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CHAPTER 2

THE LONG PARLIAMENT AND THE CIVIL WAR

KING CHARLES'S theory was that Parliament had met to grant him the money he needed.     The Parliament's conviction was that it had come together to hold the king and his servants to accountability for what they had done, and to provide safeguards against a repetition of the tyranny of the last eleven years.     Parliament held the whip-hand, for the king dared not dissolve it until the Scots were paid, lest their army should march at once upon London.

The king: had many courtiers who hated popular government, but he had only one great and terrible man of the type that can up-build tyrannies; and, with the sure instinct of mortal fear and mortal hate, the Commons struck at the minister whose towering genius and unscrupulous fearlessness might have made his master absolute on the throne.  A week after the Long Parliament met, in November, 1640, Pym, who at once took the lead in the House, moved the impeachment of Strafford, in a splendid speech which set forth the principles for which the popular party was contending.  It was an appeal from the rule of irresponsible will to the rule of law, for the violation of which every man could be held accountable before some tribunal.  About the same time Laud was thrown into the Tower; but at the moment there was no thought of taking his life, for the ecclesiastic was not—like the statesman—a mighty and fearsome figure, and though he had done as much evil as his feeble nature permitted, he had unquestionably been far more conscientious than the great earl.  Strafford had sinned against the light, for he had championed liberty until the king paid him his price and made him the most dangerous foe of his former friends.  He now defended himself with haughty firmness, and the king strove in every way to help him.  But the Commons passed a Bill of Attainder against him: and then Charles committed an act of fatal meanness and treachery.  There was not one thing that Strafford had done, save by his sovereign's wish and in his sovereign's interest.  By every consideration of honor and expediency Charles was bound to stand by him.  But the Stuart king flinched.  Deeming it for his own interest to let Strafford be sacrificed, he signed the death-warrant.  "Put not your trust in princes," said the fallen earl when the news was brought to him, and he went to the scaffold undaunted.

Cromwell showed himself to be a man of mark in this Parliament ; but he was not among the very foremost leaders.  He had no great understanding of constitutional government, no full appreciation of the vital importance of the reign of law to the proper development of orderly liberty.  His fervent religious ardor made all questions affecting faith and doctrine close to him; and his hatred of corruption and oppression inclined him to take the lead whenever any question arose of dealing, either with the wrongs done by Laud in the course of his religious persecutions, or with the irresponsible tyranny of the star-chamber, and the sufferings of its victims.  The bent of Cromwell's mind was thus shown right in the beginning of his parliamentary career.  His desire was to remedy specific evils.  He was too impatient to found the kind of legal and constitutional system which could alone prevent the recurrence of such evils.  This tendency, thus early shown, explains, at least in part, why it was that later he deviated from the path trod by Hampden, and afterward by Washington and Washington's colleagues: showing himself unable to build up free government or to establish the reign of law, until he was finally driven to substitute his own personal government for the personal government of the king whom he had helped to dethrone, and put to death.  Cromwell's extreme admirers treat his impatience of the delays and shortcomings of ordinary constitutional and legal proceedings as a sign of his greatness.  It was just the reverse.  In great crises it may be necessary to overturn constitutions and disregard statutes, just as it may be necessary to establish a vigilance committee, or take refuge in lynch-law; but such a remedy is always dangerous, even when absolutely necessary; and the moment it becomes the habitual remedy, it is a proof that society is going backward.  Of this retrogression the deeds of the strong man who sets himself above the law may be partly the cause and partly the consequence; but they are always the signs of decay.

The Commons had passed a law authorizing the election of a Parliament at least once in three years: which at once took away the king's power to attempt to rule without a Parliament; and in May they extorted from the king an act that they should not be dissolved without their own consent.  Ship Money was declared to be illegal; the star-chamber was abolished ; and Tonnage and Poundage were declared illegal, unless levied by Act of Parliament.  Then the Scotch army was paid off and returned across the Border.  The best work of the Commons had now been done, and if they could have trusted the king it would have been well for them to dissolve; but the king could not be trusted, and, moreover, the religious question was pushed to the front.  Laud's actions—actions taken with the full consent and by the advice of the king—had rendered the Episcopal form of church government obnoxious.  The House of Commons was Presbyterian, and it speedily became evident that it wished to establish the Presbyterian system of church government in the place of Episcopacy; and, moreover, that it intended to be just as intolerant on behalf of Presbyterianism as the king and Laud had been on behalf of Episcopacy.  There was a strong moderate party which the king might have rallied about him, but his incurable bad faith made it impossible to trust his protestations.  He now made terms with the Scotch, in accordance with which they agreed not to interfere between himself and his English subjects in religious matters.  He hoped thereby to deprive the Presbyterian English of their natural allies across the Border.  This conduct, of itself, would have inflamed the increasing religious bitterness; but it was raised to madness by the news that came from Ireland at this time.

Inspired by the news of the revolt in Scotland and the troubles in England, the Irish had risen against their hereditary oppressors.  It was the revolt of a race which rose to avenge wrongs as bitter as ever one people inflicted upon another; and it was inevitable that it should be accompanied by appalling outrages in certain places.  It was on these outrages that the English fixed their eyes, naturally ignoring the generations of English evil-doing which had brought them about.  A furious cry for revenge arose.  Every Puritan, from Oliver Cromwell down, regarded the massacres as a fresh proof that Roman Catholics ought to be treated, not as professors of another Christian creed, but as cruel public enemies; and their burning desire for vengeance took the form, not merely of hostility to Roman Catholicism, but to the Episcopacy, which they regarded as in the last resort an ally of Catholicism.

In November, 1641, the Puritan majority in Parliament passed the Grand Remonstrance—which was a long indictment of Charles's conduct.  Cromwell had now taken his place as among the foremost of the Root and Branch party, who demanded the abolition of Episcopacy, and whose action drove all those who believed in the Episcopal form of church government into the party of the king.  He threw himself with eager vehemence into the party of the Remonstrance, and after its bill was passed told Falkland that if it had been rejected by Parliament he would have sold all he had, and never again seen England.

For a moment the Puritan violence, which culminated in the Grand Remonstrance, provoked a reaction in favor of the king; but the king, by another act of violence, brought about a counter-reaction.  In January, 1642, he entered the House of Commons, and in person ordered the seizure and imprisonment in the Tower of the five foremost leaders of the Puritan party, including Pym and Hampden.  Such a course on his part could be treated only as an invitation to civil war.  London, which before had been wavering, now rallied to the side of the Commons; the king left Whitehall; and it was evident to all men that the struggle between him and the Parliament had reached a point where it would have to be settled by the appeal to arms.

In August, 1642, King Charles planted the royal standard on the Castle of Nottingham, and the Civil War began.  The Parliamentary forces were led by the Earl of Essex.  They included some twenty regiments of infantry and seventy-five troops of horse, each sixty strong, raised and equipped by its own captain.  Oliver Cromwell was captain of the Sixty-seventh Troop, and his kinsfolk and close friends were scattered through the cavalry and infantry.  His sons served with or under him.  One brother-in-law was quartermaster of his own troop; a second was captain of another troop.  His future son-in-law, Henry Ireton, was captain of yet another; a cousin and a nephew were cornets.  Another cousin, John Hampden, was colonel of a regiment of foot; so was Cromwell's close friend and neighbor, the after-time Earl of Manchester, who was much under his influence.

It was nearly a hundred years since England had been the scene of serious fighting, and Scotland had witnessed nothing more than brawls during that time.  Elizabeth's war with Spain had been waged upon the ocean.  However, thousands of English and Scotch adventurers had served in the Netherlands and in High Germany under the Dutch and Swedish generals.  In both the Royal and Parliamentary armies there was a sprinkling of men—especially in the upper ranks of the officers—who had had practical experience of war on a large scale.  The English people offered exceptionally fine material for soldiers; the population was still overwhelmingly rural and agricultural.  In the cities the hardy mechanics and craftsmen were accustomed to sports in which physical prowess played a great part.  The agricultural classes were far above the peasant serfs of Germany and France; and the gentry and yeomanry were accustomed to the use of the horse and the fowling-piece, and were devoted to field-sports.  In courage, in hardihood, in intelligence, the level was high.

Although gunpowder had been in use for a couple of centuries,  progress  toward the modern arms  of  precision had been so  slow that close-quarter  weapons were  still,  on the whole, superior; and shock tactics rather than fire tactics were decisive.     Artillery, though used on the field of battle, was never there a controlling factor, being of chief use in the assault of fortified places.     The musketeers took so long to load their clumsy weapons that they could be used to best advantage only when protected,  and they played a less important part on a pitched field than the great bodies of pike-men with which they were mingled.     In England the cavalry had completely the upper hand of the infantry.     It was used, not merely to finish the fight, but to smash unbroken and unshaken bodies of foot; and so great was its value in the open field that every effort was made by the commanders on both sides to keep it at the largest possible ratio to the whole army.     Every decisive battle of the Civil  War was made such by the cavalry.    The arrangement of the armies was, in-variably, with the infantry in the centre, the pikemen and the musketeers  ordinarily  alternating  in  clumps,  while the cavalry was on both wings.     The dragoons, though mounted, habitually fought on foot with their fire-pieces.    Lancers were rarely used.     The heavy cavalry were clad in cuirasses, and armed with long, straight swords and pistols.     The light cavalry usually wore the buff coat, sometimes with a breast piece, always with a helmet; and in addition to their sword and pistols, carried a carbine.

Throughout Europe, at this time, cavalry trusted altogether too much to their clumsy firearms, save when handled by some great natural leader of horse; and, in consequence, on the Continent, the infantry had won the upper hand.  But it happened in the English Civil War that the only great leaders developed were cavalrymen, and so the horse retained throughout the mastery over the foot; although, as each arm was always pitted against the same arm in the opposing forces, the struggle frequently wore itself out before the victorious horse and victorious foot, if they belonged to different parties, could fight it out between them.

The Civil War opened with just such blundering and indecisive fighting as marked the opening of the American Civil War two centuries later.  There was no hard-and-fast line, whether geographically or of caste, between the two parties; in every portion of England, and in every rank of society, there were to be found adherents both of the king and of the Commons; but, as a whole, the east and south of England were for the Parliament; the north and west were Royalist.  The bulk of the aristocracy stood for the king; the bulk of the lesser gentry and yeomanry were against him.  The revolutionary movement—as in America in 1776—received its main strength from the lesser gentry, small farmers, tradesmen, and upper-class mechanics and handicraftsmen.  In America in 1776 there was no proletariat.  So far as there was one in England in 1642, it took no interest in the struggle.  The peasantry, the mass of the agricultural laborers, were inclined toward the king, though the men immediately above them in social position, who represented the lowest rank that had political influence, were the other way.  The townsmen were generally for the Parliament.

In comparing the English Civil War of the seventeenth century with the American Civil War of the nineteenth, there are some curious points of similarity, no less than some very sharp contrasts.  During the two centuries there had been a great growth in esteem for fixity of principle.  In the English Civil War nothing was more common than for a man to change sides, and there was treachery even on the* field of battle itself; whereas, in the American Civil War, though many of the leaders, like Lee and Thomas, were in great doubt as to the proper course to follow, yet when sides had once been taken, there was no flinching and no looking back.  Moreover there was far greater intensity of popular feeling in the American Civil War; even the States that were divided in opinion at the outset held no considerable mass of population which did not soon throw its weight on one side or the other; whereas, in the English Civil War there were large bodies of men who strove to avoid declaring for either side.  At the very end of the contest, tens of thousands of persons, mainly peasants, organized under the title of Clubmen, with the avowed purpose of holding the scales even between the two sets of combatants, and of looking out for their own interests.  The American Civil War was fought for the-right of secession, and efforts were made—in Kentucky, for instance—to establish the right of a locality to be neutral.  The "states'-rights" theory reached an almost equal development in some of the English counties during the Cromwel-lian contest.  Yorkshire at one time declared for neutrality.  The trained bands of Cornwall, when the Royalist forces were driven back within their borders, promptly turned out and drove off the pursuing Parliamentarians, but refused to obey orders to leave the county in pursuit of their foes, and disbanded to their own homes.  Later, they repeated exactly the same course of procedure.  There were at times local truces,, or agreements as to the conditions of the contest in particular localities.

On both sides "associations" were formed, consisting of special groups of counties banded together intimately for the purpose of defense.  The most important of these, the Eastern Association, included Cromwell's own home, taking in all of the middle east.  This region was throughout the contest the backbone of resistance to the king.  Its people were strongly Puritan in feeling, and it was they who gave Cromwell his strength: for they gave him his Ironsides; and furnished the-famous New Model for the Parliamentary army which finished, the war.
 
At the outset of the war many of the nobles raised regiments from among their own tenants, and the armies were of picturesque look, each regiment having its own uniform.  The Guards of Lord Essex adopted the buff leather coat, which afterward became the uniform of the whole Roundhead army.  Hampden's regiment was in green; the London trained bands in bright scarlet.  Other regiments were clad in blue or gray.  In the Cavalier army there were foot-guards in white and foot-guards in red; and among their horse, the Life Guards of the king—composed of lords and gentlemen who had no separate commands—wore plumed casques over their long curled locks, embroidered lace collars over their glittering cuirasses, gay scarfs, gilded sword-belts, and great-boots of soft leather doubled down below the knee.

The history of the English Civil War, like the history of the American Revolutionary War and the American Civil War, teaches two lessons.  First, it shows that the average citizen of a civilized community requires months of training before he can be turned into a good soldier, and that raw levies—no matter how patriotic—are, under normal conditions, helpless before smaller armies of trained and veteran troops, and cannot strike a finishing-blow even when pitted against troops of their own stamp.  In the second place it teaches a lesson, which at first sight seems contradictory of the first, but is in reality not in the least so; namely, that there is nothing sacrosanct in the trade of the soldier.  It is a trade which can be learned without special difficulty by any man who is brave and intelligent, who realizes the necessity of obedience, and who is already gifted with physical hardi-hood and is accustomed to the use of the horse and of weapons, to enduring fatigue and exposure, and to acting on his own responsibility, taking care of himself in the open.

Cromwell's troops were .not regulars, like the professional soldiers of the Thirty Years' War; they were volunteers.  After two or three years' service they became the finest troops that Europe could then show; just as by 1864 the volunteers of Grant and Lee had reached a grade of perfection which made them, for their own work, superior to any other of the armies then in existence.

Under modern conditions, in a great civilized state, the regular army is composed of officers who have as a rule been carefully trained to their work; who possess remarkably fine physique, and who are accustomed to the command of men and to taking the lead in emergencies; and the enlisted men have likewise been picked out with great care as to their bodily development; have been drilled until they handle themselves, their horses, and their weapons admirably, can cook for themselves, and are trained to the endurance of hardship and exposure under the conditions of march and battle.  An ordinary volunteer or militia regiment from an ordinary civilized community, on the other hand, no matter how enthusiastic or patriotic, or how intelligent, is officered by lawyers, merchants, business men, or their sons, and contains in its ranks clerks, mechanics, or farmers' lads of varying physique, who have to be laboriously taught how to shoot and how to ride, and, above all, how to cook and to take care of themselves and make themselves comfortable in the open, especially when tired out by long marches, and when the weather is bad.  At the outset such a regiment is, of course, utterly inferior to a veteran regular regiment, but after it has been in active service in the field for a year or two, so that its weak men have been weeded out, and its strong men have learned their duties—which can be learned far more rapidly in time of war than in time of peace—it becomes equal to any regiment.  Moreover, if a regular regiment consists of raw recruits and is officered by men who have learned their profession only in the barracks and the study and on the parade-ground, it may be a cause of very disagreeable surprise to those who have, grown to regard the word "regular" as a kind of fetich.

Again, a volunteer regiment may have the wisdom to select officers for the highest positions who know how to handle men, who have seen actual soldiering, who possess natural capacity for leadership, eagerness to learn, and the good sense to know their own shortcomings; and the rank and file may be men of adventurous temper, already skilful riflemen, and of great bodily hardihood, accustomed to exposure, accustomed to cook—that is to say, to take care of their stomachs—to live in the open, to endure hardship and fatigue, and to take advantage of cover in battle.  Such a regiment, especially if raised on the frontier, may, from the outset, prove itself equal to or better than any ordinary regular regiment—as has recently been shown by our troops in the Philippines, by the Australians and Canadians in South Africa, and, above all, by the Boers; and as was shown nearly a century ago by Hofer's Tyrolese and Andrew Jackson's backwoodsmen.  Of course, no good traits will avail in the least if men are possessed with the belief that they cannot be taught anything, if they .are not eager to obey and to learn; or if they do not possess .a natural fighting edge.

So it is with the men in high command.  The careful training in body and mind, and especially in character, gained in .an academy like West Point, and the subsequent experience in the field, endow the regular officer with such advantages that, in any but a long war, he cannot be overtaken even by the best natural fighter.  In the American Civil War, for instance, the greatest leaders were all West Pointers.  Yet •even there, by the end of the contest both armies had produced regimental, brigade, and division commanders, who though originally from civil life, had learned to know their business exactly as well as the best regular officers; and there was at least one such commander—Forrest—who, in his own class, was unequalled.  If in a war the regular officers prove to have been trained merely to the pedantry of their profession, and do not happen to number men of exceptional ability in their ranks, then sooner or later the men who are born soldiers will come to the front, even though they have been civilians until late in life.
 
None of the men on the Parliamentary side who had received their training in the Continental armies amounted to much.  On the Royalist side the only professional soldier who made his mark was Rupert; and Rupert, after a year or two, was decisively beaten by Cromwell—a great natural military genius, who, although a civilian till after forty, showed an astonishing aptitude in grasping the essentials of his new profession.  His only military rival in the war was Montrose, who was also not a professional soldier.

In September King Charles had gathered a force of ten thousand men at Nottingham, while Essex was getting together a larger army not far off, at Northampton.  The wealth of the kingdom was with the Parliament, which also possessed the arsenal, the fleet, and the principal ports.  On the other hand, man for man, the king's troops were superior to the Parliament's, especially in the most dreaded arm of the service, the horse.  The fervid zealots who, like John Bunyan, entered the Parliamentary army, were never in the majority, and needed peculiar training to bring out their remarkable soldierly qualities.  The sober, thrifty, religious middle class— which was the backbone of the Parliamentary strength—had no special aptitude for military service.  If its members could once be put in the army and kept there a sufficient length of time, their qualities made them excellent soldiers; but, as a whole, they were not men of very adventurous temper, and had had no such training in arms, or in the sports akin to war, as inclined them to rush into the army.  On the other hand, the Royalist nobles and squires, and their game-keepers, grooms, and hard-riding kinsmen, with their taste for field-sports, their love of adventure, and their high sense of warlike honor, made splendid material out of which to organize an army, and especially cavalry.  In consequence, for the first half of the war the Royalist cavalry was overwhelmingly superior to the Parliamentary cavalry, composed as it was of men bought with the money of the bourgeoisie, who had no particular heart in their work; who were timid horsemen and unskilled swordsmen.  The difference in favor of the Royalist horse was as marked as the superiority of the Confederate horse in the American Civil War, under leaders like Stuart, Morgan, and Basil Duke; until time was afforded, in the one case for the growth of Cromwell, in the other for the development of leaders like Sheridan and Wilson.

Cromwell had already shown himself very active.  He had seized the magazine of the Castle of Cambridge, and secured the University plate, which was being sent to the king.  He had raised volunteers and expended money freely out of his own scanty means.  His troop of horse was, from the beginning, utterly different from most of the Parliamentary cavalry; it was composed of his own neighbors, yeomen and small farmers, hard, serious men, whose grim natures were thrilled by the intense earnestness of their leader, and whom he steadily drilled into good horsemanship and swordsmanship.  His chaplains always played an important part; one of them, Hugh Peters, was a man of mark, who joined ability to high character.

The king's cavalry was led by Prince Rupert,, a dashing swordsman and horseman, a born cavalry leader, who, though only twenty-three, had already learned his trade in the wars of the Continent.  Rupert opened the real fighting, scattering a large body of Parliamentary horse in panic rout when he struck them near Powick, on the Severn.

In October the king marched on London, and at Edgehill met the army of Essex.  Each side drew up, with the infantry in the centre, the cavalry on the flanks.  On the king's side there was much jealousy among the different generals, and some insubordination, but far more activity and eagerness for fight than the Parliamentary troops displayed.  The battle was fought on the afternoon of October 23d, and the Parliamentary army was demoralized at the outset by the treacherous desertion of a regiment commanded by a man most inappropriately named Sir Faithful Fortescue.  He moved out of the ranks and joined Rupert's horse.  Rupert charged with headlong impetuosity, and by his fury and decision so overawed the Parliamentary horse opposed to him that they did not wait the shock, but galloped wildly off, actually dispersing the nearest infantry regiments of their own side.  Rupert then showed the characteristic shortcoming which always impaired the effect of his daring prowess.  He never could keep his men in hand after they had scattered the foe; he never kept a sufficient reserve with which to meet a counter-stroke.  None but a great master of war could withstand his first shock; but after the first shock he was no longer dangerous.  At Edgehill his horse followed the routed left wing of the Parliamentarians until they became as completely scattered as their beaten foes.  He struck the Parliamentary baggage-train, which was defended by Hampden with a couple of infantry regiments, and his scattered troopers were beaten back when he attempted to take it.

Meanwhile, the Royalist horse on the left wing had fallen with the same headlong fury on the Parliamentary right, but had only struck a small portion of the Parliamentary cavalry.  These they drove in rout before them, themselves following in hot pursuit.  The result was, that the bulk of the Parliamentary foot, and a portion of the right wing of the Parliamentary horse, including Oliver Cromwell's troop, were left face to face with the Royalist foot, which was inferior in numbers; and falling on it, after a desperate struggle they got the upper hand and forced it back.  Rupert at last began to gather his horse together to face the victorious Roundhead foot; and as night fell, the two armies were still fronting each other.  The king advanced on London in November, but was unable to force his way into the city, and fell back.

The war had not opened well for the Parliamentary side, and their especial weakness was evidently in cavalry—the arm by which decisive battles in the open field were won.  Cromwell, with unerring eye, saw the weakness and started to remedy it.  It is about this time that his famous conversation with Hampden took place.  Said Cromwell: "Your troops are most of them old decayed serving-men and tapsters, and such kind of fellows; and their troops are gentlemen's sons, younger sons, and persons of quality; do you think that the spirits of such base, mean fellows will ever be able to encounter gentlemen that have honor and courage and resolution in them? .  .  .  You must get men of a spirit; and take it not ill what I say—I know you will not—of a spirit that is likely to go on as far as gentlemen will go, or else you will be beaten still.  ...  I raised such men as had the fear of God before them, as made some conscience of what they did, and from that day forward they were never beaten."

The famous Presbyterian clergyman, Baxter, who was by no means friendly to Cromwell, described his special care to get religious men into his troop; men of greater intelligence than common soldiers, who enlisted, not for the money, but from an earnest sense of public duty.  Naturally, said Baxter, these troopers "having more than ordinary wit and resolution had more than ordinary success."

By another writer of the time, Cromwell's horse are described as "freeholders and freeholders' sons, who upon matter of conscience engaged in this quarrel; and thus being well-armed within by the satisfaction of their own consciences, and without by good iron arms, they would as one man stand firmly and charge desperately." Cromwell at once distinguished himself among his contemporaries, alike by the absolute obedience he rendered to his superiors, and by the incessant, unwearying activity with which he drilled his men in the use of their weapons and horses.  He was speedily promoted to a colonelcy.  In a news-letter of the time his regiment was described as composed of "brave men; well disciplined.  No man swears but he pays his twelve pence; if he be drunk he is set in the stocks or worse; if one calls the other Roundhead, he is cashiered; insomuch that the counties where they come leap for joy of them, and come in and join with them.  How happy were it if all the forces were thus disciplined!" Cromwell suppressed all plundering with an iron hand.  An eminently practical man, not in the least a theoretical democrat, but imbued with that essence of democracy which prompts a man to recognize his fellows for what they really are, without regard to creed or caste, it speedily became known that under him any one would have a fair show according to his merits.  He realized to the full that the quality of troops was of vastly more consequence than their numbers; that only the best men can be made the best soldiers; and these best men themselves will make but poor soldiers unless they have good training.  His troops proved what iron discipline, joined to stern religious enthusiasm, could accomplish; just as later their immense superiority to the forces of the Scotch Covenanters showed that religious and patriotic enthusiasm, by itself, is but a poor substitute for training and discipline.  In one of his letters he writes: "I beseech you, be careful what captains of horse you choose; what men be mounted.  A few honest men are better than numbers.  Some time they must have for exercise.  If you choose godly, honest men to be captains of horse, honest men will follow them, and they will be careful to mount such.  I had rather have a plain russet-coated captain that knows what he fights for, and loves what he knows, than that which you call a gentleman, and is nothing else.  I honor a gentleman that is so indeed.  ...  It may be it provoked some spirit to see such plain men made captains of horse.  .  .  .  Better plain men than none; but best to have men patient of work, faithful and conscientious in employment."

Ordinarily, Cromwell was able to get for his leaders men who were gentlemen in the technical sense of the term, but again and again there forged to the front under him men like Pride, whose natural talents had to supply the place of birth and breeding.  He writes again: "My troops increase; I have a lovely company; you would respect them did you know them.  .  .  .  They are honest, sober Christians; they expect to be used as men." Again he writes, when his Presbyterian colleagues were showing a tendency to oppress and drive out of the army men whose religious beliefs did not square with theirs: "Surely, you are not well-advised thus to turn off one so faithful to the cause, and so able to serve you as this man (a certain colonel).  Give me leave to tell you I cannot be of your judgment.  If a man notorious for wickedness, for oaths, for drinking, hath as great a share in your affection as one who fears an oath, who fears to sin.  .  .  .  Ay, but the man is an 'Anabaptist'! Are you sure of that? Admit he be, shall that render him incapable to serve the public? Sir, the state, in choosing men to serve it, takes no notice of their opinions : if they be willing faithfully to serve it, that satisfies.  .  .  .
 Take heed of being sharp or too easily sharpened by others, against those to whom you can object little, but that they square not with you in every opinion concerning matters of religion."

In these sentences lies the justification of genuine democracy, of genuine religious liberty, and toleration by the state of religious differences.  They were uttered by a man far in advance of the temper of his age.  He was not sufficiently advanced to extend his toleration to Roman Catholics, and even extending it as far as he did he was completely out of touch with the majority of his fellow countrymen; for the great bulk—both Episcopalians and Presbyterians—were bitterly hostile to the toleration of even inconsiderable differences of doctrine and ritual.  The ideal after which Cromwell strove, though lower than that to which we of a more fortunate age have attained, was yet too high to be reached in his day.  Nevertheless, it was a good thing to have the standard set up; and once the mark which he had established was reached, it was certain that the spirit of toleration would go much farther.  As soon as Baptists and Congregationalists, no less than Episcopalians and Presbyterians, were tolerated by the state for the reasons he gave, it was sure to become impossible to refuse toleration to Catholics and Unitarians.

We must honor Cromwell for his aspirations toward the ideal, but we must acknowledge how far short of reaching it he fell.  At this very time he was handling without gloves the Episcopalian clergy.  In order to secure the assistance of the Scotch, Parliament had determined to take the Covenant, which made the state religion of England the same form of lofty, but intolerant, Presbyterianism that obtained in Scotland.  Under the decision of the government the ritual of the Church of England was forcibly suppressed, and there was no little harrying of Episcopal clergy and vandal destruction of ancient art symbolism by the Puritan zealots.  "Leave off your fooling and come down, sir!" said Cromwell, walking into Ely Cathedral, where the clergyman had persisted in the choir service; and there was no choice but to obey.

In 1643 Cromwell forged to the front as almost the only steadily successful Parliamentary commander.  To marvellous energy, fervid zeal, great resourcefulness, fertility of invention, and individual initiative, he added the unerring insight of the born cavalry leader.  He soon saw that the true weapon of the cavalryman was the horse; and, discarding the carbines with which his troop had first been armed, he taught them to rely upon the shock of a charging, close-knit mass of men and horses trained to move rapidly as a unit.

He was ceaseless in his efforts to get his men paid, fed, and equipped.  Like his great friend, Sir Thomas Fairfax, though he stopped all plundering, he levied heavy fines on the estates of the Royalists, and by these means, and by assessments from the Association, and by voluntary loans and contributions, he was able to keep his men well equipped.

There was no comprehensive strategy in the fighting this year; but the balance of the isolated expeditions undertaken inclined in favor of the king.  Cromwell appears clearly, for the first time, as a successful military leader in May, near Grantham.  He had under him twelve troops.  The Cavaliers much outnumbered him.  Nevertheless, when, after some preliminary firing from the dragoons on both sides, Cromwell charged at a round trot, the Cavaliers, instead of meeting the charge, received it and were broken and routed.  The fight was of great value as being the first in which the Parliamentary horse beat a superior number of Royalist horse.  Cromwell was as yet learning his trade.  On this occasion he hesitated a long time about charging, and only charged at all when it became evident that his opponents would not; and he owed his victory to the incompetence of the Royalist commander.  It was an invaluable lesson to him.

A great deal of scrambling, confused, and rather pointless warfare followed.  Rupert and Hampden encountered each other, and Hampden was defeated and killed.  Hampden's great colleague, Pym, died later in the year, just after having brought about the league with Scotland—one of the first-fruits of which was the trial and execution of Laud.  Presbyterianism was now dominant, and set itself to enforce everywhere the rigid rule of clerical orthodoxy.  Against this the Independents began to raise their voices; but the real force which was to gain them their victory over both Royalist and Presbyterian was as yet hidden.  Cromwell's Ironsides—as they were afterward termed when Rupert christened Cromwell himself by that name—the regiments which he raised and drilled after his own manner from the Eastern Association, these represented the real power of the Independents, and these were not yet recognized as the heart and right arm of the army.

Cromwell held Nottingham, where the Royalists attacked him and he beat them off.  He took Burleigh House, which was held by a strong Royalist garrison; then, in July, 1643, he advanced to rescue the Parliamentary general, Lord Willoughby, who was besieged at Gainsborough by a division of Newcastle's army.  About a mile and a half out of town he met the cavalry of Lord Cavendish, which was drawn up at the top of a hill.  To attack him it was necessary to advance up steep slopes, honeycombed by rabbit burrows; but Cromwell's squadrons were already remarkable alike for flexibility and steadiness, and their leader knew both how to prepare his forces and how to take daring advantage of every opportunity that offered.  As his leading troops struggled to the top of the hill Cavendish's horsemen advanced, but the Cromwellian troopers, closing up, charged them at once.  There was a stiff contest, but as the rest of the Parliamentary troops came to the front, the Royalists were overthrown and driven off in wild rout.  Cavendish himself brought up his reserve and routed a portion of the Parliamentary forces; but Cromwell had neither lost his head nor let his force get out of hand.  He, too, had a reserve, and with this he charged Cavendish and overthrew him, Cavendish himself being slain.

This feat was succeeded by another quite as notable.  After relieving the town and giving Lord Willoughby powder and provisions, Cromwell advanced toward some Royalist soldiers who still remained in view, about a mile distant.  To his astonishment, these proved to be the vanguard of Newcastle's whole army, and there was nothing for it but to retreat.  Cromwell's troops were tired, and only his excellent generalship and indomitable courage prevented a disastrous rout.  Both the Parliamentary horse and foot were at first shaken by the advance of the fresh Royalist soldiery, but Cromwell speedily got them in hand and retired by divisions, making head against the enemy alternately with one body of horse and then with another, while the rest of the troops drew back behind the shield thus afforded them.  The alternating squadrons of the rear-guard always made head against the enemy and checked him, but always slipped away before he could charge, and thus the tired army was brought off in safety.

In September Cromwell joined Sir Thomas Fairfax; and in October they met and overthrew a Royalist force at Winceby, the Puritan troopers singing a psalm as they advanced to the combat.  The numbers seem to have been about equal, perhaps three thousand a side.  The battle began with a skirmish between the dragoons of the two forces.  It was decided by the tremendous charge of Cromwell's steel-clad troopers.  The charge was made at the trot, Cromwell leading his men.  The Royal dragoons fired upon them as they came on, Cromwell's horse was killed, and a Cavalier knocked him down as he rose, but was himself killed by a Puritan trooper.  Cromwell sprang to his feet, flung himself on a fresh horse, and again joined in the fight.  His troops were heavy cavalry, cuirassiers, and the opposing Royalists, with only buff coats, were overthrown by the shock of his advance.  Fairfax charged in flank, and the rout was complete.  The Royalist leaders chronicled with astonishment the fact that the Parliamentary horse showed great superiority—that they were "very good and extraordinarily armed." Apparently the victory was owing to the excellent drilling of Cromwell's troops, which enabled them to charge knee to knee; and when thus charging, the weight of the horses and of the iron-clad men made them irresistible.

In 1644 the war at first dragged on as a series of isolated expeditions and fights in which neither side was able to score any decided advantage.  Rupert performed two or three brilliant feats; the Scotch crossed the border to aid the Parliamentarians ; and Charles tried to come to some understanding with the Irish, by which they would, if possible, furnish him troops, and if not, would at least free the English troops in Ireland.  Some of the latter he did bring over.  After one or two successes a body of them were captured and many subscribed to the Covenant.  The most noted man who thus changed sides was the after-time general, George Monk.

Cromwell was looming up steadily; not only for the discipline of his men, but for the vigilant way in which he kept touch with the enemy and gained information about them, making the best possible use of pickets, outposts, and scouting-parties; all, by the way, being, as was usual in those times, under the headship of an officer known as the scout-master—a far better term than the cumbrous modern "Chief of the Bureau of Intelligence." Of course Cromwell's growing military reputation added greatly to his weight in Parliament, of which, like most of the leading generals, he was still a member.  His first feat during this year showed how little the duties of the soldier and the statesman were as yet differentiated.

Early in January he appeared in the House of Commons, charged Lord Willoughby with misconduct, and brought about his removal and the naming of Manchester to the sole command in the seven associated counties.  Manchester was little more than a figurehead.  He made Cromwell his lieutenant-general and yielded in all things to him, until he was alienated by falling under the control of the Scotch Covenanters, who already hated Cromwell as a representative of the "sectaries" whom they persecuted.  The House of Commons appointed a Committee of Both Kingdoms to assume the supreme executive authority for the conduct of the war.  Cromwell was made a member of this committee, and was also the ruling member of the Committee of the Eastern Association, which furnished the zealously Puritan force that was already the mainspring of the Parliamentary army.

In June the Scotch, under the Earl of Leven, and the English, under Lord Fairfax and Lord Manchester, were besieging York, which was defended by Lord Newcastle.  Toward the very last of the month Rupert marched rapidly to its relief.  The three Parliamentary generals fell back instead of falling on him as he advanced.  Newcastle wished to leave them alone, but Rupert insisted upon following and attacking the Parliamentary armies.  He and Newcastle had about twenty thousand men.  The Parliamentarians probably numbered some twenty-five thousand; but throughout this war it is impossible to give either the numbers or the losses with accuracy.

On July 2d Rupert overtook the end of the Parliamentary column, which was saved from disaster only by the fortunate fact that the horse of Cromwell and Sir Thomas Fairfax formed the rear-guard.  The two latter sent on word of Rupert's advance, warning the Parliamentary generals that they could not now avoid a fight; and promptly the Scotch and English troops were turned to face their Royalist foes on Marston Moor.

A ditch stretched across the moor, and the armies drew up with this extending for most of its length between them.  Each side was marshalled in the usual order—infantry in the centre, cavalry on the flanks.  The horse of the Parliamentary right wing was commanded by Sir Thomas Fairfax, who had under him his own English cavalry and three Scottish regiments.  The right wing of the foot was commanded by Lord Fairfax, and consisted of the Yorkshire troops and two brigades of Scots.  The centre, with its reserve, consisted of Scotch troops; the left, of the infantry of the Eastern Association.  Leven was with the infantry of the centre; Manchester on his left.  The horse of the left wing were under Cromwell, his Ironsides occupying the front line with three Scotch regiments in reserve.

In the Royalist army the horse on the left wing were under Goring; the infantry in the centre were under Newcastle, and Rupert himself led the horse of the right wing.  At last the two great cavalry leaders of the war—Rupert and Cromwell— were to meet face to face.  The war had lasted nearly two years.  The best troops, under the best leaders, had reached very nearly their limit of perfectibility; they were veterans, soldiers in every sense.

Hour after hour passed while the armies stood motionless, the leaders on either side anxiously scanning the enemy, seeking to find a weak point at which to strike.  Evening drew on and no move was made.  The Royalist leaders made up their mind that the battle would not be fought that day.  Suddenly, at seven o'clock, the whole Parliamentary army moved forward, the Puritan troopers chanting a psalm, according to their wont.

On the right, Fairfax's troopers, as they advanced, were thrown into disorder.  Goring charged them furiously, drove them back on the reserve of Scotch cavalry, and overthrew them all.  The rout was hopeless, and the flying horsemen carried away the Yorkshire foot with them.  Sir Thomas kept the ground, with a few of his troopers and a large number of Lord Balgony's Scotch Lancers and the Earl of Eglinton's Scotch Cuirassiers.  The fugitives were followed in hot pursuit by Goring, but part of his horse were kept in hand by their commander, Sir Charles Lucas, who, wheeling to the right, charged the flank of the Scotch foot, who had formed the Parliamentary centre, and who had now crossed the ditch and were attacking the Royalists in front.  The Scotch fought with stubborn valor, repulsing Lucas again and again, but suffering so heavily themselves that it became evident that they could not long stand the combined front and flank attack.

While disaster had thus overtaken the Parliamentary right, on the left Cromwell had completely the upper hand.  His steel-clad troopers crashed into Rupert's horsemen at full speed.  The fight was equal for some time, neither stubborn Roundhead nor gallant Cavalier being able to wrest the mastery from the other.  But Rupert, who always depended upon one smashing blow, and put his main force into his front line, did not, like Cromwell, understand how best to use a reserve.  Cromwell's reserve—the Scotch cavalry—came up and charged home, and the Royalist horse were overthrown with the shock.  "God made them as stubble to our swords," said Cromwell.

Sending his leading troops in pursuit, to prevent the enemy from rallying, Cromwell instantly gathered the bulk of his horse and fell on the right wing of the Royalist foot—already hard pressed by the foot of the Eastern Association.  The king's men fought with dogged courage, most conspicuous among them being Newcastle's own Northumbrian Regiment, the famous Whitecoats, who literally died as they stood in the ranks.

Sweeping down the line the Ironsides smashed one regiment after another, until, in the fading summer evening, Cromwell had almost circled the Royalist army, and came to their left wing, where he saw the Royalist horse charging the right flank of the Scots and harrying the routed Yorkshire foot.  Immediately he reformed his thoroughly trained squadrons almost on the same ground where Goring's horse stood at the beginning of the battle, and fronting the same way.  The foot of the Association formed beside them, and just before nightfall the Puritan cavalry and infantry made their final charge.  Goring's troopers were returning from their pursuit; Lucas's men were recoiling from their last charge, in which Lucas himself had been captured.  They were scattered like chaff by the shock of the steel-clad Cromwellian troopers, riding boot to boot; and the remaining Royalist foot shared the same fate.  The battle was over just as night fell, stopping all pursuit.  But there was little need of pursuit.  As at Waterloo, the very obstinacy with which the fight had been waged made the overthrow all the more complete when at last it came.  Night went down on a scene of wild confusion, with thousands of fugitives from both armies streaming off the field through the darkness; for the disaster to the right wing of the Parliamentary army had resulted not only in the rout of all the Yorkshire men and half of the Scotch, but also in the three Parliamentary commanding generals, Leven, Manchester, and Lord Fairfax, being swept off in the mass of fugitives.  The fight had been won by Cromwell, not only by the valor, coolness, keen insight, and power of control over his men, which he had shown in the battle itself, but by the two years of careful preparation and drill which had tempered the splendid weapons he used so well.

This was the first great victory of the war; but it produced no decisive effect; for there was no one general to take advantage of it.  York fell; but little else resulted from the triumph.  Fairfax, Manchester, and Leven all separated to pursue various unimportant objects.  They left Rupert time to recruit his shattered forces.  They did not march south to help Essex, who was opposed to the king in person.  Essex blundered badly, and when he marched into Cornwall was outmanoeuvred and surrounded, and finally had to surrender all his infantry.  Before this the king had already beaten the Parliamentary general, Waller, at Copredy Bridge, the defeat of the Parliamentarians being turned into disaster by the conduct of the London trained bands, who, after two years of battle, were still mere militia, insubordinate and prone to desert.  It was not with such stuff that victory over the Royalists could be obtained.  Mere militia who will not submit to rigid discipline cannot be made the equals of regulars by no matter how many years of desultory fighting.  In the War of the American Revolution it was the Continentals— the regulars of Washington, Wayne, and Greene—who finally won the victory, while even to the very end of the struggle the ordinary militia proved utterly unable to face the redcoats.  So in the English Civil War, it was the carefully drilled and trained horse and foot of the Eastern Association, and not the disorderly London trained bands, who overthrew the king's men.  Cromwell had developed his troops just as Grant and Lee, Sherman and Johnson long afterward developed theirs.  It is only under exceptional conditions, and with wholly exceptional populations, that it is possible to forego such careful drilling and training.

One great reason for the failures of the Parliamentary forces was that their leading generals no longer greatly cared for success.  They were Presbyterians, who believed in the Parliament, but who also believed in the throne.  They hated the Independents quite as much as they hated the Episcopalians, and felt a growing distrust of Cromwell, who in religious matters was the leader of the Independents, and who had announced that if he met the king in battle he would kill him as quickly as he would kill any one else.  Essex was no more capable of putting a finish to the war than McClellan was capable of overthrowing the Confederacy.  The one, like the other, had to make room for sterner and more resolute men.

The Committee of Both Kingdoms struggled in vain to get their generals to accomplish something.  At Newbury—where one indecisive battle had already been fought—they got together an army nearly double the strength of the king's: with no result save that another indecisive battle was fought, on October 29, 1644.  It was evident that there had to be a complete change in the management of the war if a victory was to be achieved.  Accordingly Cromwell once more turned from the field to the House of Commons.
 
In November he rose in Parliament and denounced Manchester as utterly inefficient; and then turned his onslaught from an attack on one man into a general move against all the hitherto leaders of the army.  On December 9th he addressed the House in one of his characteristic speeches, rugged in form, but instinct with the man's eager, strong personality, fiery earnestness, and hard common sense.  He pointed out, not all the truth—for that was not politic—but the evident truth that it was not wise to have leaders who both served in Parliament and also commanded in the army.  The result was the passage of the Self-denying Ordinance, by which all members of either of the houses were required to resign their commands; so that, at a stroke, the Presbyterian and Parliamentary leaders were removed from their control of the forces.  Two months afterward it was decreed that the forces of the Commonwealth should be reorganized on the "New Model." For the short-time service and militia levy system there was substituted the New Model; that is, the plan under which in the Eastern Association the Ironsides had been raised to such a pitch of efficiency was extended to include the whole army.  Sir Thomas Fairfax was put in command, but so evident was it to every one that Cromwell was the real master mind of the Parliamentary armies that the Self-denying Ordinance was not enforced as far as he was concerned, and he was retained, nominally as second, but in reality as chief, in command.  This was not only a victory for the radical military party, but a victory for the Independents over the Presbyterians.  The Independent strength was in the army, and they now had their own leaders.

During the period of reorganization of the army the war lagged along in its usual fashion, with Rupert as much to the fore as ever; and to the Royalists it merely seemed that their adversaries had gotten at odds, and that the great noblemen, the experienced leaders, had been driven from their leadership.  Their hopes were high, especially as in Scotland affairs had taken a sudden and most unexpected turn in their favor.  Immediately after Marston Moor, Montrose had begun his wonderful year of crowded life.  Recognizing the extraordinary military qualities of the Celtic clansmen of the Highlands, he had stirred them to revolt, and had proved himself a master of war by a succession of startling victories which finally put almost all Scotland at his feet.  One would have to examine the campaigns of Forrest to find any parallel for what he did.  Because of his feats he has been compared to Cromwell, but his fights were on so much smaller a scale that the comparison is no more possible than it would be possible to compare Forrest with Grant or Lee.

It is a noteworthy fact that the two soldier types which emerged from the English Civil War as victorious over all others were the Cromwellian Ironside and the Scotch Highlander.  The intense religious and patriotic fervor and hard common sense of the one was in the other supplanted by a mere wild love of fighting for fighting's sake.  It may be questioned which was most formidable in battle, but in a campaign there was no comparison whatsoever between them; and once his other foes Were vanquished, the Cromwellian soldier had not the slightest difficulty in holding down the Highlander.

The victories of Montrose, the feats of Rupert, and the failures of the Parliamentarians since Marston Moor gave Charles every feeling of confidence, when, on June 14, 1645, he led his army against the New Model at Naseby.  As usual in these battles, it is not possible to state the exact numbers, but it would appear that, as at Marston Moor, the Royalist troops were outnumbered, being about ten thousand as against fourteen thousand in the Parliamentary army.  Fairfax commanded for the Parliament, and the king was present in person.  As usual, the infantry on each side was in the centre.  On the right wing of the Parliamentarians Cromwell led his horse, while Ireton had the horse of the left.  Rupert commanded the cavalry on the right wing of the Royalists, and Sir Marmaduke Langdale that of the left.  Thus Rupert was not, as at Marston Moor, pitted against Cromwell; and any one except Cromwell he could beat.  Ireton was a stout soldier, but he and his cavalry were completely overthrown; then, according to their usual custom, Rupert's Cavaliers followed the headlong flight of their opponents in an equally headlong pursuit.  Meanwhile, in the centre, the foot crashed together and fought with savage obstinacy on equal terms.  As at Marston Moor, the fight was decided solely by Cromwell.  He overthrew the Royalist horse as he always overthrew them, and he kept his men in hand as he always kept them.  Leaving a sufficient force to watch the broken hostile squadrons, he wheeled the remainder and fell on the Royalist infantry in flank and rear.  For a moment, King Charles, stirred by a noble impulse, led forward his horse guards to do or die; but the Earl of Carnworth seized his bridle and stopped him, saying: "Will you go upon your death?" Had the king been indeed a king, as ready to stake his own life for his kingdom as he was to stake the lives of others, it would have gone hard with the man who sought to halt him, for in such a case no man is stopped by another unless he himself is more than willing; but Charles faltered, the moment passed, and his army was overthrown in wild ruin.  Rupert came back and reformed his men, but when Cromwell charged home with horse and foot the Royalist troopers never waited the onslaught.  There was plenty of light for pursuit now, and Cromwell showed yet another trait of the great commander by the unsparing energy with which he followed his foe to complete the wreck.  For twelve miles the Parliamentary horse kept touch with the flying foe.  The king's army was hopelessly shattered; from half to two-thirds of their number were slain or captured.  The Parliamentary losses were also heavy; a thousand of their men were killed or wounded.  Ireton had been wounded, and Skippon, the Parliamentary major-general of foot.  Fairfax, who had behaved with his usual gallantry, had had his helmet knocked off in the hand-to-hand fighting.  The victory was Cromwell's.

So decisive was the overthrow that it practically ended the war.  For a moment the king had hopes of what Montrose would do; but when Montrose came out of the Highlands he found that the clansmen would not march beside him for a long campaign; at Philiphaugh he was overwhelmed by numbers, and the Royalist party in Scotland disappeared with his overthrow.  Fairfax whipped Goring and captured Bristol.  Cromwell took Winchester, where he dealt severely with certain of his troopers who had been plundering.  He then stormed Basing House, an immense fortified pile, the property of the Catholic Marquis of Winchester.  Again and again the Parliamentary generals had attempted to take the place, but had always been beaten.  Cromwell would not be denied; after three days' battering with his guns, and an evening spent in prayer and in reading the 115th Psalm, he stormed it with a rush, and the splendid castle, its rooms and galleries filled with all the treasures of art, was left a blackened and bloodstained ruin.  After this it was in vain that the Royalist troops strove to make head against their foes.  If they stood in the open they were beaten; castle after castle, and fortified manor-house after manor-house, were battered down or stormed by Cromwell and his comrades; and in the spring of 1646 the king surrendered himself to the Scotch army.