specie was refused by the banks and the community tacitly agreed to dispense with its employment. Their place was supplied by a currency exclusively of paper, and in many cases of the worst description. Already are the bank notes now in circulation greatly depreciated, and they fluctuate in value between one place and another, thus diminishing and making uncertain the worth of property and the price of labor, and failing to subserve, except at a heavy loss, the purposes of business. With each succeeding day the metallic currency decreases; by some it is hoarded in the natural fear that once parted with it can not be replaced, while by others it is diverted from its more legitimate uses for the sake of gain. Should Congress sanction this condition of things by making irredeemable paper money receivable in payment of public dues, a temporary check to a wise and salutary policy will in all probability be converted into its absolute destruction. 
It is true that bank notes actually convertible into specie may be received in payment of the revenue without being liable to all these objections, and that such a course may to some extent promote individual convenience  an object always to be considered where it does not conflict with the principles of our Government or the general welfare of the country. If such notes only were received, and always under circumstances allowing their early presentation for payment, and if at short and fixed periods they were converted into specie to be kept by the officers of the Treasury, some of the most serious obstacles to their reception would perhaps be removed. To retain the notes in the Treasury would be to renew under another form the loans of public money to the banks, and the evils consequent thereon. 
It is, however, a mistaken impression that any large amount of specie is required for public payments. Of the seventy or eighty millions now estimated to be in the country, ten millions would be abundantly sufficient for that purpose provided an accumulation of a large amount of revenue beyond the necessary wants of the Government be hereafter prevented. If to these considerations be added the facilities which will arise from enabling the Treasury to satisfy the public creditors by its drafts or notes receivable in payment of the public dues, it may be safely assumed that no motive of convenience to the citizen requires the reception of bank paper. 
To say that the refusal of paper money by the Government introduces an unjust discrimination between the currency received by it and that used by individuals in their ordinary affairs is, in my judgment, to view it in a very erroneous light. The Constitution prohibits the States from making anything but gold and silver a tender in the payment of debts, and thus secures to every citizen a right to demand payment in the legal currency. To provide by law that the Government will only receive its dues in gold and silver is not to confer on it any peculiar privilege, but merely to place it on an equality with the citizen by reserving to it a right secured to him by the Constitution. It is doubtless for this reason that the principle has been sanctioned by successive laws from the time of the first Congress under the Constitution down to the last. Such precedents, never objected to and proceeding from such sources, afford a decisive answer to the imputation of inequality or injustice. 
But in fact the measure is one of restriction, not of favor. To forbid the public agent to receive in payment any other than a certain kind of money is to refuse him a discretion possessed by every citizen. It may be left to those who have the management of their own transactions to make their own terms, but no such discretion should be given to him who acts merely as an agent of the people  who is to collect what the law requires and to pay the appropriations it makes. When bank notes are redeemed on demand, there is then no discrimination in reality, for the individual who receives them may at his option substitute the specie for them; he takes them from convenience or choice. When they are not so redeemed, it will scarcely be contended that their receipt and payment by a public officer should be permitted, though none deny that right to an individual; if it were, the effect would be most injurious to the public, since their officer could make none of those arrangements to meet or guard against the depreciation which an individual is at liberty to do. Nor can inconvenience to the community be alleged as an objection to such a regulation. Its object and motive are their convenience and welfare. 
If at a moment of simultaneous and unexpected suspension by the banks it adds something to the many embarrassments of that proceeding, yet these are far overbalanced by its direct tendency to produce a wider circulation of gold and silver, to increase the safety of bank paper, to improve the general currency, and thus to prevent altogether such occurrences and the other and far greater evils that attend them. 
It may indeed be questioned whether it is not for the interest of the banks themselves that the Government should not receive their paper. They would be conducted with more caution and on sounder principles. By using specie only in its transactions the Government would create a demand for it, which would to a great extent prevent its exportation, and by keeping it in circulation maintain a broader and safer basis for the paper currency. That the banks would thus be rendered more sound and the community more safe can not admit of a doubt. 
The foregoing views, it seems to me, do but fairly carry out the provisions of the Federal Constitution in relation to the currency, as far as relates to the public revenue. At the time that instrument was framed there were but three or four banks in the United States, and had the extension of the banking system and the evils growing out of it been foreseen they would probably have been specially guarded against. The same policy which led to the prohibition of bills of credit by the States would doubtless in that event have also interdicted their issue as a currency in any other form. The Constitution, however, contains no such prohibition; and since the States have exercised for nearly half a century the power to regulate the business of banking, it is not to be expected that it will be abandoned. The whole matter is now under discussion before the proper tribunal  the people of the States. Never before has the public mind been so thoroughly awakened to a proper sense of its importance; never has the subject in all its bearings been submitted to so searching an inquiry. It would be distrusting the intelligence and virtue of the people to doubt the speedy and efficient adoption of such measures of reform as the public good demands. All that can rightfully be done by the Federal Government to promote the accomplishment of that important object will without doubt be performed. 
In the meantime it is our duty to provide all the remedies against a depreciated paper currency which the Constitution enables us to afford. The Treasury Department on several former occasions has suggested the propriety and importance of a uniform law concerning bankruptcies of corporations and other bankers. Through the instrumentality of such a law a salutary check may doubtless be imposed on the issues of paper money and an effectual remedy given to the citizen in a way at once equal in all parts of the Union and fully authorized by the Constitution. 
The indulgence granted by Executive authority in the payment of bonds for duties has been already mentioned. Seeing that the immediate enforcement of these obligations would subject a large and highly respectable portion of our citizens to great sacrifices, and believing that a temporary postponement could be made without detriment to other interests and with increased certainty of ultimate payment, I did not hesitate to comply with the request that was made of me. The terms allowed are to the full extent as liberal as any that are to be found in the practice of the executive department. It remains for Congress to decide whether a further postponement may not with propriety be allowed; and if so, their legislation upon the subject is respectfully invited. 
The report of the Secretary of the Treasury will exhibit the condition of these debts, the extent and effect of the present indulgence, the probable result of its further extension on the state of the Treasury, and every other fact necessary to a full consideration of the subject. Similar information is communicated in regard to such depositories of the public moneys as are indebted to the Government, in order that Congress may also adopt the proper measures in regard to them. 
The receipts and expenditures for the first half of the year and an estimate of those for the residue will be laid before you by the Secretary of the Treasury. In his report of December last it was estimated that the current receipts would fall short of the expenditures by about $3,000,000. It will be seen that the difference will be much greater. This is to be attributed not only to the occurrence of greater pecuniary embarrassments in the business of the country than those which were then predicted, and consequently a greater diminution in the revenue, but also to the fact that the appropriations exceeded by nearly six millions the amount which was asked for in the estimates then submitted. The sum necessary for the service of the year, beyond the probable receipts and the amount which it was intended should be reserved in the Treasury at the commencement of the year, will be about six millions. If the whole of the reserved balance be not at once applied to the current expenditures, but four millions be still kept in the Treasury, as seems most expedient for the uses of the Mint and to meet contingencies, the sum needed will be ten millions. 
In making this estimate the receipts are calculated on the supposition of some further extension of the indulgence granted in the payment of bonds for duties, which will affect the amount of the revenue for the present year to the extent of two and a half millions. 
It is not proposed to procure the required amount by loans or increased taxation. There are now in the Treasury $9,367,214, directed by the act of the 23d of June, 1836, to be deposited with the States in October next. This sum, if so deposited, will be subject under the law to be recalled if needed to defray existing appropriations; and as it is now evident that the whole, or the principal part, of it will be wanted for that purpose, it appears most proper that the deposit should be withheld. Until the amount can be collected from the banks, Treasury notes may be temporarily issued, to be gradually redeemed as it is received. 
I am aware that this course may be productive of inconvenience to many of the States. Relying upon the acts of Congress which held out to them the strong probability, if not the certainty, of receiving this installment, they have in some instances adopted measures with which its retention may seriously interfere. That such a condition of things should have occurred is much to be regretted. It is not the least among the unfortunate results of the disasters of the times; and it is for Congress to devise a fit remedy, if there be one. The money being indispensable to the wants of the Treasury, it is difficult to conceive upon what principle of justice or expediency its application to that object can be avoided. To recall any portion of the sums already deposited with the States would be more inconvenient and less efficient. To burden the country with increased taxation when there is in fact a large surplus revenue would be unjust and unwise; to raise moneys by loans under such circumstances, and thus to commence a new national debt, would scarcely be sanctioned by the American people. 
The plan proposed will be adequate to all our fiscal operations during the remainder of the year. Should it be adopted, the Treasury, aided by the ample resources of the country, will be able to discharge punctually every pecuniary obligation. For the future all that is needed will be that caution and forbearance in appropriations which the diminution of the revenue requires and which the complete accomplishment or great forwardness of many expensive national undertakings renders equally consistent with prudence and patriotic liberality. 
The preceding suggestions and recommendations are submitted in the belief that their adoption by Congress will enable the executive department to conduct our fiscal concerns with success so far as their management has been committed to it. Whilst the objects and the means proposed to attain them are within its constitutional powers and appropriate duties, they will at the same time, it is hoped, by their necessary operation, afford essential aid in the transaction of individual concerns, and thus yield relief to the people at large in a form adapted to the nature of our Government. Those who look to the action of this Government for specific aid to the citizen to relieve embarrassments arising from losses by revulsions in commerce and credit lose sight of the ends for which it was created and the powers with which it is clothed. It was established to give security to us all in our lawful and honorable pursuits, under the lasting safeguard of republican institutions. It was not intended to confer special favors on individuals or on any classes of them, to create systems of agriculture, manufactures, or trade, or to engage in them either separately or in connection with individual citizens or organized associations. If its operations were to be directed for the benefit of any one class, equivalent favors must in justice be extended to the rest, and the attempt to bestow such favors with an equal hand, or even to select those who should most deserve them, would never be successful. 
All communities are apt to look to government for too much. Even in our own country, where its powers and duties are so strictly limited, we are prone to do so, especially at periods of sudden embarrassment and distress. But this ought not to be. The framers of our excellent Constitution and the people who approved it with calm and sagacious deliberation acted at the time on a sounder principle. They wisely judged that the less government interferes with private pursuits the better for the general prosperity. It is not its legitimate object to make men rich or to repair by direct grants of money or legislation in favor of particular pursuits losses not incurred in the public service. This would be substantially to use the property of some for the benefit of others. But its real duty  that duty the performance of which makes a good government the most precious of human blessings  is to enact and enforce a system of general laws commensurate with, but not exceeding, the objects of its establishment, and to leave every citizen and every interest to reap under its benign protection the rewards of virtue, industry, and prudence. 
I can not doubt that on this as on all similar occasions the Federal Government will find its agency most conducive to the security and happiness of the people when limited to the exercise of its conceded powers. In never assuming, even for a well-meant object, such powers as were not designed to be conferred upon it, we shall in reality do most for the general welfare. To avoid every unnecessary interference with the pursuits of the citizen will result in more benefit than to adopt measures which could only assist limited interests, and are eagerly, but perhaps naturally, sought for under the pressure of temporary circumstances. If, therefore, I refrain from suggesting to Congress any specific plan for regulating the exchanges of the country, relieving mercantile embarrassments, or interfering with the ordinary operations of foreign or domestic commerce, it is from a conviction that such measures are not within the constitutional province of the General Government, and that their adoption would not promote the real and permanent welfare of those they might be designed to aid. 
The difficulties and distresses of the times, though unquestionably great, are limited in their extent, and can not be regarded as affecting the permanent prosperity of the nation. Arising in a great degree from the transactions of foreign and domestic commerce, it is upon them that they have chiefly fallen. The great agricultural interest has in many parts of the country suffered comparatively little, and, as if Providence intended to display the munificence of its goodness at the moment of our greatest need, and in direct contrast to the evils occasioned by the waywardness of man, we have been blessed throughout our extended territory with a season of general health and of uncommon fruitfulness. The proceeds of our great staples will soon furnish the means of liquidating debts at home and abroad, and contribute equally to the revival of commercial activity and the restoration of commercial credit. The banks, established avowedly for its support, deriving their profits from it, and resting under obligations to it which can not be overlooked, will feel at once the necessity and justice of uniting their energies with those of the mercantile interest. 
The suspension of specie payments at such a time and under such circumstances as we have lately witnessed could not be other than a temporary measure, and we can scarcely err in believing that the period must soon arrive when all that are solvent will redeem their issues in gold and silver. Dealings abroad naturally depend on resources and prosperity at home. If the debt of our merchants has accumulated or their credit is impaired, these are fluctuations always incident to extensive or extravagant mercantile transactions. But the ultimate security of such obligations does not admit of question. They are guaranteed by the resources of a country the fruits of whose industry afford abundant means of ample liquidation, and by the evident interest of every merchant to sustain a credit hitherto high by promptly applying these means for its preservation. 
I deeply regret that events have occurred which require me to ask your consideration of such serious topics. I could have wished that in making my first communication to the assembled representatives of my country I had nothing to dwell upon but the history of her unalloyed prosperity. Since it is otherwise, we can only feel more deeply the responsibility of the respective trusts that have been confided to us, and under the pressure of difficulties unite in invoking the guidance and aid of the Supreme Ruler of Nations and in laboring with zealous resolution to overcome the difficulties by which we are environed. 
It is under such circumstances a high gratification to know by long experience that we act for a people to whom the truth, however unpromising, can always be spoken with safety; for the trial of whose patriotism no emergency is too severe, and who are sure never to desert a public functionary honestly laboring for the public good. It seems just that they should receive without delay any aid in their embarrassments which your deliberations can afford. Coming directly from the midst of them, and knowing the course of events in every section of our country, from you may best be learnt as well the extent and nature of these embarrassments as the most desirable measures of relief. 
I am aware, however, that it is not proper to detain you at present longer than may be demanded by the special objects for which you are convened. To them, therefore, I have confined my communication; and believing it will not be your own wish now to extend your deliberations beyond them, I reserve till the usual period of your annual meeting that general information on the state of the Union which the Constitution requires me to give. 
M. VAN BUREN. 

  
  
SPECIAL MESSAGES. 
WASHINGTON, September 7, 1837. 
To the Senate of the United States: 
I transmit, for the consideration of the Senate with a view to its ratification, a general convention of peace, friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, signed at Lima on the 30th of November, 1836, by Samuel Larned, the chargé d'affaires of the United States, and J. Garcia del Rio, minister of state in the department of finance of the North Peruvian State. 
M. VAN BUREN. 

WASHINGTON, September 19, 1837. 
Hon. R.M. JOHNSON. 
SIR: I have the honor to inclose a report of the Secretary of War, on the subject of the resolution of the Senate of the 2d of March, 1837. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
M. VAN BUREN. 

WASHINGTON, September 26, 1837. 
To the House of Representatives of the United States: 
I herewith transmit to the House of Representatives a report from the Secretary of State, accompanied by copies of the correspondence requested by their resolution of the 13th instant. 
M. VAN BUREN. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 25, 1837. 
The Secretary of State, to whom was referred the resolution of the House of Representatives dated the 13th instant, requesting the President to communicate to that body, "so far as the public interest will permit, the correspondence between the Government of the United States and that of Great Britain relating to the northeastern boundary of the United States since the message of the late President to the Senate of the United States of the 15th of June, 1836, and all the correspondence which has taken place since that period between the Government of the United States and the governor of the State of Maine on the subject of alleged aggressions upon the rights of Maine by the British authorities," has the honor respectfully to submit to the President copies of the letters and documents requested by that resolution. 
JOHN FORSYTH. 

STATE OF MAINE, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
Augusta, March 30, 1837. 
SIR: In compliance with a request of the legislature of this State, I have the honor to transmit to you the accompanying report and resolutions. 
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
ROBERT P. DUNLAP. 

STATE OF MAINE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
MARCH 29, 1837. 
The joint select committee who had under consideration the order relating to the expediency of calling the attention of Congress to the subject of fortifying our maritime and interior frontier have attended to that duty, and ask leave to present the following report: 
One object of the federal compact is "to provide for the common defense and general welfare." 
In accordance with these objects of the compact, the General Government has from time to time made liberal appropriations for fortifying and defending the several States along our extended maritime frontier west and south of the western boundary line of this State. East of that line a mere trifle has as yet been appropriated for these objects. 
Maine has a maritime frontier of about 500 miles in extent, following the indentations of her shores, and our interior frontier, bounding on New Brunswick on the east and the Canadas on the north, is about 600 miles in extent. 
Considering this great extent of seacoast, her numerous excellent harbors, her noble rivers and great advantages for shipbuilding, and her proximity to the fishing grounds, probably no State in the Union possesses the natural advantages for carrying on this branch of industry that Maine does. 
It is a fact worthy of consideration that all maritime nations have looked to their fisheries as the nursery of hardy seamen for the merchant service in time of peace and for the navy in time of war, and as a great question of national policy (aside from the inducement to encourage this branch of business as an unfailing source of natural wealth) it is deemed worthy of the fostering care of all commercial nations. 
Already the navigation of Maine is estimated at more than 300,000 tons, and exceeded by only two States in the Union, and her increase annually of tonnage is greater than that of any other State. 
The abundance of building materials, believed to be inexhaustible, her great conveniences for shipbuilding along her extended seacoast, her numerous bays, rivers, and harbors, render it highly probable that the day is not far distant when the maritime interests of Maine will exceed that of any of her sister States; and if reliance can be placed upon the statements of a scientific engineer of high respectability and standing, who has during the past year, under the direction of the government of this State and our parent Commonwealth, made a geological survey of a portion of our State, it may be doubted whether the same extent of territory on the continent contains more real value viewed in all its bearings (the facilities of quarrying, manufacturing, exporting, and its influence upon the great interests of the State and nation) than is contained in our inexhaustible quarries of granite, lime, marble, slate, etc., mines and minerals in which large and profitable investments are already made. Some of these branches of business have been carried on for many years, and others to a large extent are commencing under the most favorable auspices. 
These, together with our agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing interests, our immense forests of invaluable timber, with a water power of vast extent and value, giving us the means of laying the seaports of the Union under a contribution for ages to come, and warranting the belief that our present shipping interest will be sustained and employed and a great increase required. 
About one-third of the most valuable portion of our territory is claimed by Great Britain, and the history of this protracted controversy from its commencement to the present time is such as to awaken general anxiety. We are admonished by recent events that we have not yet reached the termination of our toils and embarrassments, and they have awakened the painful apprehension that our just rights may not be secured by honorable negotiation or patient submission to unprovoked injuries. These considerations, in the opinion of your committee, call loudly for the interposition of the General Government, and require at their hands all needful preparation for possible contingencies. The late Governor Lincoln nearly ten years since called the attention of the Government to the importance of erecting a strong fortification in some eligible position on the confines of that portion of our territory to which an adverse claim is set up by Great Britain. In the opinion of your committee, the subject has lost none of its interest since that period, but, on the contrary, the events to which we have alluded give to it vastly augmented importance; and to our view, irrespective of any conditions growing out of the present controversy, a strong fortification upon the northeastern boundary of the United States, situated far in the interior and upon the confines of a foreign country, and surrounded by millions of acres of fertile land, destined soon to be peopled with a numerous population of hardy yeomanry, is of high importance. 
Our isolated situation, being the northeastern boundary of the nation, with an interior frontier upward of 600 miles upon a foreign country and a large proportion of our territory lying between two Provinces of Great Britain and so situated as to render it greatly to the advantage of that nation to possess it; the inflexible determination which she manifests to pursue the course which interest dictates should not be forgotten; the extent of our seacoast; the exposed situation of our seaport towns, lying within a few hours' sail of the British naval depot in the neighborhood of Maine; the disastrous consequences of our defenseless situation during the last war; the great and increasing maritime interests which we have at stake without one single point where a ship, if dependent upon the United States fortifications, would be safe from the attacks of a frigate  these and the consideration that little, comparatively, has yet been done for Maine seem to our view to constitute irresistible reasons why Maine should no longer be forgotten or neglected in the common defense of the country. 
Through all the long-protracted struggles, difficulties, and embarrassments of our infant Republic this portion of our Union has never been urgent or importunate in pressing its claims, but has submitted patiently to the force of circumstances which rendered it necessary to defer them. 
But in the present altered condition of the country  the national debt paid off at a season of universal peace and unexampled prosperity, with an overburthened Treasury, and when it is deemed necessary to dispose of it to resort to measures which many eminent statesmen consider unwarranted by the Constitution and which a great portion of the people of the Union consider of doubtful policy  at such a period and under such circumstances it is difficult to perceive the justice of longer withholding suitable appropriations for the defense of Maine, and to our view it can only be withheld by doing violence to the principles of equal rights and by neglecting a plain constitutional duty. 
Your committee therefore submit the following resolutions. 
STEPHEN C. FOSTER,
Chairman. 
STATE OF MAINE. 
RESOLVE relating to the fortification of frontier States. 
Resolved, That the obligation of the Federal Government, under the Constitution, when it has the means to erect suitable fortifications for the defense of the frontier of the States, is a practical duty not justly to be denied, evaded, neglected, or delayed. 
Resolved, That our Senators in Congress be instructed and our Representatives requested to use their influence to obtain liberal appropriations for the defense of Maine and the Union. 
Resolved, That the governor be requested to transmit copies of the above report and resolutions to the President and Vice-President, the Secretaries of State, Navy, and War, and to each of our Senators and Representatives in Congress. 
[Passed by both Houses and approved March 30, 1837.] 

STATE OF MAINE, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
Augusta, April 30, 1837. 
His Excellency MARTIN VAN BUREN,
President of the United States. 
SIR: In compliance with a request of the legislature of this State, I have the honor to transmit to Your Excellency the accompanying report and resolutions: 
In behalf of the State of Maine, I would respectfully, yet urgently, call on the President of the United States to cause the northeastern boundary of this State to be explored and surveyed and monuments erected in accordance with the request contained in the resolutions which are herewith communicated. As the subject is one in which the people of Maine have a deep interest, I feel a confidence it will commend itself to your early attention. 
With high consideration, I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, 
ROBERT P. DUNLAP. 

STATE OF MAINE, IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
FEBRUARY 2, 1837. 
The joint committee to whom was referred so much of the governor's message as relates to the northeastern boundary, and the documents and evidence, together with an order of the two houses instructing the committee "to inquire into the expediency of providing by law for the appointment of commissioners on the part of this State, by the consent of the Government of the United States, to survey the line between this State and the Province of New Brunswick according to the treaty of 1783, to establish monuments in such places as shall be fixed by said commissioners and by commissioners to be appointed on the part of the Government of Great Britain, have attended to the duties assigned them with the industry and solicitude which the importance of the subject demanded. Could the committee have spared the time and had the means to obtain documents not within the jurisdiction of the State, and consequently out of its power, a more clear, methodical, and perfect view of the subject would have been presented; but as there had been hitherto so much procrastination and the impatience of the public, already great, was becoming more and more intense, your committee without further preamble or apology ask leave to present the following report: 
The legislature and people of Maine, we believe, will not contend that the treaty-making power of the United States does not extend to a final adjustment of a disputed and undefined line of boundary between a State and a foreign nation; but we do insist that no power is granted by the Constitution of the United States to limit or change the boundary of a State or cede a part of its territory without its consent. It is even by no means certain how far such consent would enable the treaty authority to exert its powers. Citizens might be made the subjects of a treaty transfer, and these citizens owing allegiance to the State and to the Union, and allegiance and protection being reciprocally binding, the right to transfer a citizen to a foreign government, to sell him, might well be questioned as being inconsistent with the spirit of our free institutions. But be this as it may, Maine will never concede the principle that the President and two-thirds of the Senate can transfer its territory, much less its citizens, without its permission, given by its constitutional organs. 
Your committee, however, deem it but fair to admit that they have discovered no inclination in the General Government, or any department of it, to assume this power. On the contrary, the President has repeatedly declined the adoption of a conventional line deviating from the treaty of 1783, upon the express ground that it could not be done without the consent of Maine. 
It is due, nevertheless, to the State of Maine to say that the committee have no evidence that any conventional line has been proposed to them for their consent. It indeed appears that the consent of Maine had not been given to the adoption of any other boundary than that prescribed by the treaty of 1783 up to the 29th February, 1836, and we are well assured that no proposition for a different boundary has since that time been made to any department of the government of this State. 
The President of the United States on the 15th June last communicated to the Senate, in compliance with their resolution, a copy of the correspondence relative to the northeastern boundary. This correspondence embraced a period from the 21st July, 1832, to the 5th March, 1836. 
The opinion and advice of the King of the Netherlands, to whom the controversy was referred by the provisions of the treaty of Ghent, was made on the 10th January, 1831, and of the three questions submitted, viz, the northeastern boundary, the northwesternmost head of Connecticut River, and the forty-fifth parallel of latitude, he seems to have determined but one. He did decide that the source of the stream running into and through Connecticut Lake is the true northwest head of that river as intended by the treaty of 1783; and as to the rest, he advises that it will be convenient (il conviendra) to adopt the "Thalweg," the deepest channel of the St. John and St. Francis, for the north line, and that the forty-fifth degree is to be measured in order to mark out the boundary to the St. Lawrence, with a deviation so as to include Rouses Point within the United States. As to the convenience of establishing the St. John and St. Francis as the northern boundary of Maine, we have only to observe that however "convenient" it may be to Great Britain to obtain so large a portion of our territory and waters, it would certainly be very inconvenient to us, and inasmuch as we are probably capable of judging of our own "convenience," and have never solicited the advice of anyone on this point, it is scarcely to be expected that we shall be advised to adopt a line so preposterous and injurious. 
It was in this view and in strict conformity with the Constitution conferring the treaty power that the President on the 7th December, 1831, submitted to the Senate this "award" and "advice" of the King of the Netherlands. Senators were divided on a principal point, some insisting that to carry the award or opinion into effect was only in execution of the treaty, and it therefore belonged exclusively to the President "to take care" that this "supreme law" was faithfully executed or to reject it altogether. 
But the prevailing opinion was that this "award" or "advice" was perfecting an unfinished treaty, and that therefore it could not be effected by the President without "the advice and consent of the Senate, two-thirds of the members present concurring therein." So far from the concurrence of two-thirds for the measure, there were thirty-four to eight against it, and it was consequently rejected, and a recommendation to the President was adopted to open a new negotiation to determine the line of boundary according to the treaty of 1783. 
It is insisted by the British ministers that a due north line from the monument at the source of the St. Croix will intersect no highlands described in the treaty of 1783. Now this is an assumption by Great Britain totally unwarranted by any evidence. The boundaries bearing upon the question are thus given: "From the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, to wit, that angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of the St. Croix River to the highlands; along the said highlands which divide the rivers that empty themselves into the St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the north westernmost head of Connecticut River"; "east by a line to be drawn along the middle of the river St. Croix from its mouth, in the Bay of Fundy, to its source, and from its source directly north to the aforesaid highlands which divide the rivers that fall into the Atlantic Ocean from those which fall into the St. Lawrence." 
The first object, starting place, or terminus a quo, is this northwest angle of Nova Scotia. It is the corner of the British Province designated by themselves. It was presumed, and it is still believed, that they knew the identical spot; we have a right to demand of them to define it. In the treaty of 1783 they were disposed to define it, and hence they say it is that angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of the St. Croix to those highlands which divide the rivers that flow into the St. Lawrence from those which flow into the Atlantic Ocean. 
Nothing can be more clear than that the British negotiators of the treaty of 1783 had reference to their east and west line between Canada and Nova Scotia. This in 1755-56 was matter of controversy between France and England, the French claiming that it was far south and the British strenuously contending that these very highlands were even more north than we have endeavored to fix them. 
The controversy resulted in a war, which, after the capture of Quebec, was terminated by the peace of 1763, whereby Great Britain obtained both sides of the line, and she then established the north line of Nova Scotia about where we contend it should be. So far from admitting that a due north line from the monument will not intersect the highlands intended by the treaty of 1783, the State of Maine has always insisted, and still insists, that no known obstacle exists to the ascertaining and accurately defining them, and thus establishing the terminus a quo, to wit, the northwest angle of Nova Scotia. It would seem strange, indeed, that this line, so fully discussed and controverted between the English and French in 1755-56, should have been left unsettled still when both Provinces became British. It is impossible to imagine such ignorance of so important a point as this northwest angle, so often referred to and spoken of as a notorious monument. 
The peace of 1783 was considered by Great Britain as a grant by metes and bounds. The boundaries were prescribed, and this northwest angle was the commencement. Twenty years only before this (1763) Nova Scotia had been organized as a distinct Province, then including what are now Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and this angle was referred to as a boundary without hesitancy or doubt. Indeed, the treaty itself, as if to make assurance doubly sure, fixed it where a due north line from the source of the St. Croix will intersect those highlands which divide the rivers which flow into the river St. Lawrence from those which flow into the Atlantic Ocean. This source of the St. Croix has been determined and a monument fixed there by the commissioners under the fifth article of the treaty of 1795 (Jay's). Now the assumption that the north line from this monument will intersect or meet no such highlands is entirely gratuitous. 
The treaty does not speak of mountains nor even hills, but of "highlands" that divide rivers flowing different ways. It was well known that rivers did fall into the St. Lawrence and into the Atlantic, that these rivers would run down and not up, and it was consequently inferred that the land from whence these rivers flowed must of necessity be high, and unless there are to be found in that region geological phenomena which exist nowhere else on the face of the globe this inference is irresistible. 
The truth is that these highlands have been known and well understood by the British themselves ever since the grant of James I to Sir William Alexander, in 1621. The portion of the boundary there given which relates to this controversy is "from the western spring head of the St. Croix, by an imaginary line conceived to run through the land northward to the next road of Ships River or Spring discharging itself into the great river of Canada, and proceeding thence eastward along the shores of the sea of the said river of Canada to the road, haven, or shore commonly called Gaspeck" (Gaspé). 
The cession of Canada by France made it necessary to define the limits of the Province of Quebec, and accordingly His Britannic Majesty, by his proclamation of 7th October, 1763, is thus explicit as to what affects this question: "Passing along the highlands which divide the rivers that empty themselves into the said river St. Lawrence from those which fall into the sea, and also along the north coast of the Bay de Chaleurs and the coast of the Gulf of the St. Lawrence to Cape Rosiers" etc. 
The act of Parliament of the fourteenth George III (1774) defines thus the south line of Canada: "South by a line from the Bay de Chaleurs along the highlands which divide the rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence from those which flow into the sea." The north line of the grant to Alexander is from the source of the St. Croix to the "spring head" or source of some river or stream which falls into the river St. Lawrence, and thence eastward to Gaspé Bay, which communicates with the Gulf of St. Lawrence in latitude 49° 30', and would make nearly an east and west line. The proclamation of 1763 defines the south line of the Province of Quebec as passing along the highlands which divide the rivers that fall into the St. Lawrence from those which fall into the sea, and also along the north coast of the Bay de Chaleurs to the Gulf of St. Lawrence. This is the south boundary, and consequently in an east and west direction; but it passes north of Bay de Chaleurs, wherefore the south boundary of the Province must of necessity be north of Bay de Chaleurs. The eastern boundary is northerly by the Gulf of Cape Rosiers, in about latitude 50°, longitude 64° north of Gaspé Bay, and at the mouth of the river St. Lawrence, where it communicates with the gulf or sea. And the act of Parliament makes this south side from this same bay along those highlands, and it must inevitably run west or it is no south boundary. Now no one can doubt that in the proclamation of 1763 it was the intent to adopt Sir William Alexander's northern for this southern boundary of the Province of Quebec. 
Indeed, it appears in every commission to the governor of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick from 1763 to 1784, and after the treaty of peace of 1783, that the Province of Nova Scotia extended to the southern boundary of the Province of Quebec. It then irresistibly and inevitably follows that a west line from the Bay de Chaleurs, intersecting a due north line from the monument, is the identical northwest angle. Now a line from Mars Hill direct to Cape Rosiers, instead of being easterly, would be north of northeast, crossing the Bay de Chaleurs. But passing along its north coast, as the proclamation provides, the line from this Mars Hill must be more northerly still. Indeed, the pretense that a pyramidal spur or peak, such as this hill, should constitute the range of highlands mentioned in the treaty is so utterly visionary that it is entitled to no sort of respect. 
We may now by these facts and reflections give this inquiry a right direction, to wit, to the ascertainment of the north boundary of Nova Scotia, which is the southern boundary of Canada. We have always been lured from this by the British negotiators to the left or west of this north line from the monument. 
No one who is in the least conversant with the subject can suppose for a moment that this northwest angle can be found in such a direction. The question for us is, Are there any highlands north of the Bay de Chaleurs extending in a western direction toward a north line drawn from the monument? If this line westerly from the bay be not distinctly marked so far as to intersect this north line, the principle is to extend it in the same direction to the place of intersection; that is, if the line between Nova Scotia and Canada is west to within, say, 30 miles of the north line from the monument, and the rest of the way is indefinite or obscure, extend it on in the same direction until you form a point of intersection, and this will be the northwest angle of Nova Scotia. But the truth is, the highlands are there, and have been found in running due north from the monument. The elevations were taken by the British surveyor from the source of the St. Croix, at the monument, to the first waters of the Restigouche; and at Mars Hill, 40 miles, the summit of this isolated sugar loaf was 1,100 feet, and at the termination of the survey at the Restigouche waters, 100 miles farther, the elevation was I,600 feet; consequently the summit of Mars Hill, 1,100 feet above the waters of the St. Croix, is 500 feet lower than the lands at the Restigouche. And yet the pretense is that there are no highlands but this detached spur, Mars Hill! Still further, the highest position surveyed is nearly 50 miles short of the Melis, which falls into the St. Lawrence, and we do not perceive that the elevations have been taken there at all, but we do find it is here that the waters separate, and consequently the land must be still higher. 
In failure of highlands (assumed not to exist), the British negotiators claim a line which, instead of dividing the St. Lawrence and Atlantic waters, would actually extend between two rivers, both of which fall into the Atlantic. 
To say nothing of the absurdity, not to say ignorance, of such a claim, it is enough that it is in the teeth of the treaty itself. It is painful to repeat the argument that no other highlands were intended, for all others were expressly excluded but those which divide the waters that flow in those different directions. The effect of their construction, as we all know, is to give them the whole of the St. John, with all its tributaries, and a tract of territory south of that river equal at least to 75 miles square. 
Whether from the peaceful spirit of our Government, the Christian patience of Maine, or the "modest assurance" of the British negotiators  any or all  certain it is that His Britannic Majesty's pretensions are growing every day. It is not only an afterthought, but one very recently conceived, that we were to be driven south of the St. John. 
His Britannic Majesty's agent, Mr. Chipman, who has been lately urging us south of that river, was also agent to the commission, under the treaty of 1795, to ascertain the true St. Croix, and in insisting on a more western branch of this river gives as a reason that a line due north will cross the St, John farther up, whereas if you take an eastern branch such line will cross near Frederickton, the seat of government of New Brunswick, and materially infringe upon His Majesty's Province. He not only admits, but contends, that this north line must cross the river. Here are his words: "This north line must of necessity cross the river St. John." Mr. Liston, the British minister, in a private letter to Mr. Chipman of 23d October, 1798, recommends a modification of the powers of the commissioners for the reason that it might give Great Britain a greater extent of navigation on the St. John River. The same agent, Mr. Chipman, was also agent under the fourth article of the treaty of Ghent, and we find him contending there "that the northwest angle of Nova Scotia is the same designated in the grant to Sir William Alexander in 1621, subject only to such alterations as were occasioned by the erection of the Province of Quebec in 1763." Now we have already seen that this south line of the Province of Quebec, so far from altering this northwest angle, in fact confirms it. 
In perfect accordance with this disposition to encroach is a proposition of the British minister (Mr. Vaughan) that inasmuch as the highlands can not be found by a due north direction from the monument we should vary west until we should intersect them, but not EAST. Now that in case a monument can not be found in the course prescribed you should look for it at the left, but not to the right, seems to us a very sinister proposition. We have shown, and, as we think, conclusively, that the range of highlands is to be looked for on British ground, and nowhere else, because it is their own boundary, and a line which must, with an ascertained north line, form the angle of one of their own Provinces. And yet we are not to examine there at all; we have never explored the country there, and are expected to yield to such arrogant, extravagant, and baseless pretensions! 
We would ask why, in what justice, if we can not find the object in the route prescribed, are we to be thus trammeled? Where is the reciprocity of such a proposition, so degrading to the dignity and insulting to the rights and liberties of this State? No; the people of Maine will not now, and we trust they never will, tamely submit to such a one-sided measure. 
The next restriction or limitation with which this negotiation is to be clogged is an admission that the Restigouche and St. John are not Atlantic rivers, because one flows into the Bay de Chaleurs and the other into the Bay of Fundy; yet neither falls into the river St. Lawrence. They would then find those highlands between the St. John and the Penobscot. There can not be a more arrogant pretension or palpable absurdity. Suppose the waters of both these rivers are excluded as flowing neither way, still the waters that flow each way are so far separated as to leave a tract of country which, if equally divided, would carry us far beyond the St. John. But we admit no such hypothesis. The Atlantic and the sea are used in the charters as synonymous terms. The Restigouche, uniting with the Bay de Chaleurs, which communicates with the sea, and the St. John, uniting with the Bay of Fundy, which also communicates with the sea, and that, too, by a mouth 90 miles wide, are both Atlantic rivers. These rivers were known by the negotiators not to be St. Lawrence rivers; they were known to exist, for they were rivers of the first class. If they were neither St. Lawrence nor Atlantic, why were they not excepted? They were not of the former, therefore they must be included in the latter description. Indeed, if rivers uniting with Atlantic bays are not Atlantic rivers, the Penobscot and Kennebec, which unite with the respective bays of Penobscot and Sagadahock, would not be Atlantic rivers, and then where are those highlands which divide the waters referred to in the treaty of 1783? Should we leave this question unsettled a little longer, and the British claims continue to increase, we might very soon find these highlands south of the Connecticut, and all the intermediate country would be recolonized by "construction." We therefore invoke the sympathy of all New England, with New York besides, to unite against this progressive claim  this avalanche which threatens to overwhelm them as well as ourselves. 
Again, if this Mars Hill (and we confess we can not speak of the pretension with any patience) is the northwest angle, and the north boundary of Nova Scotia and the south boundary of the Province of Quebec are the same, and north of the Bay de Chaleurs, then there is indeed no northwest angle, for a line due north from the monument, passing by Mars Hill, must pursue nearly the same direction to get to the north of that bay without crossing it; and who ever thought of an angle at the side of a continuous line? Now, according to the British maps taken in this very case, you must run a course of north about 14° east to obtain the north side of the bay without crossing it, and the distance would be in this almost due north direction more than 100 miles, while that from the monument to Mars Hill would be little more than 40. Now when we consider that this northerly line must form nearly a right angle to pass along the north shore of the Bay de Chaleurs, that this is 100 miles farther north than Mars Hill, where instead of an angle there can be only an inclination of 14°, can there be a greater absurdity than the British claim founded on these facts? 
We will now present some facts and remarks in regard to the surveys and explorings made by the commission under the fifth article of the treaty of Ghent, and the first fact that occurs is that the elevations taken by the British surveyor stop far short of where the waters divide, and we find no proof that these elevations were carried through by our own surveyors. If the British surveyor, after ascertaining he was still ascending and had in fact arrived at the lands at a branch of a river elevated 500 feet above the summit of Mars Hill, found it prudent to stop short, we see no good reason why the American agent did not proceed on and take accurate elevations at a place where the waters divide. If such a survey was made, the committee have not been able to obtain the evidence. It is not in the maps or documents in the library or office of the Secretary of State, and the committee believe that no such elevations have been taken northerly of the first waters of the Restigouche. It is, indeed, a little singular that we have so little evidence, not only in regard to this height of land, but also of the rivers which flow into the St. Lawrence to the left, and especially to the right, of the north line from the monument. 
We know some of them, to be sure, such as the Oelle Kamouska, Verte, Trois Pistoles, Remouskey, and Metis on the left, and the Blanche, Louis, Magdalen, and others on the right of this line, but we know them chiefly as on maps and as transcribed from older maps, but very little from actual survey or even exploration. An examination of the sources of those rivers at the right of this north line, with the important natural boundary, the north shore of the Bay de Chaleurs, would accurately define the divisional line between the Province of Quebec and Nova Scotia, which extending west would intersect the due north line and thus form the northwest angle of Nova Scotia. 
It moreover appears that little or no exploration has been made of the lands east of the due north line. It seems strange to us, although it may be satisfactorily explained, why we should have been drawn away from this very important region. It is, indeed, the true source of inquiry. In this direction the evidence is to be found, and Maine can never be satisfied until it is looked for here. 
An extraordinary method of adjusting this question, though in perfect accordance with other pretensions, has been proposed by Great Britain  that the disputed territory should be divided in equal portions, each party being satisfied of the justice of its claims. To this proposition we can not subscribe. It is equally unjust between nations and individuals. Whether a party in controversy is satisfied or not with the justice of his claims is what is only known to himself, and consequently the one whose claims are most exorbitant, however unjust, will always get the best end of the bargain. But such a rule would in this case apply most unfortunately to Maine. We are limited at farthest to the St. Lawrence, and to a very narrow point there, while the British may extend their claims to the south and west indefinitely. Establish this principle and we shall soon find their claims, already so progressive, stretched over to the Piscataqua, and then if we are to divide equally both as to quantity and quality the divisional line then would fall south of the Kennebec. If the want of the consent of Maine is the obstacle to such an adjustment, we trust it will always remain an insuperable one. Indeed, we protest against the application to us of such a rule as manifestly unequal and unjust. 
We come now to the recent transactions of the British colonial authorities, sanctioned, as it appears, by the Government at home, and we regret to perceive in them also those strong indications of continual and rapid encroachment which have characterized that Government in the whole of this controversy. Mr. Livingston, in his letter of 21st July, 1832, proposes that "until the matter be brought to a final conclusion both parties should refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction," and Mr. Vaughan, in reply of 14th April, 1833, in behalf of his Government, "entirely concurs." Here, then, the faith of the two Governments is pledged to abstain from acts of jurisdiction until all is settled. Now, how are the facts? We understand, and indeed it appears by documents herewith exhibited, that an act has passed the legislature of New Brunswick "incorporating the St. Andrews and Quebec Railroad Company," that the King has granted, £10,000 to aid the enterprise, and that the legislature of Lower Canada, by its resolutions of both houses, has approved the scheme and promised its cooperation. It may be that the Government at home was not aware that this railroad must inevitably cross the disputed territory. 
But this ignorance of the subject seems incredible. A railroad from St. Andrews to Quebec would be impossible unless it crossed the territory in question, even next to impossible and totally useless were it to pass at the north of the St. John. It seems, therefore, extraordinary indeed that the British Government, even in the incipient stages of this enterprise, should make an appropriation which is in direct violation of its solemn pledge. To give to a railroad corporation powers over our rights and property is the strongest act of sovereignty. It is an act of delegated power which we ourselves give to our own citizens with extreme caution and with guarded restrictions and reservations. This railroad must not only cross the disputed territory, but it crosses it 50 miles south of the St. John and almost to the southerly extremity of the British claim, extravagant as it is. By the map herewith exhibited of the survey of the route it appears that the road crosses our due north line at Mars Hill, thence doubling round it toward the south it crosses the Roostic between the Great and Little Machias, the Allegwash at the outlet of First Lake, a branch of the St. John south of Black River, and passes into Canada between "Spruce Hills" on the right and "Three Hills" on the left, thus crossing a tract of country south of the St. John 100 by 50 miles. We have not a copy of the act of incorporation of New Brunswick, and can not, therefore, say that the route there defined is the same as on the map. Be this as it may, certain it is, as anyone will see, that no possible route can be devised which will not cross the territory in question. It is, then, a deliberate act of power, palpable and direct, claiming and exercising sovereignty far south even of the line recommended by the King of the Netherlands. 
In all our inquiries and examinations of this subject there has been great negligence in regard to this northwest angle. Judge Benson, one of the commissioners under Jay's treaty, in a letter to the President of the United States expressly and clearly defines this angle. He states distinctly that the due north line from the source of the St. Croix is the west-side line, and the highlands are the north-side line which form this angle, and this had never been questioned by the British themselves. 
This due north line, viz, the west-side line, was established by the commission of which Judge Benson was a member, and the British have made the north side line to be north of the Bay de Chaleurs, and yet with these postulates to pretend that the points of intersection can not be found is one of the greatest of their absurdities; and another absurdity quite equal is that after passing west along the north shore of this bay they would fall down nearly south more than 100 miles to Mars Hill, about 60 miles from the south shore of the Province, at the Bay of Passamaquoddy, which is part of the Bay of Fundy, and this point, too, of so little inclination that it is a palpable perversion of language to call it an angle, much more a northwest angle. 
It is, indeed, time for us to begin to search, and in the right places, too, in order to put a stop to these perpetual encroachments upon our territory and rights. Our first object should be to ascertain and trace the north boundary of Nova Scotia, which is the south boundary of the Province of Quebec, and see if Canada comes as far down as Mars Hill. And we should proceed to finish taking the elevations on the due north line to some point where the waters divide. The General Government should be immediately called on to execute the work, with the cooperation of Massachusetts and Maine. Notice should be given to the British authorities to unite in the undertaking, and if they refuse our Government ought to proceed ex parte. The act would be entirely pacific, as the object would be to ascertain facts  much more pacific than the survey, without notice, of the St. Andrews and Quebec Railroad through our territory, not for the purpose of ascertaining a boundary, but to assume jurisdiction. 
Your committee have gone through this tedious investigation with all the deliberation, exactness, and candor which our time, means, and feelings would allow. Our animadversions may in some instances have been strong, and even severe, but we think we have expressed the sentiments and feelings of the people of Maine, suffering under protracted injuries. This State should take a firm, deliberate, and dignified stand, and one which it will not retract. While it awards to the General Government all its legitimate powers, it will not be forgetful of its own. We call upon the President and Congress. We invoke that aid and sympathy of our sister States which Maine has always accorded to them. We ask, nay we demand, in the name of justice, HOW LONG we are to be thus trampled down by a foreign people? And we trust we shall meet a cordial and patriotic response in the heart of every republican of the Union. 
Your committee therefore submit the following resolutions: 
STATE OF MAINE. 
RESOLVES relative to the northeastern boundary. 
Resolved, That we view with much solicitude the British usurpations and encroachments on the northeastern part of the territory of this State. 
Resolved, That pretensions so groundless and extravagant indicate a spirit of hostility which we had no reason to expect from a nation with whom we are at peace. 
Resolved, That vigilance, resolution, firmness, and union on the part of this State are necessary in this state of the controversy. 
Resolved, That the governor be authorized and requested to call on the President of the United States to cause the northeastern boundary of this State to be explored and surveyed and monuments erected according to the treaty of 1783. 
Resolved, That the cooperation of Massachusetts be requested. 
Resolved, That our Senators in Congress be instructed and our Representatives requested to endeavor to obtain a speedy adjustment of the controversy. 
Resolved, That copies of this report and resolution be transmitted to the governor of Massachusetts, the President of the United States, to each of our Senators and Representatives in Congress, and other Senators in Congress, and the governors of the several States. 
[Passed house March 24, 1837; passed Senate and approved March 25, 1837.] 

STATE OF MAINE, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
Augusta, June 27, 1837. 
His Excellency MARTIN VAN BUREN,
President of the United States. 
SIR: I lose no time in communicating to Your Excellency a copy of a letter from Sir John Harvey, lieutenant-governor of the Province of New Brunswick, and also of a letter from J.A. Maclauchlan to Sir John Harvey, in relation to the arrest and imprisonment of Ebenezer S. Greely. 
I have the honor to be, with high consideration, your obedient servant, 
ROBERT P. DUNLAP. 

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
Frederickton, New Brunswick, June 12, 1837 
His Excellency the GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF MAINE. 
SIR: Since I had the honor of addressing your excellency under date the 6th instant, announcing my assumption of the administration of this government, a report has been laid before me by the warden of the disputed territory, copy of which I feel it to be an act of courtesy toward your excellency to lose no time in communicating to you. 
In including the territory within the limits of the British claim in the census which "Ebenezer Greely"' appears to have been instructed to take of the population of the county of "Penobscot" he has evidently acted in ignorance or under a misconception of the subsisting relations betwixt England and the United States of America, which I can not allow myself to doubt that your excellency will lose no time in causing to be explained and removed. Though necessarily committed to confinement, I have desired that every regard may be shown to Greely's personal convenience consistent with the position in which he has voluntarily placed himself. I use this expression because, as your excellency will observe, Greely was informed by the warden that if he would desist from the act in which he was engaged and the language which he was holding to the people of the Madawaska settlement (acts constituting not only an interference with the acknowledged rights of jurisdiction of this Province, but the positive exercise within its limits of actual jurisdiction, however unauthorized on the part of the State of Maine) and would withdraw from this district he should be allowed to do so; otherwise that in the discharge of the duties imposed upon him by his office he (the warden), who is in the commission of the peace, must be under the necessity of apprehending, in order to make him amenable to the laws of the Province. This proposal Greely rejected, and was accordingly committed to jail to be dealt with according to law. In the meantime, as an evidence of my desire to cultivate the most friendly understanding with the government of the State of which Greely is a citizen, I lose no time in saying that upon receiving an assurance from your excellency that your authority shall be exerted in restraining this or any other citizen of the State of Maine from adopting proceedings within the British limits (as claimed) calculated to infringe the authority and jurisdiction of this Province and to disturb and unsettle the minds of that portion of its inhabitants residing in the disputed territories until the question in dispute be brought to a final settlement Greely shall immediately be enlarged. 
Trusting that your excellency will see in this proposition an anxious desire on my part to redeem the pledge given in my communication of the 6th instant, I have the honor to be, your excellency's most obedient, humble servant, 
J. HARVEY,
Major-General, Lieutenant-Governor, etc. 

FREDERICKTON, NEW BRUNSWICK,
June 10, 1837. 
His Excellency Major-General SIR JOHN HARVEY, K.C.H.,
Lieutenant-Governor, etc.: 
May it please your excellency: In obedience to your excellency's instructions, communicated to me through the advocate-general in the absence of the attorney and solicitor generals, I have now the honor to report for the information of your excellency that I proceeded with the least possible delay to the Madawaska settlement. On my arrival at the Great Falls, 130 miles from hence, I was informed the American citizen Ebenezer S. Greely had passed up the day previous for the purpose of again proceeding with the census of the inhabitants of Madawaska under authority from the State of Maine. Aware of the probable excitement that would naturally arise between the two governments from this circumstance, and at the same time fully convinced that His Majesty's Government would but regret any unnecessary misunderstanding during the pending negotiation, I thought it advisable to call upon Mr. Coombs, a magistrate residing 12 miles above the Falls, and request him to accompany me, which he readily did, to witness the conversation between Mr. Greely and myself. 
We then proceeded and overtook Mr. Greely a short distance above Green River, about 24 miles from the Falls, having ascertained by the inhabitants, as he passed up the river, that Mr. Greely was the whole of the previous day employed in taking down their names, number of each family, and stating they would shortly receive from the State of Maine a sum of money not exceeding $3 for each head of family out of the surplus revenue of the United States. 
I required Mr. Greely to show me his instructions for exercising authority in Madawaska, when he handed me a document, a copy of which I beg to inclose your excellency, and after perusing the same I returned it with my opinion that I really thought he (Mr. Greely) had mistaken the intention of his instructions, as no allusion was made either to that settlement or the territory in dispute, and therefore if he would then desist in taking the census I would take no notice of what had passed. Moreover, in reply to my advice and request, he (Mr. Greely) remonstrated and attempted to make it appear that he would be fully borne out by his government in what he had done, and it was also his intention to complete the census if he was not prevented; this reply I regret having left me no alternative but to make him a prisoner, which I did on Wednesday, the 7th instant. On Friday evening I arrived in Frederickton, and this morning (Saturday), by the advice of the advocate-generals, I committed him to the gaol of the county of York. 
I have the honor to be, your excellency's most obedient, humble servant, 
J.A. MACLAUCHLAN,
Warden of the Disputed Territory. 

STATE OF MAINE, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
JUNE 19, 1837. 
His Excellency MARTIN VAN BUREN,
President of the United States. 
SIR: I have the honor to inclose to Your Excellency the copy of a letter which came to hand by the last mail, by which it appears that Ebenezer S. Greely, esq., the agent employed by the county commissioners for the county of Penobscot to take the census of the town of Madawaska, has been arrested by the authorities of the Province of New Brunswick and is now incarcerated in the jail at Frederickton. 
In this state of things it becomes my painful duty to make this communication to Your Excellency and to insist that prompt measures be adopted by the Government of the United States to effect the early release of the aforementioned citizen. 
I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant, 
ROBERT P. DUNLAP. 

FREDERICKTON, PROVINCE OF NEW BRUNSWICK,
June 12, 1837. 
ROBERT P. DUNLAP, Esq.,
Governor of Maine. 
SIR: On the 15th of May last I was appointed by the county commissioners of Penobscot County to take the census of Madawaska. On the 6th of June instant I was arrested by Mr. Maclauchlan, from this place, and committed to jail by him, and there I now remain  in the prison at Frederickton. I was committed on the 10th instant. I addressed a letter to you on the 10th, which has gone by the way of St. Andrews. Fearing that letter will not arrive soon, I write again to-day by way of Houlton. I have described my arrest more particularly in my first letter, which you will undoubtedly receive before long; therefore I only give the facts in this, having a chance, by the assistance of Mr. Lombard, of Hallowell, of forwarding this to Houlton privately. I was employed in business of the State, and do expect my Government will intercede and liberate me from prison in a foreign and adjacent Province. I shall be pleased to receive a line from you expressing your opinion, direction, etc. 
I remain, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
EBRN'R S. GREELY. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 26, 1837. 
His Excellency ROBERT P. DUNLAP, Esq.,
Governor of Maine. 
SIR: I have the honor, by direction of the President, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter to him of the 19th instant, inclosing the copy of a communication dated the 12th of the same month addressed to you by Ebenezer S. Greely, esq., the agent employed by the county commissioners for the county of Penobscot to take the census of the town of Madawaska, from which it appears that he has been arrested by the authorities of the Province of New Brunswick and is now in confinement in the jail at Frederickton, and insisting that prompt measures be adopted by the Government of the United States to effect the early release of the above-named citizen. 
The circumstances attending this outrage as given in Mr. Greely's letter are not sufficient, in the view of the President, to warrant the interference of the Government at present. For what cause, at what place, and by what authority the arrest was made is not stated. The necessary explanations may be found, perhaps, in the previous communication which Mr. Greely refers to as having been addressed to you by him on the 10th June; if not, it is probable that you will easily be able to obtain explicit information from other sources and communicate it to this Department. It is indispensable that a full knowledge of all the facts illustrative of the case should be in possession of the Government before any formal application for redress can be properly preferred. 
In the meantime I have in conversation unofficially called the attention of Mr. Fox, the British minister at Washington, to this complaint, and he has given me an assurance that he will immediately address a representation on the subject to the governor of New Brunswick requesting, unless there shall be some very extraordinary reasons against it, that Mr. Greely may be set at liberty. 
I am, sir, your obedient servant, 
JOHN FORSYTH. 

STATE OF MAINE, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
Augusta, June 27, 1837. 
Hon. JOHN FORSYTH,
Secretary of State of the United States. 
SIR: I would respectfully solicit copies of all documents and papers in the Department of State of the United States in relation to the subject of the northeastern boundary, with the exception of such as were furnished this department by the General Government in the year 1827. It is understood that copies have been furnished relative to this subject down to the respective statements submitted by the two Governments to the King of the Netherlands, but the arguments we have not been furnished with. 
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
ROBERT P. DUNLAP.