Topic 60 
ENGLAND AND THE REST OF THE WORLD

December 19, 1918

MR.  LEARY:
Miss Strieker called up this morning to say that Colonel Roosevelt would like you to call on him tomorrow at II o'clock at the Roosevelt Hospital, and bring P.  W.  Wilson with you.  He wants to talk over the article Mr.  Wilson has in this morning's Tribune.  If it can't be arranged for tomorrow morning, then Saturday morning will do.
K.  P.
Mr.  Wilson's telephone number is Bryant 1451.

THIS note was the prelude to one of the most important, as well as one of the last, talks I had with Colonel Roosevelt.  In it he made the flat assertion that it lay with the United States and England to preserve the peace of the world; that he could foresee no reason why there should not be a general arbitration treaty between the two countries, but that such a treaty could not with safety be made with Japan and perhaps not with Italy.

"I see no reason — there is no reason," said he, "why we should not have a general arbitration treaty with Great Britain.  I could not, would not, have said that five years ago, but I can now conceive of no question that may arise between the two countries that cannot in safety and honor be left to arbitration.  Working together they have the peace of the world in their hands.

" I would not favor, I would not approve of such a treaty with Japan.  It would be dangerous.  Such a treaty with Italy might conceivably be dangerous.  But in such a treaty with Great Britain there would be no danger to either party."

Colonel Roosevelt had two things in mind in sending for Mr.  Wilson — to show his appreciation of Wilson's Tribune article referred to in Miss Phelps's note, and to give him assistance in making America's position clear to his English readers.  The article referred to a meeting a few nights earlier of the socalled League of Small Nations to which Wilson had been bidden to speak.  He went there expecting it to be, as the name indicated, a meeting in the interest of small nations.  Instead, it was devoted mainly to demands for the independence of India and to general denunciation of all things English.  Wilson, a former M.P., and a veteran of the press gallery at Westminster, took up the challenge, when it came his turn to speak, with the declaration: "I am an Englishman." Despite hisses he had his say, and with characteristic British doggedness, thereafter pursued his country's assailants through the press.

Colonel Roosevelt had very little to say about this incident.  Instead he plunged, almost immediately Wilson was introduced and he had apologized for having to receive him in a hospital, into the question of President Wilson's mission abroad and the way matters were working out.

"As an American," said he, " I am glad and proud of the reception given Mr.  Wilson.  I know, you know, it is to the President of the United States these honors, these acclamations are given.  As an American I am naturally gratified.  But I very much fear that Mr.  Wilson does not appreciate the fact that these honors, this wonderful welcome, are extended to President Wilson and not to Wilson the individual.  There is danger in this to an egoist of the Wilson type.

"The greatest danger, however, is that the people of England, the people of Europe, will take Mr.  Wilson at his own appraisal, at the value he sets upon himself, and ignore the sentiment of the Republican leaders, the Republican Senate, in the matter of a league of nations.  They should realize that Mr.  Wilson may sell what he cannot deliver, may promise more than he can deliver.  They should not forget that in the recent election Mr.  Wilson, by demanding that the American people elect a Congress favorable to him and his views, demanded, in effect, a vote of confidence, and that the American people, by voting him a Republican House and a Republican Senate, gave him a vote of no confidence.

"The vote was a repudiation of Mr.  Wilson's desire to have a free hand, and should be, as it is, notice to the world, that there are other opinions and other persons to be considered — notice that any treaty Mr.  Wilson may make will be and must be subject to scrutiny and examination, and, therefore, should be made with due regard to that provision in our Constitution giving the Senate coordinate power in treaty making.

"A league of nations per se may be a very desirable thing.  It may be a very dangerous thing.  It may be an instrument that will do the very thing it is designed to prevent — cause war and talk of war.

" I see no reason — there is no reason — why we should not have a general arbitration treaty with Great Britain.  I could not, would not have said that five years ago, but I can now conceive of no question that may arise between the two countries that cannot in safety be left to arbitration.  Working together they have the peace of the world in their hands.

"I would not favor, I would not approve such a treaty with Japan.  It would be dangerous.  Such a treaty with Italy conceivably might be dangerous.  But in such a treaty between the United States and Great Britain there would be no danger to either party.

" We have a common language and common ideals.  Our laws have the same common roots.  There is no question on which we can well quarrel, for our interests are alike.  We have nothing England is likely to wish to take away from us, and I am sure we envy England possession of nothing she has.  Her navy, great though it may be, is not a menace to our commerce.  In the years before we officially recognized the fact that Germany was making war upon us, it stood between us and the consequences of a policy of unpreparedness.  Talk about freedom of the seas — the British Navy has kept them free.

"A general arbitration treaty with Japan is impossible.  Every one who has given the subject careful thought knows that.  At the moment we are at peace with Japan.  Tomorrow, the immigration question may bring us to the edge of war again.

"That question, immigration, is one that we cannot and must not undertake to arbitrate.  It would not arise with England.  Your immigration here is small.  It is furthermore a highly desirable immigration.  Japan's is not desirable and is not wanted.  Nor can there be arbitration on internal matters including the tariff which is an internal matter and must be so considered.  With Japan, however, the danger at all times is immigration, and allied questions.

"There is also objection to such a treaty with Italy.  It is conceivable — in fact possible — that the time is not far distant when the United States may wish to limit or restrict immigration from Italy.  I have the greatest respect for the Italian, but it is possible to get too much even of a good thing, and conceivable that the time will come when we will have all the undigested Italian immigration we may wish.  Then we will wish to close the door.  We could not and would not arbitrate that.

"Therefore, a general arbitration agreement is not possible or desirable.  An honest man will not make a contract he cannot keep.  We are not yet, thank God, converted to the German idea that contracts are scraps of paper.

"The only thing I can see that may make friction between the United States and Great Britain is the Irish question.  That, however, is an internal question that England sooner or later must settle for her own comfort and convenience if nothing else.  It is a matter that makes for trouble within the family — it is, as you know, a cause of annoyance and an issue of importance in Canada and Australia.  Its clearing up will be welcomed by the Dominions, and, I believe, by the people of England generally.  They wish to do justice by Ireland.  Eventually they will do so."

The Colonel had prefaced this talk by a word as to his condition.  He received us, seated in a great arm chair, with a dressing robe partly concealing, partly revealing, that, save for a coat, he was fully dressed.  His color was good, his voice strong, his eye clear.  The only indication other than his presence in a hospital that anything was wrong was a slight swelling in his right arm and hand.

"I'm here," he said, "mainly because I don't happen to have a town house, and it is not at all easy for the doctor who wishes to keep an eye on this inflammatory rheumatism of mine to run out to Oyster Bay.  They sort of like to have me here — at least they don't object to my presence, so I 'm here.  I'll leave in a few days now so as to be home for Christmas with the grandchildren."

Leaving the hospital, Mr.  Wilson, not exactly clear as to why Colonel Roosevelt had sent for him, asked what he should do.

"I appreciate that I have been honored by Mr.  Roosevelt," said he, "but I realize that he is far too busy a man to give up the large part of a morning to a visiting Englishman, merely for the sake of talking to him.  Yet he was not talking for publication; you know he stipulated that he was not being interviewed and must not be quoted.  He made it clear, however, that you know what he has in mind and that he relies on your having that thing done.  Now: what did he have in mind?"

"Two things," said I.  "First, he's a splendid fighter and admires courage in others.  In his sending for you on the strength of your melee with the League of Small Nations, one first class fighting man was extending the right hand of fellowship to a kindred spirit, and as a mark of that fellowship and his appreciation giving you information that almost any American reporter I know of would risk his right eye to get.  Second, and more important, Colonel Roosevelt recognizes the vast importance of getting the real situation in America, the real American sentiment, before the English people.  You are now in a position to state very clearly what the Republican attitude is and will be, for Colonel Roosevelt is today the head and the voice of the Republican Party and in all human probability, as matters now stand, will be the next President.

"This talk leaves you in a position to say authoritatively, and without fear of successful challenge, just where Roosevelt and those for whom he speaks do stand.  In any event, you cannot now go wrong on any despatch involving this feature of the situation.

"As you will soon be in London, it may be that you will wish to await your arrival there before writing anything.

"In any event, you are in a position to tell the folks at home just how things stand here.  If you write, you cannot, of course, quote Colonel Roosevelt.  You may, however, say what' friends of Colonel Roosevelt' say, or, 'persons in the confidence of Colonel Roosevelt say he feels or believes so and so.' That will be all right."

On the following day I saw the Colonel again for a few minutes and told him what I had told Wilson.

"Quite right," said he.  "If he does that, he will help his people by giving them a real view of the way matters stand here, and that will help us.  It is folly, almost criminal folly, to lead the people of Europe to expect the impossible.  The awakening will be painful and the after effects bad, if they are led to believe we are prepared to surrender our nationality.  We are nationalists, not internationalists, just as we are monogamists and not polygamists, and we love our country above all other countries.

"Do you think Wilson clearly understood me?"
I said I did.

" I 'm glad of that.  What these fool internationalists do not see is that there are things that cannot be arbitrated, and it's not wise or honest to agree to arbitrate where one knows non-arbitrable matters are likely to arise.  You've patiently sat through enough of my speeches to be reasonably familiar with my assertion that a man does not ask arbitration when a blackguard slaps his wife's face.  The Lord knows outsiders may think, after what has happened the last few years, that we are so gaited, but we are not.

" I might have told Wilson that I am not concerned about the Anglo Japanese alliance.  It is of very limited value to either nation, for it is an unnatural alliance.  The real alliance, the alliance worth while, is where the parties' interests are common interests, where they think along the same broad lines and their aspirations do not conflict.  Such an alliance need not be written, nor signed, rior sealed.  It will stand on its own bottom and by its inherent strength.  On the other hand, the written agreement, where these conditions do not attain, is never of lasting value.  Can you imagine the English people siding with Japan against us? Neither can I.  Nor can any other man that is sane and honest with himself and has any real knowledge of the English people.  Even Hearst would have difficulty in imagining such a thing were he only approximately honest with himself.

"What I am afraid of is that this man Wilson will arouse hopes that never can be realized, and that the United States will suffer from the resentment that must follow.  Then the very crowds that acclaim him now will rise up and damn him and us along with him, and we'll be left, as we were before we asserted our manhood and went into this war, the best hated people in Europe.

"Wilson is playing a dangerous game.  He's playing diplomacy with the most skilled diplomatists.  Just now he's got all the advantage.  But he is in the position of the tenderfoot with money playing poker with professional gamblers.  In the beginning he has the advantage of money, they of experience.  In the end they have the money and he some experience.  The difference is that in one case an individual is gambling with his own, while in this case Mr.  Wilson is playing with other folks' chips.  If my poker terms are bad, the other members of the Charley Thompson Finger Club will correct you.

"They will play with Mr.  Wilson.  They will give him a grand time, and he will, unless I am greatly mistaken, give them promises the American people will not endorse.  There will be delay and confusion and in the end the thing will have to be done right.

"It is, of course, possible that anything Mr.  Wilson agrees to may be ratified by the Senate.  But it will only make for trouble, bitter trouble later on, if promises are made that we cannot keep."

On the death of Colonel Roosevelt I cabled Mr.  Wilson in London advising him that in my opinion the time had come when he could tell the story of that Friday morning in Roosevelt Hospital.  I believe he made some reference to the matter, but did not go into it in detail or at any considerable length.

It is not good form for one newspaper man to ask another why he did or did not do a certain thing.  Therefore I have never asked my friend Wilson "why."

If, however, I were to guess, I would not hesitate to say the reason for the matter not being given in full to the people of England, and through them to all Europe, was that the then editor of the London News was and is of those who worship at the shrine of Woodrow Wilson and acclaim him as the long awaited Messiah.