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THE FOES OF OUR OWN HOUSEHOLD

CHAPTER 2

MUST  WE BE BRAYED IN A  MORTAR BEFORE  OUR FOLLY  DEPART  FROM   US? 

IT is useless to cry over spilt milk. But it is much worse than useless, it is mischievous, and may be ruinous, to pretend that the milk was not spilt, and therefore to invite a repetition of the conditions which caused the spilling. For the last three years our foremost duty, to ourselves and to the world, has been to prepare. This duty we have shamefully neglected, and our neglect is responsible for the dragging on of the war, and for the needless sacrifice of myriads of lives. Yet those highest in authority seem to read this lesson backwards, as medieval sorcerers read the Lord's Prayer.

The Secretaries of War and the Navy, of course, speak for President Wilson. They are his instruments in formulating and carrying out the entire military policy, temporary and permanent, of the Government. In the Official Bulletin of June 7th, the Secretary of War, Mr. Baker, is reported as saying that there is "difficulty . . . disorder and confusion ... in getting things started," and as adding: "But it is a happy confusion. I delight in the fact that when we entered this war we were not, like our adversary, ready for it, anxious for it, prepared for it and inviting it. Accustomed to peace, we were not ready." The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Daniels, is quoted in the public press (of course less authentic authority than the Official Bulletin) as answering a query as to whether the Navy was preparing new weapons, by saying: "That cannot be determined until we know whether we are going to fight an offensive or a defensive war."

The importance of these statements is that they lay down the rule of conduct which we as a people are now officially supposed to accept for our future policy; therefore it is proposed that we continue the policy of unpreparedness which we have followed in such striking fashion in the last three years. We are so to act, on the ground that although our unpreparedness produced "difficulty, disorder and confusion," yet that it was a "happy confusion," and that our failure to prepare ought to give us "delight"; and that before we make ready the engines which alone can make our navy thoroughly effective and formidable in war, we must wait until some months after the war comes and then try to reach a cautious, provisional conclusion as to whether it is to be offensive or defensive!

Apparently, it is proposed to continue our policy of unpreparedness in the future because it has not brought us to destruction in the past The explanation of the latter fact is simple. For the last four years the international situation has been such that we could, and did, commit every species of blunder and yet escape punishment. Our task in foreign affairs was very easy; it was very badly performed; but the conditions were such that no formidable nation in the world dared take its eyes off the other formidable nations; and so, in spite of the really marvelous indecision and feebleness of our governmental policy, we were able to follow a devious, and often a retrograde, course through and among our difficulties with little loss of money—and seemingly loss of honor did not concern us, for we had grown to accept streams of adroit and irrelevant rhetoric as a worthy substitute for honorable action.

In Mexico the various insurgent leaders whom we alternately petted and opposed systematically slaughtered our own men, women and children, and those of the Spaniards, and Chinese, whom they despised as heartily as they did us; but they played no such antics with the nations they feared and respected, such as the Germans, English, French and Japanese; accordingly none of the latter found it necessary to interfere at the moment; and therefore the mass of our people, who were not in Mexico, and who were taught by the Government to look with lethargic, indifference on the slaughter of their fellow citizens in Mexico, were able to eat the bread of humiliation in physical safety. How any people with an honorable past could submit to such shame as our Government inflicted on our people in connection with the Carrizal incident is literally inexplicable.

Then the great war occurred. It at once became a matter of incalculable consequence to each of the contending nations not to irritate us; and our safety for the time being seemed assured. Germany, however, gradually acquired such overweening contempt for our career of greedy and peaceable infamy, she so despised the merely conversational reply of our Government to her outrages, she regarded with such utter derision our tame submission to murder at the same time that we prattled of peace and duty, and our failure to prepare so thoroughly convinced her that our scabbard held nothing save either a pen or a wooden sword, that she literally kicked vis into war—a war which our own lack of self-respect had rendered inevitable and for which we had not prepared in the smallest degree.
On January 3ist last Germany sent us a note which, after a couple of months' hesitation and uncertainty, was accepted by the President and Congress as a declaration of war—for we did not go to war in April, but merely stated that Germany was already at war with us. We sundered diplomatic relations with Germany a couple of days after the arrival of the note. For two months we announced that we were waiting for an "overt act" of murder.

Our Government denned this term with meticulous precision. It decided, for example, that the murder of the two little American-born O'Donnell girls was not, so far as we were concerned, a murder, because their father had not been naturalized—apparently we did not regard the slaughter of the children of a non-naturalized parent as "making democracy unsafe." Some thirty American non-combatants were killed before a case occurred in which the Germans consented to commit murder in such fashion as to violate all, instead of merely some, of the rules our Government had laid down as guides for the justifiable homicide of peaceful Americans going about their lawful business on the high seas.

We sluggishly drifted sternforemost into war. The reasons alleged were acts precisely like the acts which had been committed throughout the previous two years; there was more justification for going to war two years previously when the Lusitania was sunk than at that particular moment. After an interval of meditation we announced through our Government that we had discovered that it was our duty to wage the war because it was a fight for the perpetuation of democracy and for the rights of small nations and of humanity generally—all of which we had been strenuously denying, directly and indirectly, for the preceding two years and a half.

Then our people began to wake up to the actual situation. They had been taught to believe that easy—and slippery—rhetoric was a cheap substitute for action, and they now found it so cheap as to be worthless. They had been taught to trust for safety to boasts about our peaceful power and virtuous intentions, and to clamorous demands that everybody should love us because we were so harmless, and to quavering assertions that the way to avoid war was not to prepare for it. When the test came they found that all these devices in the aggregate amounted to absolutely nothing when once we were face to face with the "merciless old verities." We began, rather dimly, to realize that, as a national asset, a combination of glib sophistry with the feeble sham-amiability which obviously springs from fear, was of small value when we were faced by stern and brutal men. with guns in their hands.

Let our people keep steadily in remembrance that the pacifists, sometimes speaking their own folly, and sometimes acting under the sinister inspiration of the paid German emissaries, insisted that we should keep unprepared because, in the words of Mr. Wilson's Secretary of War, to be prepared for war is to be "anxious for it ... and inviting it." They insisted that unpreparedness meant peace. The Presidential campaign last fall was fought and won on the issue that such persistent unpreparedness "kept us out of war"—all of the political leaders on one side and a considerable number of those on the other side taking this position. Yellow called to yellow.

Well, we all know the outcome. Our unpreparedness did not "keep us out" of the war. Unpreparedness never does keep a nation out of war; it merely makes a nation incompetent to carry it on effectively. And preparedness does not "invite" war; on the contrary it usually averts war, and always renders the prepared nation able to act efficiently if war should, unhappily, come.

Seven months have passed since Germany's practical declaration of war against us—(our immediate breaking of diplomatic relations and the subsequent action of Congress show that our Government really accepted the German note of January 3ist as in effect a declaration of war, although the Administration's inveterate habit of shuffling obscured the truth for the first sixty days). During these months there has been admirable work done by the men, including the big business men, who in a spirit of the highest patriotism have given up their whole time to governmental work, food conservation and control, Red Cross activities, public work of all kinds at Washington and elsewhere. The preparatory work for a really extensive program of aircraft construction has been both speedy and efficient. Congress, with fine patriotism, appropriated vast sums of money for the use of the Administration. Admiral Sims and our anti-submarine craft are doing effective work in support of the similar British craft; General Wood, General Bell, General Crowder, General Squier, Admiral Cleaves, and many other army and navy officers have in their several fields accomplished very much—the utmost possible with the means at hand; that gallant and efficient officer, General Pershing, and his fine divisions of infantry are certain to give us all cause for pride and exultation when they are put on the firing line. Some hundreds of thousands- of other gallant men have volunteered, under very discouraging circumstances, and some millions stand ready to be drafted.

But let us look facts squarely in the face. If Germany were free to use even a tenth of her strength against us all the troops that we have at this moment assembled, at home and abroad, would not hold her a week. During the last seven months the bad effects of our complete failure to prepare during the preceding three years have been appallingly evident. The "difficulty, disorder and confusion," as Secretary Baker puts it, have been such as in sum to have amounted to absolute inability to produce within these seven months any force thai' could match even a single German army corps. If we had been pitted single-handed against any one old-world military power of the first rank, whether European or Asiatic, we should have been conquered as completely as Belgium or Roumania, within these seven months—indeed, within the first three months. We owe our ignoble safety, we owe the fact that we are not at this moment cowering under the heel of an alien conqueror, solely to the protection given us by the British fleet and the French and British armies during these months. Except for the safety thus secured us, Pershing and his men, and Sims and his men, and some tens of thousands like them, would have bravely died in hopeless battle; and our remaining millions of men would never even have had a chance to fight for their wives and children.

No American worth his salt can look these facts in the face without shame and alarm. Rhetoric is a poor substitute for action, and we have trusted only to rhetoric. If we are really to be a great nation, we must not merely talk big; we must act big. And our actions have been very, very small!

Had we prepared in advance we could have put a couple of million troops in the field last April; and the war would have been over now. As it is, we have so far done nothing.

We cannot permanently hold a leading place in the world unless we prepare. But there is far more than world-position at stake. Our mere safety at home is at stake. We cannot prevent ourselves from sooner or later sinking into precisely the position China now occupies in the presence of Japan, unless we prepare. The probabilities are overwhelming that the next time we fight a formidable foe we shall not again find allies whose interest it will be to protect us, and to shield us from the consequences of our feebleness and short-sightedness, as France and England have for seven months—indeed for three years—been doing. This means that ruin will surely in the end befall us unless we ourselves so prepare our strength that against a formidable opponent we shall be able to do for ourselves what the English and French armies and navies are now doing for us.

Let us make no mistake. Unless we beat Germany in Europe, we shall have to fight her deadly ambition on our own coasts and in our own continent. A great American army in Europe now is the best possible insurance against a great European or Asiatic army in our own country a couple of years, or a couple of decades hence.

We are fighting for humanity; but we are also, and primarily, fighting for our own vital interests. Our army in France will fight for France and Belgium; but most of all it will be fighting for America. Until we make the world safe for America (and incidentally until we make democracy safe in America), it is empty rhetoric to talk of making the world safe for democracy; and no one of these objects can be obtained merely by high-sounding words, or by anything else save by the exercise of hard, grim, common sense in advance preparation, and then by unflinching courage in the use of the hardened strength which has thus been prepared.

Nine-tenths of wisdom is being wise in time. In this crisis we have been saved by the valor of others from paying a ruinous price for our folly. Let us now put ourselves in such shapft that next time we shall be able to save ourselves, instead of helplessly asking some one who is stronger and braver to do the job for us. The first step toward the achievement of this end is clearly to understand the present situation. Seven months after Germany virtually declared war on us, five months after we reluctantly admitted that we were at war, we have a few tens of thousands of gallant infantry near the front, forming an almost inappreciable proportion of the large armies engaged; we have some hundreds of thousands of men who have just begun, or expect soon to begin, training. We have refused to standardize our ammunition by the ammunition of our allies. We are beginning to manufacture good artillery, and to get our submarines and anti-submarines in shape—although we have signally failed to meet the submarine menace affirmatively by the development of an anti-submarine force sufficient to quell it; we have shaped an excellent plan for aircraft development; but as yet we have not a single big field gun or a single war aeroplane fit to match against the field artillery and flying machines of either our allies or our enemies. We are short of rifles, of tents, of clothing, of everything. We are actually building rifles of a new type which nevertheless will not take the standardized ammunition of either of our allies. And in the Official Journal of the Administration we are officially told on behalf of the Administration that this is a "happy confusion" and that we should feel "delight" because of our shameful unpreparedness.

Once again, let us remember Germany's record of ruthless efficiency in her former wars—in each of which her stoutest allies were the pacifists, the foolish braggart optimists, and all the anti-preparedness host, in the households of her foes.

Seven months have elapsed since Germany's practical declaration of war against us; and less than seven months were required by Germany in 1870-71 to conquer France. She needed only as many weeks to conquer Austria. Japan's efficiency against Russia was as marked.

I do not describe these conditions in order to reproach those responsible for them. I would gladly pass them by in silence, and devote myself exclusively, as I have been doing for the last seven months, to backing up every belated measure for war-efficiency which by any stretch of my conscience I found myself able to champion. But when Mr. Wilson's Administration jauntily expresses "delight" in conditions which are a source of bitter humiliation to every patriotic and reasonably clear-sighted American, when the Administration thus impliedly advocates making our past record the standard for our future conduct, it becomes a matter of imperative obligation upon an honest man to speak out. The task of our Government during the last four years in foreign affairs has not been difficult. It has been exceptionally easy and yet it has been wretchedly performed. Our task in this war is not difficult. On the contrary it is exceptionally easy, so easy that we must clearly understand that never again will the conditions be so favorable to wage serious war, and escape the consequences of our blunders and our folly; for never again can we expect other nations to protect us with their armies and fleets while our politicians slowly make ready.

I believe that with our wealth, our population, our immense energy, and extraordinary resources, we will within a year or so after our entry into the war develop such usable strength as to make us a ponderable element in aid of our allies. I believe that by that time we shall be able to defend ourselves with reasonable efficiency if by any mischance the war should come to our own continent. But if we ever fight a formidable foe single-handed, we shall not be granted a year in which to prepare, even inadequately.
One of the most ominous of our shortcomings has been our failure to prepare cargo ships in view of the ever-growing danger from the submarine menace. The submarine has developed into a more formidable offensive than defensive weapon. It has not been able to prevent the transport of great invading armies across the seas, for the toll it takes is too small to be serious as against one such expedition. But the toll continues, month after month; with the result that, as the years continue, it exercises tremendous pressure.

Britain, France and Italy now need fuel and food; our armies abroad, as they increase in number, will need food, munitions, reenforce-ments; the submarines are steadily cutting down the available tonnage of the world; and during these seven months we have done nothing whatever to provide against this mortal danger, either by developing an efficient anti-submarine force or a sufficient number of speedy cargo ships. When, on January 3ist last, the German note came, even the blindest of our public servants ought at once to have grasped its significance and begun with the utmost energy to prepare both for warfare against the submarine and also for the output of immense quantities of ships reasonably able to escape from the submarine.

We could have commandeered many ships that were being built. Any number of things could have been done; and nevertheless we are only just getting ready to begin! Ships of the necessary speed could be built only of steel, and only steel ships would be permanently useful; yet the Administration dawdled through month after month, doing nothing save to acquiesce in or abet a squabble started on behalf of wooden ship interests, and of service only to Germany. General Goethals was admirably fitted to build the ships, if he had been backed as he was backed when he built the Isthmian canal; but he was not given the backing, and the conditions were made such that he was finally driven from office. We are only now beginning to exert our business energy along this vitally necessary line; we may yet make our position partially good; but our seven months' delay has been unpardonable, and we cannot offset its evil effects—and how evil these effects will be no one can as yet foretell. Think what Germany did to her foes in the first ninety days, in the first thirty days of this war, and you will have an idea of the appalling disaster that will some day befall us unless we turn seriously to the solution of the problem of self-defense.

There is but one such solution. It is the adoption of the principle of universal military training of our young men in advance, in time of peace, with as a corollary the acceptance of the obligation of universal service in time of war. This is the only democratic system. This is the only efficient system. Acceptance of the principle it involves will automatically result in eliminating during peace time, instead of waiting until war comes to eliminate, the kind of administration of the War and Navy departments which has resulted in inefficient submarines, aircraft that could not be sent across the enemy's trenches, and artillery which could not be pitted in battle against the guns of military nations. When the average citizen has received a year's training with the colors on the field he will recoil from our present fatuous acceptances of shams.

It is at present the duty of every good American to do the best he can with the inadequate or imperfect means provided. Let him, if a man of fighting age, do his utmost to get into the fighting line—Red Cross work, Y. M. C. A. work, driving ambulances, and the like, excellent though it all is, should be left to men not of military age or unfit for military service, and to women; young men of vigorous bodies and sound hearts should be left free to do their proper work in the fighting line. A war is primarily won by soldiers; the work of the non-47 soldiers, however valuable, is merely accessory to the primary work of the fighting men.

Let every man volunteer who can; let him volunteer in the army, the navy, the national guard; let him eagerly serve in the drafted troops if he is drafted. Hundreds of thousands of men have responded to the President's various. calls for volunteers; volunteers for the army, for the navy, for the marine corps, for the national guard, for the officers' training camps; and there would have been none of the shortage that has actually occurred if only the right kind of appeal for volunteers had been made and the proper methods of using and developing them had been adopted.

The draft has been admirably administered by General Crowder and is excellent in so far as it recognizes the principle of obligatory service; it is inadequate and unjust in so far as it is treated only as a temporary device, and in so far as it makes such service "selective," that is, in so far as it requires the haphazard selection of one man to make sacrifices while other men, not entitled to exemption, are relieved of duty at his expense. It is not too late to remedy this. A law should at once be passed making military training universal for our young men, and providing for its immediate application to all the young men between 19 and 21. In the Civil War three-fourths of the Union soldiers entered the army when they were 21 or under.

The officers' training camps have done invaluable service. They were started by a small group of young men in New York, two years and a half ago; these young men persevered in spite of the cold, discouraging, and sometimes hostile attitude of the Administration; and to Major General Leonard Wood the credit mainly belongs, for he took hold of the work and put it through and thereby did more than any other one man for our preparedness in advance—and when this war broke out, he was actually punished for this and for other things he had done in the interest of preparing our military strength. Advantage can be taken of these camps only by men of a "college education or its equivalent," who have sufficient means to enable them to stand the expense. Under existing conditions men of less means cannot become officers—whereas, if we had only been already under a system of universal military training the officers would have been chosen in democratic fashion from the best among all the men, rich or poor, who underwent the training.

We are in the war. The shortcomings, due to failure to prepare, and to ill-advised action, must at the moment be treated only as additional spurs to action. We must render service in spite of them. But if we have a shred of common sense we will see to it that hereafter they are not repeated and that our permanent policy is such that we shall be ready for the next war, and not have to trust to somebody else to save us.

We honor the regulars of the army and navy. We honor the national guardsmen. We honor the men of the training camps, and the drafted men whom they are to command and train. But never forget that all these men are now able to fit themselves to render service only because the British and French fleets give us time, for if we had not such protection we should already have been trampled into dust beneath the feet of our foes.

Shame shall be our portion if we rest content with such safety. Shame shall bow the heads of our sons and daughters if we do not prepare in advance so that at any moment we can guard our hearthstones with our own hardened strength.

There is but one effective way in which thus to prepare. Base universal suffrage on the only safe foundation, universal service. Let the man be trained in time of peace to military duty; and let no man vote in the country who is not willing to fight for the country. To make military service in a democracy a matter of individual choice is as unjustifiable as to make obedience to law or the payment of taxes an individual choice.

Let the woman be trained in all the ways that will fit her for her work in peace or war. Give to man and woman equality of right; base the privilege thus secured on the service each must render; and demand from them, not identity of function, but, as a matter of obligation, the full performance of whatever duty each can best perform.

Let every young man, at nineteen or twenty, serve a year in the field. Let all officers be chosen from the best of those who have thus served and who wish the chance to enter the officers' school; this will put rich man and poor man on the same footing. When once this system has begun fairly to function, we shall be ready at any time to repel the attack of any foreign foe who may make war on us; and at the same time by training them in soul, mind and body, in giving them habits of self-respect, moral and physical cleanliness, respect for the rights of others, self-reliance and obedience, we shall have immeasurably bettered the young men of the nation and have fitted them for the tasks of peace.

Nor should the benefit of such training be confined to young men. In this great war, a war between peoples as well as between armieSj, the woman has worked in the hospital, in the factory, in the fields, thereby releasing the man for work on the battle line. Her training in time of peace would render her more fit for such duties, and also more fit to do the peace work of home nursing, home sanitation and the like. We need in our national life a common, democratic purpose, expressing itself in a sense of heightened social responsibility. Let America adopt for her sons and her daughters the principle of universal training, of universal service; and let her take the lead among nations by making both the training and the service really universal, so that the collective strength of the nation may be used against our foes of peace as well as our foes of war.

So much for our future policy. At this moment our policy should consist in wholeheartedly bending our every effort to win an overwhelming triumph in the war. We are for the time being safe behind the rampart of the British fleet, and of the French and British armies. It is galling thus to owe our safety to others; but let us at least bend all our energies to developing our might so that in our turn we may be able to guarantee safety to ourselves and triumph to our allies. We would not have time to develop our strength were it not for the protection the allies give us. But they do give it. Therefore we have the opportunity to make use of our gigantic resources. We can, within a year, if only we choose, develop our strength so that we shall be the deciding factor in the war, and develop our intelligent purpose so that we shall refuse to accept any peace not based on the complete overthrow of the Prussianized Germany of the Hohenzollerns. If we do this we shall restore our self-respect, we shall incalculably benefit our children, we shall win a commanding position, and we shall be able to render untold service to ourselves and to our allies. If we do not do this, if we fail to develop and exert our strength to the utmost, if we partly adopt the attitude of the onlooker, if we let others do the hard, rough, dangerous fighting work, then we shall have betrayed a sacred trust, from the standpoint of America, of heroic and bleeding France, of gallant and suffering Belgium, and of the world at large. In such case1 we must, when peace comes, stand humbly in the presence of the nations who have really fought. In such case, the world will have been saved, but it will have been saved by England, and not by us. In such case all that we can do will be to thank England for having saved the world—and the peace will be England's peace. Only those who do the job will have a right to the reward in honor and in power. Only if we play a leading part in bringing the war to a close can we expect to make the peace in reality our peace. I honor England for all that she is doing; but I wish us to do as well, for otherwise we shall have no right to be more than a looker-on at England's peace, at the allies' peace—unless, indeed, in the unbelievable event that our Government should make us traitorous to our duty, and secure a base peace which would really be Germany's peace, a peace without victory, a peace welcomed by all the Huns within our gates, by all the pacifists and pro-Germans, by all the shirkers and slackers and soft fools; a peace which would make high-spirited Americans bow their heads with shame. Only if we do our full duty can we make it a joint peace of ourselves and our allies, a peace in which we rightfully have our full say, on an equality with England, France, Russia, Italy. If we aren't going to do the job, then I shall be glad to see it done by England and the rest of the allies. But I am a good American and therefore I wish to see us do the job ourselves. Rhetoric and boasting won't give us our place in the world. This is the hour of the fighting men and of the other men and the women who stand back of the fighting men, and enable them to fight.

To my fellow Americans I preach the sword of the Lord and of Gideon. In this great war for righteousness, we Americans have a tremendous task ahead of us. I believe the American people are entirely willing to make any sacrifice, and to render any service, and I believe that they should be explicitly shown how great the service is they are called upon to render, how great the need is that they should unflinchingly face any sacrifice that is made. I ask of you, and I ask of those who govern you—who govern this great mass of people—that we may be given direct practical lines of effort. With all my heart I believe that our people have in them the same patriotism, the same nobility of soul to which Washington and Lincoln were able to appeal. I ask that the appeal be made, the appeal for effort, and with it the guarantee by actual governmental performance that the effort shall not be wasted.

It is through the Government that we must do the chief work, of course; but let us also ourselves do individually each his or her own part. Let us help the Red Cross; let us cheerfully accept the draft, and gladly volunteer, if we meet the requirements, and if we are allowed to volunteer. Then in addition let each of us make up his mind willingly and cheerfully to accept any personal hardships that may come, in high taxes, in repeated loans and reduced income. Let us fare more simply, and cut out alcohol; let us show our eager and resolute purpose to key up the industrial and social life of the country to the highest scale of efficiency and accomplishment. We must raise food in abundance. We must speed up our industries. We shall need an enormous provision of supplies; we shall need much concentration and control of the means of production.

If we are to hold our proper place as a great nation, there must be prodigious exertions on the part of this republic. We are in this war, and we must not make it a half war. The only proper rule is never to fight at all if you can honorably avoid it, but never under any circumstances to fight in a half-hearted way. Wrhen peace comes it must be the peace of complete victory. In winning this victory we must have played a full part—the part of deeds—the deeds of fighting men. We should instantly strain every nerve to make ready millions of men, and an abundance of all the huge and delicate and formidable and infinitely varied instruments of modern warfare.

We can't achieve our ends by talk—they must be achieved by effort. We can't achieve them unless we act together loyally, and with all our hearts; as Americans and nothing else. We are fighting for humanity, for the right of each well-behaved nation to independence and to whatever form of government it desires; and we are fighting for our own hearthstones and for the honor and the welfare of our children and our children's children. We are fighting against a very efficient and powerful, and an utterly brutal and unscrupulous enemy. Let us give every man in this country his rights without regard to creed or birthplace, or national origin, or color. Let us in return exact from every man the fullest performance of duty, the fullest loyalty to our flag, and the most resolute effort to serve it.

The test of our worth now is the service we render. Sacrifice? Yes, as an incident of service; but let us think only of the service, not of the sacrifice. There never yet was a service worth rendering that did not entail sacrifice; and no man renders the highest service if he thinks overmuch of the sacrifice.

Let us pay with our bodies for our souls' desire!