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THEODORE ROOSEVELT
1919

CHAPTER 13

 PANAMA CANAL—GENERAL GOETHALS

CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS started with the Cross of Christ for India, by a new route, and headed straight from Spain toward India. He did not know that a hemisphere was between him and the Far East, and in his voyage westward struck the island of San Salvador and revealed a new world. Had it not been that God had hung two continents by a narrow strip of land he could have gone straight through the Atlantic into the Pacific and to India. Ever since that time men have tried to cut a canal across that strip at the Isthmus of Panama, making the Atlantic and the Pacific one.

Four hundred years ago Spain felt that there ought to be such a passageway opened that she might have access to the gold and the rich agricultural products of Peru, and her kings and engineers undertook to set in motion such plans, but they found that the difficulties were so insurmountable that the proposition was abandoned. The United States, feeling the importance of such a trans-Isthmian route in the promotion of its commercial and military interests, turned its attention to the building of such a canal. About seventy years ago a treaty was signed by our government with New Granada, afterward Colombia, as a preliminary step to the great undertaking. In 1850 the Clayton-Bulwer treaty between United States and Great Britain was signed. In 1866 the first canal commission was appointed by the United States government. Ten years later the committee reported in favor of the Nicaraguan Canal. Five years after this Ferdinand de Lesseps, having earned world-fame as the promoter of the Suez Canal, organized a French company to build a sea-level canal at the Isthmus of Panama. After eight years, the expenditure of three hundred million dollars, and the sacrifice of many precious lives the project was given up as a failure. There was bad engineering and business recklessness, if not dishonesty, in the administration, and the dream of four centuries went up in smoke. The Spanish-American War called fresh attention to the necessity of America's building and owning a canal at the Isthmus of Panama. In 1901 the Hay-Pauncefoote treaty between the United States and Great Britain revoked the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and gave our government full sovereignty rights on any canal across the isthmus. In the same year a new Panama committee was created, which made a report favoring the Nicaraguan route, and in 1902 Congress passed a bill authorizing the purchase of the old French rights of the canal for forty million dollars and recommending the construction of the canal at Panama.

Theodore Roosevelt had just gotten settled in the saddle as President of the United States when things began to move with reference to this gigantic enterprise. The Panama Canal, requiring the greatest piece of engineering since the world began, appealed to him—it was his size. The failures of the centuries meant nothing to an intellect like his, and a will that knew no obstacles. He determined it should be built, and he built it. Obstacles as great as those that made the dream of the centuries a failure confronted him, but one after another he met and conquered them, and the canal stands perhaps as his greatest monument, if not the greatest monument to any character in the world. The early canal commissions being led by civilians was so tied up with governmental red tape that they made unsatisfactory progress. President Roosevelt picked out a West Point graduate, a professional engineer, secured authority from Congress to give him a free hand in the Canal Zone, which it had acquired, and Lieut.-Col. George W. Goethals, magnificently equipped for his work in every way, stood as a mighty giant by the side of Roosevelt and was his strong right arm in cutting through the Panama Canal. The canal extends from deep water at Colon on the Atlantic to deep water at Panama on the Pacific, a distance of fifty miles, or forty miles from shore to shore. It has great lakes and locks, and it is a practical business proposition with ships, even the largest of them going both ways from ocean to ocean. In time of war our ownership of it is of unspeakable advantage.

One of the most mighty triumphs of the Panama administration was the sanitary revolution affected in the Canal Zone. The mosquitoes were killed, yellow and other deadly fevers that formerly made success impossible were banished, and one of the worst plague spots on the earth was made as healthy as the average American city. This work was done under the direction of Colonel Gorgas of the medical corps of the United States army.

    These two magnificent giants stand side by side in this titanic undertaking. If Roosevelt had no other monument, the Panama Canal would make him immortal. Major-Gen. George W. Goethals shares that immortality, by the superb manner in which he put into active operation President Roosevelt's plans. The undertaking has glory enough to go all around, and any one who had anything to do with the building of that canal, from the Secretary of War down through the leading engineers, through the gold men, down through the silver men to the humblest laborer, deserves the gratitude of his countrymen. Those thirty-five thousand persons that did the work, and those who may have sacrificed their lives in the undertaking, are as much patriots as any soldier in the army and as much heroes as the soldiers on the battlefield. They will never know how valuable their lives were to their country and what a monumental service they rendered to their fellow-citizens and the people of the world. And the dear women who went with their families to care for the men at their tasks were just as loyal patriots as the men themselves and deserve the lasting gratitude of mankind.

Major-General Goethals not only finished the Panama Canal, but when, his work done and his plans all formed for a return home, the great slides closed the waterway, he went back on the job and stayed there until dredges and shovels had restored the canal. He restored it so completely that, since its second opening on April 15, 1916, it has been ready, every day, to serve the nation and the commerce of the world. In recognition of his pertinacity of purpose and his engineering record the general was awarded the John Fritz Medal, one of the hightest attainable for an engineer.

   I called on General Goethals and asked him for a few facts with reference to the relation of Mr. Roosevelt to the building of the canal, to be used in this volume; he cheerfully consented, and gave me the following:
My relations with Colonel Roosevelt could not be called intimate, and I saw him personally only in connection with canal matters during the time of his Presidency, and subsequently when I visited the States I invariably reported to him the condition of affairs, knowing his extreme interest in the project. My first interview was^1 in February, 1907, following a conversation with Mr. Taft, then Secretary of War, who advised me that in consequence of a letter received from Mr. Stevens, the President had concluded to accept his resignation; that he had recommended me to succeed him, and that the President would probably ask me to call on him in connection with the matter.

That evening I visited him at the White House, by request, and found that he had spent the evening discussing the advisability of awarding the contract for the construction of the canal, though not definitely committed to such action. We spent nearly two hours discussing the various provisions of the specifications, the pros and cons, so far as the contractor and the government interests were concerned, and I was particularly impressed with his intimate knowledge of all details affecting the canal, and the construction difficulties which were liable to be encountered. I was furnished with a copy of the specification, as well as with the summary of bids, asked to go over them and be prepared to discuss them again with him on the second night following.

At the beginning of this interview he advised me that he had concluded to accept Mr., Stevens' resignation and decided to turn the construction work over to the army engineers and to order me to the canal to take charge.

We again spent considerable time in discussing the proposed contract, the financial arrangements made by the lowest bidder for furnishing the bond, and at the conclusion it was definitely decided that all bids would be rejected and, whether the work should be done by contract or otherwise, would be postponed for a period of six months, during which time I would be given an opportunity to study conditions on the isthmus and to report my reasons as soon as I reached a conclusion as to the method that should be adopted for completing the work.

The next personal contact I had with him was in January, 1908. Prior to this I had submitted recommendations relative to carrying on the work, advocating the abandonment of the contract method for reasons which were specifically stated in the report that I made to him. At the January interview the organization charged with the construction of the canal was discussed at great length. The Spooner Act of 1902, which authorized the President to construct the canal under certain conditions, stipulated that it should be done through an agency consisting of seven members. The commission was to pass upon all plans and all matters of detail connected with the project, even to the extent of employments and salaries attached thereto. It was a very bulky organization, had not worked satisfactorily in the past, and was not working satisfactorily.
Subsequently to the passage of the Spooner Act, Mr. Roosevelt, recognizing the inherent difficulties of commission organization for management, had endeavored to secure a modification of the law so as to concentrate the authority and fix the responsibility. But Congress, fearful of vesting so much power in the hands of one man, had failed to enact the necessary legislation. The House of Representatives had consistently supported the President, but the Senate was always the deterring and opposing influence.

On the recommendation of Mr. Taft in 1905, the President, by executive order, had reorganized the commission by the creation of an executive committee of three, who were to be the active members In passing upon the various matters requiring immediate attention, and for which the calling together of the entire commission was not practicable. And this had not worked satisfactorily. Certain jealousies and bickerings had arisen which the President realized and stated were not conducive to efficiency, and after our conference he suggested that I draw up an executive order which would bring about a reorganization and accomplish the results which we were both anxious to secure. I caused such an executive order to be prepared and submitted it to the President, who signed it; as a consequence of which, the work was reorganized and carried forward to completion.
Omitting the taking of Panama, which Colonel Rooseelt claims to have done, and the details of which I am not at all familiar with, the most important step in connection with the canal which he took was accepting the report of the minority of the Board of International Engineers, convened for the purpose of determining the type of canal which should be constructed and advocating the construction of the lock type of canal. In view of the prominence of the engineers signing the report, the study that they gave to the question, it is rather remarkable that after indicating in his letter of instructions to the board his desire to accomplish the construction of a sea-level canal, if such were practicable, that he should, after the report was submitted, have disregarded the recommendation of the majority and advocate the lock type. Not only did he advocate the lock type, but he worked strenuously for it, and, practically due to his personal interest in the matter, succeeded in securing the consent of Congress. I spoke to him many times about this point, but could never get a satisfactory answer as to the reasons which led him to pursue this course. Probably the length of time involved was the more important consideration to his mind, since at all my interviews with him the necessity of securing the completion of the canal at as early a date as possible seemed to be the paramount consideration. The opposition that he developed by his action was strong and powerful, yet he succeeded in putting it over.

The great objection by the opponents of the lock type of canal was the feasibility of constructing a dam at Gatun and the practicability of its holding the water of the lake, because of misinformation which had been disseminated and which had appeared in the minds of the members of the board relative to the underlying strata of the site.

In the fall of 1909, during a flood of the Chagres Elver, and because of a slip in the rockpile forming the south tow of the Gatun dam, and which was sensationally heralded in the press as a failure of the Gatun dam, the whole question of the lock type versus the sea-level canal was revived, and action had to be taken which resulted in the appointment of a Board of Consulting Engineers to advise the President concerning the project. The bigness of the President was clearly demonstrated by a letter that he wrote me concerning the whole subject, and stated that while we both thoroughly believed in the lock type, it is human to err and that we might have made a mistake. He personally felt the matter was of such great Importance that no personal feelings or pride should stand in the way of a proper solution, and was willing to reverse his position if he felt that he had been in the wrong in the selection of the type.

As the accident, if it may so be called, was purely local and did not affect in any wise the feasibility and practicability of the construction of the dam, the Board of Engineers so reported, and he was very much gratified in the result, though he showed throughout that he was a big enough man to change his views if he felt that he was in the wrong. He would not allow politics to interfere in any part of the work. He was besieged on all sides to appoint men of various types to positions on the canal, and his attitude is clearly exemplified by the fact that on one occasion he appointed as superintendent on one part of the work a brother of a political boss from the West. He did not remain long on the work for, feeling that he had been placed there by the President, he felt secure and did very much as he pleased. The next time I saw the President he was very much amused at the appeals which this man made to him to be reinstated, questioning my right to remove him under the circumstances, and remarked that he would have no interference with the efficiency of the work, that he had given this man his chance, and as he had not availed himself of it he would not take any further action in the matter.

He took the attitude in all labor questions that these were matters which depended so largely on local conditions that, while he was willing to listen, he would not take any action that would in any wise disrupt affairs on the isthmus, and that final decision must rest there.

My association with him developed in me that same spirit of admiration and enthusiasm concerning him which is found in all men who have come closely in contact with him. His interest in the work never lagged. He was ever ready to assist in any way that could further its completion, though after he left office there was no inducement that would get him to visit the work, for he felt that his visit might be misinterpreted by others and felt it wiser to remain away rather than be misunderstood.
In a recent address on Mr. Joseph Choate, Colonel Roosevelt made this reference to the great difficulties that confronted him in the building of the Panama Canal and of the manner in which those difficulties were overcome. He said:
In the effort to secure the land and a concession of the rights required for the construction of the canal there was a succession of negotiations, resulting in agreement and then breaking of the agreement by Colombia, with a demand for constantly increasing compensation. I made up my mind that the talking about the canal might go on for fifty years without results, so I decided to secure for our country the canal and let the people talk about the canal and me as they pleased for the next fifty years.