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THE ROUGH RIDERS

                                 BY

                         THEODORE ROOSEVELT

                              APPENDIX C 

                      THE "ROUND ROBIN" LETTER 

[The following is the report of the Associated Press correspondent of
the "round-robin" incident. It is literally true in every detail. I
was present when he was handed both letters; he was present while they
were being written.]

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, August 3rd (delayed in transmission).--Summoned by
Major-General Shafter, a meeting was held here this morning at
head-quarters, and in the presence of every commanding and medical
officer of the Fifth Army Corps, General Shafter read a cable message
from Secretary Alger, ordering him, on the recommendation of
Surgeon-General Sternberg, to move the army into the interior, to San
Luis, where it is healthier.

As a result of the conference General Shafter will insist upon the
immediate withdrawal of the army North.

As an explanation of the situation the following letter from Colonel
Theodore Roosevelt, commanding the First Cavalry, to General Shafter,
was handed by the latter to the correspondent of the Associated Press
for publication:

     MAJOR-GENERAL SHAFTER.

     SIR: In a meeting of the general and medical officers called
     by you at the Palace this morning we were all, as you know,
     unanimous in our views of what should be done with the army.
     To keep us here, in the opinion of every officer commanding
     a division or a brigade, will simply involve the destruction
     of thousands. There is no possible reason for not shipping
     practically the entire command North at once. Yellow-fever
     cases are very few in the cavalry division, where I command
     one of the two brigades, and not one true case of yellow
     fever has occurred in this division, except among the men
     sent to the hospital at Siboney, where they have, I believe,
     contracted it.

     But in this division there have been 1,500 cases of malarial
     fever. Hardly a man has yet died from it, but the whole
     command is so weakened and shattered as to be ripe for dying
     like rotten sheep, when a real yellow-fever epidemic instead
     of a fake epidemic, like the present one, strikes us, as it
     is bound to do if we stay here at the height of the sickness
     season, August and the beginning of September. Quarantine
     against malarial fever is much like quarantining against the
     toothache.

     All of us are certain that as soon as the authorities at
     Washington fully appreciate the condition of the army, we
     shall be sent home. If we are kept here it will in all human
     possibility mean an appalling disaster, for the surgeons here
     estimate that over half the army, if kept here during the
     sickly season, will die.

     This is not only terrible from the stand-point of the
     individual lives lost, but it means ruin from the stand-point
     of military efficiency of the flower of the American army,
     for the great bulk of the regulars are here with you. The
     sick list, large though it is, exceeding four thousand,
     affords but a faint index of the debilitation of the army.
     Not twenty per cent are fit for active work.

     Six weeks on the North Maine coast, for instance, or
     elsewhere where the yellow-fever germ cannot possibly
     propagate, would make us all as fit as fighting-cocks, as
     able as we are eager to take a leading part in the great
     campaign against Havana in the fall, even if we are not
     allowed to try Porto Rico.

     We can be moved North, if moved at once, with absolute
     safety to the country, although, of course, it would have
     been infinitely better if we had been moved North or to
     Porto Rico two weeks ago. If there were any object in
     keeping us here, we would face yellow fever with as much
     indifference as we faced bullets. But there is no object.

     The four immune regiments ordered here are sufficient to
     garrison the city and surrounding towns, and there is
     absolutely nothing for us to do here, and there has not
     been since the city surrendered. It is impossible to move
     into the interior. Every shifting of camp doubles the
     sick-rate in our present weakened condition, and, anyhow,
     the interior is rather worse than the coast, as I have
     found by actual reconnaissance. Our present camps are as
     healthy as any camps at this end of the island can be.

     I write only because I cannot see our men, who have fought
     so bravely and who have endured extreme hardship and danger
     so uncomplainingly, go to destruction without striving so
     far as lies in me to avert a doom as fearful as it is
     unnecessary and undeserved.

          Yours respectfully,

              THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
              Colonel Commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.

After Colonel Roosevelt had taken the initiative, all the American
general officers united in a "round robin" addressed to General
Shafter. It reads:

     We, the undersigned officers commanding the various
     brigades, divisions, etc., of the Army of Occupation in
     Cuba, are of the unanimous opinion that this army should be
     at once taken out of the island of Cuba and sent to some
     point on the Northern sea-coast of the United States; that
     can be done without danger to the people of the United
     States; that yellow fever in the army at present is not
     epidemic; that there are only a few sporadic cases; but that
     the army is disabled by malarial fever to the extent that
     its efficiency is destroyed, and that it is in a condition
     to be practically entirely destroyed by an epidemic of
     yellow fever, which is sure to come in the near future.

     We know from the reports of competent officers and from
     personal observations that the army is unable to move into
     the interior, and that there are no facilities for such a
     move if attempted, and that it could not be attempted until
     too late. Moreover, the best medical authorities of the
     island say that with our present equipment we could not live
     in the interior during the rainy season without losses from
     malarial fever, which is almost as deadly as yellow fever.

     This army must be moved at once, or perish. As the army
     can be safely moved now, the persons responsible for
     preventing such a move will be responsible for the
     unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives.

     Our opinions are the result of careful personal observation,
     and they are also based on the unanimous opinion of our
     medical officers with the army, who understand the situation
     absolutely.

       J. FORD KENT,
       Major-General Volunteers Commanding First Division, Fifth Corps.

       J. C. BATES,
       Major-General Volunteers Commanding Provisional Division.

       ADNAH R. CHAFFEE,
       Major-General Commanding Third Brigade, Second Division.

       SAMUEL S. SUMNER,
       Brigadier-General Volunteers Commanding First Brigade, Cavalry.

       WILL LUDLOW,
       Brigadier-General Volunteers Commanding First Brigade, Second
       Division.

       ADELBERT AMES,
       Brigadier-General Volunteers Commanding Third Brigade, First
       Division.

       LEONARD WOOD,
       Brigadier-General Volunteers Commanding the City of Santiago.

       THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
       Colonel Commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.

Major M. W. Wood, the chief Surgeon of the First Division, said:
"The army must be moved North," adding, with emphasis, "or it will be
unable to move itself."

General Ames has sent the following cable message to Washington:

     CHARLES H. ALLEN,
     Assistant Secretary of the Navy:

     This army is incapable, because of sickness, of marching
     anywhere except to the transports. If it is ever to return
     to the United States it must do so at once.